An Architecture for Forensic Analysis of Windows System Generated Artefacts by Hashim, Noor
  
AN ARCHITECTURE FOR THE  








A submission presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
University of Glamorgan/Prifysgol Morgannwg for the degree of    


































This is to certify that, except where specific reference is made, 
described in this thesis is the result of the candidate’s research.  Neither 
this thesis, nor any part of it, has been presented, or is currently 





Signed   ………………………………………
   Noo
 






   Professor Iain Sutherland (
 
























AN ARCHITECTURE FOR THE  
FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF WINDOWS SYSTEM GENERATED ARTEFACTS 
 
 
Computer forensic tools have been developed to enable forensic investigators to 
analyse software artefacts to help reconstruct possible scenarios for activity on 
a particular computer system. A number of these tools allow the examination 
and analysis of system generated artefacts such as the Windows registry. 
Examination and analysis of these artefacts is focussed on recovering the data 
extracting information relevant to a digital investigation. This information is 
currently underused in most digital investigations. With this in mind, this 
thesis considers system generated artefacts that contain information 
concerning the activities that occur on a Windows system and will often 
contain evidence relevant to a digital investigation. The objective of this 
research is to develop an architecture that simplifies and automates the 
collection of forensic evidence from system generated files where the data 
structures may be either known or in a structured but poorly understood 
(unknown) format. The hypothesis is that it should be feasible to develop an 
architecture that will be to integrate forensic data extracted from a range of 
system generated files and to implement a proof of concept prototype tool, 
capable of visualising the Event logs and Swap files.    
This thesis presents an architecture to enable the forensic investigator 
to analyse and visualise a range of system generated artefacts for which the 
internal arrangement of data is either well structured and understood or those 
for which the internal arrangement of the data is unclear or less publicised 
(known and not known data structures). The architecture reveals methods 
 to access, view and analyse system generated artefacts. The architecture is 
intended to facilitate the extraction and analysis of operating system generated 
artefacts while being extensible, flexible and reusable. The architectural 
concepts are tested using a prototype implementation focussed the Windows 
Event Logs and the Swap Files. Event logs reveal evidence regarding logons, 
authentication, account and privilege use and can address questions relating to 
which user accounts were being used and which machines were accessed. Swap 
file contains fragments of data, remnants or entire documents, e-mail 
messages or results of internet browsing which reveal past user activities. 
Issues relating to understanding and visualising artefacts data structure are 
discussed and possible solutions are explored. The architecture is developed by 
examining the requirements and methods with respect to the needs of 
computer forensic investigations and forensic process models with the 
intention to develop a new multiplatform tool to visualise the content of Event 
logs and Swap files. This tool is aimed at displaying data contained in event 
logs and swap files in a graphical manner. This should enable the detection of 
information which may support the investigation.  
Visualisation techniques can also aid the forensic investigators in 
identifying suspicious events and files, making such techniques more feasible 
for consideration in a wider range of cases and, in turn, improve standard 
procedures. The tool is developed to fill a gap between capabilities of certain 
other open source tools which visualise the Event logs and Swap files data in a 
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An increasing crime rate in connection with the use of the Internet and 
computers has resulted in a growing demand for computer forensics, a field 
that is evolving to provide tools, techniques and systematic approaches to 
process and analyse digital evidence (Casey, 2004). Computer forensic 
investigators today analyse crimes ranging from computer security breaches to 
high impact crimes where damages can result with a large number of 
compromises, thereby causing monetary losses due to Internet threats and 
defamation (MyCERT, 2007). 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the area of forensic tool 
development, to produce a prototype tool and to demonstrate the issues 
relating to tool creation. In comparison to other IT and computer professionals, 
it is common to see computer forensic investigators equipped with various 
tools (EnCase, FTK) in the same way as a network administrator is equipped 
with a range of software tools to diagnose faults and assess the security of a 
network. In order to obtain and process digital evidence, computer forensic 
investigators need to use tools, procedures and methods that are capable of 




providing various functions in a forensically sound manner, and possibly, 
using layers of abstraction to detect features from large volume of data. In fact, 
the toolkits available to forensic investigator has been compared to a Swiss 
army knife by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (America) 
(NIST) (2006) where many tools provide very specific functionality that needs 
to be augmented by other tools during the course of a full investigation 
(Newman, 2007). Tools are usually designed to achieve a function or a 
particular range of functions to support the different phases of a digital 
forensic investigation. These key investigative phases are: system 
preservation, evidence searching, and event reconstruction (Carrier, 2006). 
Casey (2004) refers to these three phases of a digital investigation as: 
acquisition, analysis and presentation.  
In the investigative phases, a tool is used during the acquisition phase, 
where the data is copied from the suspect storage device to either a trusted 
device or file. This tool must also preserve all of the data on the suspect’s 
storage device, to prevent evidence from being altered or overwritten (ACPO, 
2003). In the analysis phase, tools are used to examine the acquired data in 
order to identify pieces of evidence that support or refute a hypothesis 
regarding any incident. In the presentation phase, data from the analysis 
phase is arranged into a useful format; and a conclusion with related evidence 
from the investigation is presented. In all, computer forensic investigators 
need tools to identify, acquire, preserve and analyse data in a forensically 
sound manner. These requirements have inspired the production of various 
types of tools used during computer forensic investigations some of which are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
In investigative cases that involve computer systems, Carrier (2005) 
indicates that storage devices, specifically non-volatile devices such as hard 
disk drives, are important for analysing digital data. Based on studies of hard 
disk files (Gillam and Rogers, 2005; Alink et al., 2006; Garfinkel, 2006; Harms, 
2006; Mee et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007a; and Murphey, 2007), from the 




physical to application level there are three levels of analysing data: volume 
analysis, file system analysis, and application analysis.  
The analysis of the physical storage device usually begins with volume 
analysis. In volume analysis, data at volume level is examined to determine 
the location of file system, hidden data or other data. The contents of each 
volume, is usually a file system. File systems are a collection of data structures 
that are used by applications within the operating system to create, read, and 
write files. In most of the forensic work, file system analysis recovers the 
directory entries (Vlastos and Patel, 2007). Then, in file system analysis, the 
file system is analysed and resulting data fragments; metadata associated 
with files and file content. The structure of each file is dependant on the 
application or operating system that created the file. Application analysis can 
be described as the process of analysing the file contents in order to 
understand what is inside of a file. Analysis of the application level is 
important because this is the level where the various user activities and 
configurations relating to applications are recorded. Operating system files can 
be analysed to determine what programs were running and how a particular 
system may have been used (Carrier, 2005).   
Considering the different possible application and operating system 
files a number of different forensic tools may be appropriate to analyse these 
files. Given the Windows registry as a forensic artefact, a computer forensic 
investigator may use different tools and procedures to analyse registry files. In 
the case of the Registry this is due to the fact that the registry file is a 
compound file that is comprised of multiple layers (Guidance Software, 2005).  
In summary, the principle involved at the most basic physical media 
analysis sequence is: the disk is analysed to produce a stream of bytes. 
Followed by, the stream of bytes is analysed at the volume level to distinguish 
volumes. The volumes are analysed at the file system level to determine the 
files (including deleted material, but residing in the file system). The files are 
then analysed at the application level to determine user actions. Further 




elaboration on existing approaches relating to file analysis is described in 
Chapter 2.  
According to Carrier (2005), one of the basic challenges for any 
computer forensic investigator is the complexity of the data. There are 
numerous file types, each with a different structure and the structure is based 
on the application or operating system that created them. For example, a 
computer forensic investigator may require forensic evidence that illustrates 
the Internet usage in the Windows registry (Mee et al., 2006). This evidence 
may be uncovered using a specific methodology (often built into a tool), the tool 
presents them with the relevant hives that contain information in a tree-like 
structure.  
In addition to physical media, investigators may also obtain evidence 
from other sources such as live memory analysis. Where the capture of live 
memory is not possible, some evidence of memory activity can be recovered 
from the Swap files left on the hard drive. The similarity between application 
analysis and memory analysis is that both requires information about internal 
data structure and fields layout (Schuster, 2006; Okolica and Peterson, 2010). 
In contrast to application analysis where a file is analysed to understand the 
contents, memory analysis examines the processes that were running in the 
memory. Both analysis deal with internal data structure and data 
organisation to work with. A file can be structured as one or more fields, 
containing data. These fields can be categorised into either information (the 
content of a file) or metadata (information on the structure or content of the 
file).    
To interpret and analyse data, digital investigators must know how 
data is arranged in order to interpret the file content. Files are created by 
operating systems to facilitate quick access to applications and for a range of 
other purposes. The data structure of a file is a sequence of bytes, each 
sequence with a specific meaning and purpose. In system memory analysis, a 
process is the combination of some executable code, a virtual address space, 
and one or more threads of execution (data structure). Each process is 




represented as an EProcess block. The EProcess block is a data structure that 
maintains various attributes of a process, as well as pointers to other 
attributes and data structures relating to the process (Ruff, 2007). The data 
structures (file content and EProcess block) need to be read and analysed by a 
computer forensic investigator when conducting an investigation.  
A typical digital investigation of a computer system requires the 
individual analysis of numerous files. Reviewing files and interpreting their 
possible relevance to the case is time-consuming. This task becomes more 
complex as the volume of data increases, in particular when searching for 
specific files or content in large volumes of irrelevant files. The overwhelming 
volume of data found in modern systems which commonly includes Terabytes 
of data (Frauenheim, 2004), necessitates new efficient software-based tools, 
designed to deal with complexity, since data can take many interesting forms 
that require unique types of display and interaction. Fry (2007) suggests that 
the key goal of analysing data is to highlight its function in order of 
importance, and reveal the patterns and these functions that exist across 
multiple dimensions.  
The proprietary nature and wide usage of the Windows system used 
(both desktops and servers) has made it a common source of evidence. Based 
on academic work into the investigative process in relation to the forensic 
analysis of Windows computer systems (Carvey, 2004; Bejtlich, 2005; Dongen, 
2007; Luo, 2007; Murphey, 2007; Schuster, 2007), there are a number of 
possible artefacts for analysis, i.e. memory, application and file system. Morris 
(2003) suggests that system artefacts may be of evidential value when 
examining a Windows computer system. Several of these artefacts are created 
on Windows systems during normal operations without reference to the user 
and without the user’s knowledge. 
Since a number of artefacts register user activities and investigators 
are ignorant of this, there is a need to extract, analyse and present the 
artefacts in an intuitive and informative way. Accordingly, this thesis 




addresses the analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. For the 
purpose of this thesis, a system generated artefact is defined as follows: 
Definition 1  An artefact is a single file which may potentially contain 
evidence that will have been created as a routine function of the various types of 
computer operating systems. For example, an artefact which has been created 
as a repository for deleted files, contains information stored in records so that 
the original information about the file may be restored, such as the file name.  
In today’s world, where the number of crimes committed using 
computers continues to increase, a need exists for advanced forensic software 
tools which allow computer forensic investigators to follow digital tracks left by 
persons committing illegal activities. According to Volonino et al. (2007), “plain 
text documents, log files, or even system files may contain traces of this 
evidence”. Using visualisation techniques in displaying information about 
computer data helps forensic specialists in searching suspicious files (Teerlink 
and Erbacher, 2006; Vlastos and Patel, 2007; Read et al., 2009). The work 
described in this thesis concerns the architecture that supports the extraction, 
analysis and presentation of the system artefacts. The Windows operating 
system has been considered for the work due to its popularity, and to ensure 
evaluation of the work can be performed adequately by being able to gain 
access to a sufficiently large set of test data (see Chapter 7).  
1.2 Research Problem 
Recent technological advancements in computer hardware have had a 
significant impact on the size and cost of hard disks. It is known that hard disk 
capacity is increasing and the price of data storage is decreasing (Hitachi, 
2008). Digital investigators can be overwhelmed by the vast number of files 
contained on a single modern hard drive where capacities at the time of 
writing are around 2 terabytes and are estimated to reach 4 terabytes in size 
by 2011 (Brown et al., 2005). In the case where only a portion of the digital 
evidence on the computer is of interest (e.g. a log file), it is more practical to 




search the computer immediately and just take the information required 
(Craiger et al., 2005). Extracting only essential files is easier, faster, and less 
expensive than copying the entire contents and can also solve the potential 
business process problem of shutting down a large server (Sommer, 1998). 
Nevertheless, in extracting limited sets of files there is a risk that digital 
evidence will be overlooked or damaged during the collection and preservation 
process. Given the risks of collecting only a few files, it is necessary to impose a 
strict approach that will maintain the integrity of the digital evidence 
acquired.  
Acquiring a certain file directly from a live system may be impossible 
when an operating system kernel prevents file access (such as a swap file). 
However, it is still possible to access this file using a specially crafted driver, 
or a special device, for example, Filter_1 by New Technologies, Inc. 
(www.forensic-intl.com) (Schweitzer, 2003).  There are also a number of 
commercial tools that are able to copy the swap file of a running system. For 
example, the software utilities like Norton Commander or Norton DiskEdit. 
However, as with a number of these system artefacts the easiest way to collect 
the swap file is to unplug the system and export the file from a drive. 
System generated artefacts represent valuable sources of evidence and 
are increasingly the focus of investigation and legal discovery as they are 
generated by the system and are not readily visible to the common user, which 
also makes it more plausible that they have not been altered (Volonino et al., 
2007).  Examples of data that can be recovered and examined are Internet 
activity and temporary backup files, passwords and deleted files. Hence, 
ignorance on the part of the digital forensic investigator concerning the 
location, format, existence and content of these system artefacts can result in 
important evidence being lost. Therefore, system generated artefacts as in 
Definition 1 make analysis of system generated artefacts to be easily realised 
and understood by digital forensic investigator is one of the most exciting 
areas to be explored in order to improve the effectiveness of digital 
investigations.  




Analysing a system generated artefact is usually achieved by 
translating a stream of bytes into a usable data structure. An important 
question related to data structure is how to access and manipulate the data 
structures and fields that composed a data structure. On top of the technical 
challenges of locating and interpreting information, digital forensic 
investigators face the challenge of interpretation.  
During the analysis phase, correct interpretation requires not only data 
structure with their fields’ layout, but also data organisation. However, digital 
forensic investigators, either experienced or inexperienced, should ideally be 
free from the issues of dealing with the concepts of data structure and data 
organisation. A data structure and a data organisation are defined below: 
Definition 2 A data structure is an organisation of data including structural 
relationships (Adamson, 1996).  
Definition 3 “A data organisation is a way to represent information in a data 
structure, together with algorithms that access and/or modify the structure” 
(Knuth, 1997).   
Digital forensic investigators have to sift through hundreds of 
thousands of files and analyse each file on a computer system. Normally, a 
typical file needs to be analysed, either by the application that created the file 
or by a suitable specialised viewer. For example, a JPEG file requires an image 
viewer to correctly interpret the JPEG file format. As a result, the examination 
process of one file can significantly differ from the examination process of 
another file. For these reasons, as previously indicated, the forensic 
investigator needs a large toolkit to process and interpret evidence. An 
investigator may also benefit from further additional tools, ones that are 
capable of visualising the evidence extracted from a case, given the large 
volumes of data which need to be sifted through during an investigation. 
According to Ayers (2009) (as cited in Roussev and Richard, 2004), “existing 
tools are failing to keep pace with the increasing complexity and evidential 
volumes of modern computer forensic investigations”.  These problems have 
been addressed in other fields: such as network security, by using visualisation 




methods (Read et al., 2009); for reverse engineering of binary and data files, by 
using visualisation methods and text based methods (Conti et al., 2008); and in 
overcome the limitations of existing digital evidence presentation methods, 
and text or command line utilities, by using of 3D visualisation techniques 
(Vlastos and Patel, 2007). Due to the size and complexity of the data sets 
associated with network traffic, particular patterns indicating evidence of a 
network intrusion may often only be detected when the data is displayed 
visually to a human operator. According to Teerlink and Erbacher (2006), “In 
particular when examining the advanced techniques developed during the last 
few years for hiding, wiping, encrypting and deleting digital data. It has also 
been suggested that visually displaying information related to a digital 
investigation can reduce the time required to identify evidential material”. 
This thesis suggests an approach for extracting, analysing and 
representing digital evidence from system generated artefacts. This includes 
artefacts for which the internal arrangement of data is either well structured 
and understood or those for which the internal arrangement of the data is 
unclear or less publicised; for the purpose of this thesis these are referred to as 
‘known’ and ‘not known’ data structures.  Ideally it should be possible to 
extend the proposed architecture in the future to extract and analyse other 
types of artefact if an extensible architecture was used, and possibly, a design 
that would only require only the relevant parser to interpret the different data 
structure.   
Such system generated artefacts forensic analysis tool could provide 
further evidence as to what may have occurred during an investigation, for 
instance, when checking the Windows system for signs of compromise. Such a 
tool could also provide a passive forensic analysis system solution that could 
visualises the system’s activity for signs of compromise and analyse and 
visualise data from the registry, event logs, recycle bin, Internet explorer 
activity file, swap files and more. 
 
 




1.2.1 Why This Research is Important 
This research is important in that it will support digital forensic investigators 
in answering questions that arise prior to analysing a system generated 
artefact. Such questions include: what is the internal data structure (digital 
evidence) of the artefact – what can be revealed when we decode the artefact?, 
and which method is most appropriate for visualising the extracted data? For 
example, is the artefact content suitable for displaying in text or command line 
utilities?  
In addition, a digital forensic investigator may decide to examine or 
display the data in different ways, an alternative method of presentation may 
be preferable to a specific investigator or when considering different types of 
investigation. For instance, in some investigations, the content of an image file 
may be the significant element of a case, in other investigations it may be the 
metadata associated with the image file. Therefore, a digital forensic 
investigator whose intention is to use the revealed artefact’s contents as 
evidence in developing their report may like to know if the artefact’s contents 
can be highlighted in order of importance, or if there are relationships with 
other files.  
1.3 Research Hypothesis, Aim, Objectives and 
Questions 
1.3.1 Hypothesis 
This thesis proposes that it should be feasible to develop an architecture that 
is able to integrate forensic data from known and not known internal data 
structures of system generated artefacts by the Windows operating system and 
to design and implement a proof of concept prototype tool, with appropriate 
example artefacts.    




1.3.2  Aim 
The key aim of this project is to develop an architecture that simplifies and 
automates the collection and extraction of forensic evidence for known data 
structure and not known internal data structure system generated artefacts by 
the Windows operating system. The project plans to develop a prototype tool 
that is capable of visualising known data structures of appropriate artefacts in 
such a way that the investigator can easily see what data is available within 
these areas of the Windows. This architecture should aid investigators in the 
forensic analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. 
1.3.3  Objectives 
The objectives of the project are summarised below: 
I. Research 
a. A review of system generated artefacts and the use of this type 
of artefact in computer forensic analysis. 
b. Current state-of-the-art tools regarding accessing and 
visualisation of system generated artefacts.  
II. Implementation 
a. To develop an architecture to deal with system generated 
artefacts, and to integrate data from different sources. 
b. To implement a prototype tool, based on the architecture, 
capable of visualising a selected subset of system generated 
artefacts files in such a way that the investigator can easily 
access and extract available data. 
III. Evaluation 
The evaluation process would involve: 
a. Comparison of the proposed system would be made against 
current state-of-the-art tools used. 




b. An evaluation using appropriate test data sourced from blind 
sourced second-hand hard drives. 
The research hypothesis will be verified by developing a prototype 
digital forensic analysis tool that is built upon open-source applications and 
that presents users with an interface that displays the content of a specific file. 
The research is structured around three central questions discussed in 
Sections 1.3.4, 1.3.5 and 1.3.6.  
Performance of the digital forensic analysis software/system/tool is 
evaluated through (1) objective analysis and (2) subjective experiments. The 
objective analysis involves quantifying the accuracy of the data extracted from 
the forensic analysis software/system/tool upon receiving an artefact and 
displaying the content of that artefact to support and improve the artefact 
forensic analysis system. In one experiment, the effectiveness of the 
visualisation function of the proposed digital forensic analysis 
software/system/tool is analysed through experiments. These used a series of 
scenarios constructed from a selection of Event logs and Swap files information 
obtained from Glamorgan University’s Computer Forensic laboratory in which 
forensic images were taken during a disk study (Jones et al., 2009). Another 
experiment considers verifying functionalities and usefulness of the software 
application is done through eliciting expert opinion. The objective is to verify 
the software’s capability of visualising known data structure of Event logs and 
not known data structure of Swap files in such a way that the investigator can 
easily see what data is available within these areas of the Windows operating 
system.  
1.3.4 Information Extraction 
Question 1: How can we extract information from an artefact? 
One of the first challenges that an artefact forensic analysis system has to cope 
with is how the data have been stored in a specific file / file system. This is 




achieved by interpreting the data structure as this describes the relevant data 
and metadata portions of the file and file system. When we want to read data 
from the storage device, we determine where the data starts and then refer to 
its data structure to determine what the information of value is stored. The 
challenge is to interpret this data structure: each field has a size and name, 
although the size and name information is not saved with the data structure, 
and represents the information in a data structure. An additional challenge is 
to find abstraction data structures that are not explicitly available in a file and 
can be used to represent a file. Thus, appropriate parsers are required to 
extract different types of data structure that are explicitly and implicitly 
contained in a file. 
1.3.5 Organising Data                                                                                                              
Question 2: How can we organise and integrate the various data structures 
to improve the correlation of the data obtained? 
Upon identifying data structures (known and not known), how can these data 
structures be integrated? How can data be used for data retrieval, further 
analysis and data representation? An issue that should be considered is the 
flexibility of the proposed mechanism. The mechanism should be flexible 
enough so that additional data structures can easily be incorporated into a 
common data store and this should include the facility to search through the 
data. Keyword searching is used to search for texts or hexadecimal values that 
the user may be have interest. At the same time, mechanisms to ensure that 
no data is altered should also be considered, to ensure forensic integrity is 
maintained. This is usually achieved in forensic tools by the use of a hash 
function which is used to verify the integrity of the original media before and 
after imaging and used to verify the integrity of working copies of the original 
media (Casey, 2000).  




1.3.6 Supporting Forensic Analysis 
Question 3: How can we use the information obtained in the first two 
questions to support and improve forensic analysis? 
Several issues have to be addressed before the information identified in 
Question 1 can be used to improve forensic analysis: How to deal with data 
presentation that represents the different context of understanding data. Also, 
when the user gains useful insight about the file, how can information be 
inferred from fields extracted from a data structure? In order to identify the 
benefits of incorporating visualisation as a function into the tool, we need to 
perform relevant analysis on the techniques that can be used to expose 
particular aspects of the data. 
1.4 Scope of the Research  
This research works on artefacts from the Windows family of operating 
systems. An artefact is a single file or an area containing evidence that has 
been created as a routine function of the various types of computer operating 
systems, and is a computer-created file. It is categorised into two classes of file 
format that is a known and not known file format. A not known file format 
artefact is a “flat” file and will not have any fields. These types of artefact 
usually have operations that may only be performed on objects of this type. 
Users are allowed to examine and manipulate such objects using only these 
operations, not knowing how the objects have been implemented (Schneider 
and Bruell, 1998). 
This research limits its work to the Windows XP and Vista operating 
systems as these two versions of the operating system were the most common 
systems in use at the beginning of this work. They were also the two most 
commonly encountered in the disk study analysis conducted at the University 
of Glamorgan (Jones et al., 2009), thus a significant body of test data will be 




available. In terms of operating system artefacts, for reasons outlined in 
Chapter 3, this research focused on event logs file and swap files. These 
artefacts are selected based on their internal data structure and the 
characteristic of the file. It should however be noted that it is intended that the 
system is intended to be able to readily adapt to new files.  The proposed 
system focuses on examination of a file by extracting, analysing, and 
displaying file information visually. It does not focus on the preservation of 
hard disk image, case management facilities or other processes involved in a 
computer forensic investigation. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The following sections of this thesis describe the research approach used to 
address the research hypothesis outlined in this chapter (Chapter 1). It 
explores possible research design methodologies and then assesses the possible 
evaluation methods that could be applied both to the proposed architectural 
design and the prototype software. In terms of research methodology and 
research design Lakatos (1978) and Kuhn (1996) define research as “an 
activity that contributes to the understanding of a phenomenon”. The 
phenomenon is a set of behaviours of an entity that is of interest to a 
researcher or a particular research community. Understanding a phenomenon 
provides knowledge that enables prediction of the behaviour of some aspect of 
the phenomenon. Research methods or techniques are the set of activities a 
research community considers appropriate for the production of knowledge. 
Research can be a key tool in informed decision-making and can be central to 
determining what should be done, what can be done, how it will be done, and 
how well it has been done (O’Leary, 2005). 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005), “a research design is a general 
strategy for solving a research problem”. According to Kumar (2005) as cited in 
Kerlinger (1986), “A research design is a plan, structure and strategy of 
investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions or 




problems. The plan is the complete scheme or programme of the research. It 
includes an outline of what the investigator will do from writing the hypotheses 
and their operational implications to the final analysis of data.” In planning 
and designing a research study, the researcher addresses the research problem 
through certain methodologies that are particularly appropriate to the nature 
and type of data the investigation of the problem requires (Kumar, 2005). In 
addition, data and methodology interdependency is where the methodology to 
be used for a research problem take into account the data that needs to be 
collected to address the research aims, objectives, and questions (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2005).  
In the application development phase, the design is converted to a 
functional code. Development of a program (implementation) is the process 
where program functions and activities are put in place (BJA, 2010). The 
implementation encompasses coding, unit testing, and test-case definition 
activities. The proposed approach is implemented as a working tool to support 
system design practice. It is implemented as a tool to demonstrate the solution 
for the hypothesis of the research, which is a new architecture able to analyse 
and visualise information extracted from Windows system generated artefacts. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
Several of the results set this research apart from other related studies. The 
research proposes an overall solution and validates a new architecture that 
supports digital evidence examination and is applicable to a wide range of 
internal data structures found in Windows system artefacts. The experiment 
shows that this approach provides improved support for a number of artefact 
forensic analyses. The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
• An architecture for extracting artefacts contained in hard disk images. 
The artefact data is parsed separately and later combined into a single 
representation. Such an approach can be extended to include other data 




from various areas within the Windows system as identified and/or 
required by the user. 
• An architecture that is capable of visualising data contained in an 
artefact in such a way that the investigator can easily see what data is 
available within these areas of Windows operating system. 
• The provision of an open source architecture. Further, this architecture 
will be as extensible and flexible as possible:  for future improvements, 
research and addition of features; and integration of the implemented 
system into a wider forensic tool. 
• Visualisation is the method chosen to understand and communicate 
information. A prototype tool has been implemented for visualising the 
Event logs and Swap files data. Visualisation techniques used is means 
to reveal patterns and show features in order of their importance.   
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis has seven chapters, including this introductory chapter which 
covers the background to this research, followed by the research problem, 
research hypothesis and questions, scope of the research and research 
contributions. 
 
Chapter 2 covers the literature review on the theoretical foundation of 
computer forensics, the processes involved in a digital forensic investigation 
that involves digital evidence, and the spectrum of physical storage media 
analysis. It also investigates the theory and practice of examining artefacts 
extracted from a Windows operating system. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on information contained in system generated artefacts. 
This includes the data structure and data organisation of system generated 
artefacts. It also explains the possible forensic value and importance of these 




system generated artefacts. The state-of-the-art tools available to the digital 
investigator are also examined and discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 is central to this work and describes the design process of the 
proposed architecture. It introduces the proposed architecture which deals 
with the complex structure of Windows system generated artefacts. The 
architecture requirements and objectives are defined based on the priority of 
the requirements identified in Chapters 2 and 3, and from the highlighted 
issues of the current state-of-the-art tools. 
 
Chapter 5 provides details of how artefacts with known and not known data 
structures (previously identified in Chapter 3) are incorporated into the visual 
system generated artefacts forensic analysis system (SAFTool). This chapter 
explains the implementation of the architecture and the development of the 
prototype, and discusses various techniques used to implement the 
architecture. 
 
Chapter 6 details the results and describes the evaluation of the visual 
system generated artefact analysis system, which includes a qualitative review 
of the input from experts in the field of forensics. In addition, lessons learned 
from the evaluation are also presented and discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising the contributions made and 
discussing future research directions. 
1.8 Origins of Some of the Chapters 
Parts of this thesis have been published previously. Portions of Chapter 3 are 
based on the work presented in Hashim and Sutherland (2007). Portions of 






This chapter reviews the background for the development of the architecture 
and prototype forensic analysis tool. The development of an architecture and 
prototype forensics analysis tool involves understanding the current best 
practice and literature available on the theoretical foundation of computer 
forensics and the processes involved in a digital forensic investigation that 
involves digital evidence, and the full spectrum of physical storage media 
analysis. It also investigates the theory and practice of examining artefacts 
extracted from the Windows operating system. The chapter starts by 
presenting concepts from forensic science and computer science that can be 
used to collect, examine and analyse digital evidence stored on a computer. 
Although this chapter focuses on the background of computer forensics 
analysis, it also discusses some issues related to the analysis of digital 
evidence and the representation of digital evidence since they form the basis 
for the research described in subsequent chapters. The specific focus of this 
chapter is to review the key issues associated with the forensic analysis of a 
computer system.  




2.1 Forensics and Forensic Science 
Casey (2004) defines forensics as “a characteristic of evidence that satisfies its 
suitability for admission as fact and its ability to persuade based upon proof”. 
Forensic techniques can be used to recover and analyse latent evidence such as 
fingerprints left on doors, DNA recovered from blood, or, in computer of digital 
forensics, the files on a hard drive. Casey (2004) also indicates that forensic 
science provides tools, techniques and a systematic approach to process and 
analyse digital evidence and use this evidence to reconstruct what occurred 
during the perpetration of a crime, with the ultimate purpose of linking an 
offender, victim and crime scene. The use of forensic science provides a body of 
proven scientific investigative knowledge, techniques and methods for 
formulating and testing hypotheses concerning what may have occurred 
during unauthorised or criminal activity. 
2.2 Computer Forensics and Computing 
A number of core concepts from forensic science can be transferred into 
computer forensics, for example, offering carefully tested methods for 
processing and analysing digital evidence. According to Guillermo et al. (2007), 
“computer forensics combines elements of law and computer science to collect 
and analyse data from computer related systems in a way that is admissible as 
evidence in a court of law”. The use of a computer to create and store 
information leaves behind ‘electronic fingerprints’ that can be fundamental to 
determining the outcome of a criminal case (Anderson, 2005).   
In the literature, several definitions of computer forensics discussing 
how a computer may be related to a digital investigation have been found 
(Caloyannides, 2001; Kruse II and Heiser, 2002; Vacca, 2002; Carrier, 2003; 
Mohay et al., 2003; Britz, 2004; Solomon et al., 2005). According to Mohay et 
al. (2003), “computer forensics relates to the investigation of situations where 
there is computer-based (digital) or electronic evidence of a crime or suspicious 




behaviour, and the crime or behaviour may be of any type, quite possibly not 
otherwise involving computers”. Computer forensics therefore involves the 
preservation, analysis and interpretation of computer data and more 
specifically, it establishes procedures for recovery, preservation, and analysis 
of digital evidence (Britz, 2004). According to Mohay et al. (2003), “it is also 
concerned with the analysis of any information stored by, transmitted by or 
derived from a computer system in order to determine the validity of hypotheses 
which attempt to explain the circumstances or cause of an activity under 
investigation”. According to Solomon et al. (2005), “In terms of the investigative 
process forensic computing is the process of identifying, preserving, analysing, 
and presenting digital evidence in a manner that is acceptable in a legal 
proceeding”. According to Britz (2004), the importance of computer forensics 
processes protecting digital evidence from alterations, damage, and data 
corruption by providing mechanisms for evidence duplication to enable 
creation of forensically sound images that are useful for data analysis.  
According to Vacca (2002), “Computer forensics is about evidence from 
computers that is sufficiently reliable to stand up in court and be convincing”. 
The process begins with the acquisition of digital evidence, when information 
is collected or stored in anticipation of being examined and computer forensics 
ensures the preservation and authentication of computer data which can be 
easily altered, erased or subjected to claims of tampering if it is not properly 
handled. According to Schweitzer (2003), “An important aspect of computer 
forensic analysis is the recovery and analysis of deleted files and other forms of 
compelling information that are normally invisible to the user”. 
Caloyannides (2001) reviews computer forensics as “the collection of 
techniques and tools used to find evidence in a computer”. Kruse and Heiser 
(2002) emphasise the responsibility of computer forensic specialists as being 
“to follow clear, well-defined methodologies and procedures, and flexibility 
encouraged when encountering the unusual”. According to Carrier (2003), “the 




term digital forensics is commonly used and has historically been used to 
describe a much more involved process where the investigator must trace user 
activity and cannot provide a simple yes or no answer”.  
Computer forensics can be regarded as a reactive field because the 
forensic collection and analysis of data is shaped by the development and use 
of new technology and applications.  
2.3 Computer Crime and Digital Investigation 
Volonino et al. (2007) employs the term computer crime to describe both 
information crime and high-tech crime, terms that are used interchangeably 
by most people, the courts, and the legal system. These terms can be used to 
refer to the two categories of offenses that involve computers: Firstly where 
the computer is a target, so the computer or its data is the target of a crime. In 
the second case the computer as an instrument; where a computer is used to 
commit the crime.  
According to Britz (2004), “the first major publically noted computer 
crime occurred in 1986, when an accounting error of less than one dollar was 
investigated by employee at the University of California at Berkeley”. In this 
case although it appeared initially as an insignificant accounting error this 
actually related to a vulnerability that existed within the data system that was 
exploited by a hacker who was able to move about the system with remarkable 
ease and relative impunity. Child pornography, web defacement, fraud 
investigations, corporate investigations and hacking are examples of computer 
crime where computers are involved at some point in the case. However, there 
are three, not mutually exclusive, categories of computer crime: targets, 
means, and incidentals. According to Britz (2004), “In fact, a computer itself a 
piece of evidence, can be processed to identify thousands of pieces of digital 
evidence and each piece of digital evidence can be analysed to identify 
ownership, location and timing”. 




Instead, the term digital investigation is apparently used to describe “a 
process that uses science and technology to analyse digital objects and that 
develops and tests theories, which can be entered into a court of law, to answer 









Figure 2.1: Computer Investigation Model (Microsoft TechNet, 2007) 
There are a number of possible model that outline the process of an 
investigation including (Carrier and Spafford, 2003; Mandia et al., 2003; 
Mohay et al., 2003; DoJ, 2007; Microsoft TechNet, 2007). However all of these 
models have four keys phases in common: Assess, Acquire, Analyse, and 
Report (Figure 2.1): when an investigator is faced with a possible digital crime, 
the investigator should first analyse the scope of investigation and formulate 
the action to be taken. An example outcome of this assessment phase is a 
detailed document containing all of the information that is considered relevant 
about the situation and provides details about how systems might be affected 
and a proposed course of action. 




Once a course of action has been determined from the Assessment, then 
as shown in Figure 2.1 the Acquire Phase is implemented to gather, protect 
and preserve the original evidence. This process of acquisition needs an 
appropriate collection of hardware and software tools to acquire data during 
the investigation. Such a toolkit may contain a laptop computer with suitable 
software tools and also backup media which can be write protected. This 
toolkit should be created in advance from a collection of tried and tested tools 
so that the investigator is familiar with the tools features and more 
importantly the tool limitations before they are used in an actual 
investigation. Digital evidence collection can be performed on either ‘live’ or 
‘dead’ systems. In live systems investigations, where the computer is powered 
on during part of the investigative phase, the main focus is usually evidence 
relating to volatile memory or continuing network activity. The investigation 
may also involve the collection of specific data from very large systems. In 
some cases this may rely on some areas of the host operating system of the 
computer being investigated to support the analysis. However, in ‘dead’ 
systems investigation, where the computer is powered off and the storage 
media (usually the hard drive) is copied and analysed, trusted applications in a 
trusted operating system are used to find evidence. The use of an identical 
copy and trusted software tool is to support the admissibility of the evidence in 
a court of law. When important data are saved during an investigation, a MD5 
or SHA1 hash value of the content of a file is computed and to show that the 
copied data is not altered and to provide future reassurance of the file’s 
authenticity. Evidence is stored and archived in a way that ensures its safety 
and integrity.  There are three options when collecting digital evidence from a 
computer: just copying the information needed by creating a sparse copy of a 
folder or file according to Collins (2008), sparse means not dense, copying 
everything by creating a bit-stream disk-to-file and copying




everything by making a bit-stream disk-to-disk copy (Nelson et al., 2004). 
Once evidence has been collected the data requires analysis to provide 
an interpretation and possible meaning for any network, host or removable 
media data that has been collected as part of the process (Figure 2.1). Different 
approaches can be applied during the analysis in line with recommended best 
practice.  Different forms of analysis include timeframe analysis for the 
timeline activities on victim’s computer that showing email correspondences, 
online chat session (Casey, 2004), data hiding analysis for the deleted files and 
email that have been purposely hidden (Nelson et al., 2004) and file analysis 
for searching credit card numbers that could be stored in a spreadsheet or 
database data (Solomon et al., 2005). Furthermore, the specific type of analysis 
performed depends on the goal of the investigation and to some degree on what 
evidence the investigator expects to find based on the charges brought against 
the suspect. 
In the final section of the model outlined in Figure 2.1 the Report 
Phase, the gathered information and documentation collected throughout the 
investigation is interpreted to formulate conclusions based on the evidence 
found. 
The course of action recommended by most guidelines (Middleton, 2002; 
Shinder and Tittel, 2002; Mandia et al., 2003; Schweitzer, 2003)  suggests that 
irrespective of whether the case will end up in a court of law or form part of 
internal disciplinary proceeding, the goals of a forensic investigations are to: 
conduct structured investigation, preserve and secure electronic data using 
methods that can withstand the court of law, obtain all relevant data, 
minimises the  cost and business disruption to the host organisation, and to 
integrate any computer related digital evidence into appropriate  legal 
proceedings (Cummings and Lowry, 2003).  
 




2.4 Data Sources for Digital Evidence  
Data is the basic form of information that is collected, analysed and 
interpreted to create knowledge in computer forensics. Electronic data is easily 
created, hidden and manipulated, and deleted. These electronic data can be 
found through the forensic examination of the computer storage media, 
typically the hard disk drive. A hard disk can contain a myriad of different 
files systems and file types. Digital forensics, in many cases can provide a 
substantial body of evidence:  state of mind and knowledge of, access to specific 
information and about a computer user’s activities (Howell, 2005).  
There are a number of ways of describing the types of data that are 
collected in a typical forensic investigation (Guillermo et al., 2007). Volatile 
data can be described as data that is stored in memory or that will be lost 
when the computer is turned off. The term persistent or non-volatile data is 
used to mean data stored on a logical hard drive and is preserved when the 
computer is powered off. Persistent data includes active data, temporary data 
and ambient data (or residual data) and archival data. According to Hailey 
(2003) active data is the information that can be accessed through the file 
system. This refers to data files, programs, and files used by the operating 
system. Archival data is data that has been backed up and stored. This could 
consist of backup tapes, CD-ROMs, USB Storage devices or entire hard drives. 
Mohay et al. (2003) states ‘‘ambient data is typically used to describe data that 
is stored in non-traditional computer storage areas, not accessible at the logical 
or application level, created by operating system and applications in the 
background during operation, and typically includes deleted files, file slack, 
volume slack, Windows swap file, unallocated space, stored printer images and 
Internet artefacts”. Lewis (2004) and Newman (2007) also support this 
statement. 




2.4.1 Persistent Data   
Persistent data is important because of the high volume of material available 
and subsequently most forensics evidence is found in persistent data. 
Examples include documents, emails, web activity and deleted files. Persistent 
data for Windows and Unix/Linux can be compiled as in Table 2.1. Persistent 
data includes operating system generated artefacts such as logs, files, lists, 
passwords, caches, history and recently used lists. Some is in plain text, some 
is obscured and some is encrypted. These system generated artefacts are the 
result of the evolving and increasing complexity of the different forms of 
computer operating systems. To simplify the user interface of many  operating 
systems, and to deal with the issue of multiple users,   typically the modern 
operating system has to store increasing amount of information relating to a 
user, their actions, preferences and credentials. Such types of data or 
information can be referred to as operating system generated artefacts. The 
most important thing about operating system generated artefacts is that they 
can be used to as evidence to identify users and their computing activities 














Table 2.1: Persistent Data Types (modified from Nolan et al., 2005) 
 
Data Avenue By Operating System 
Windows Examples Unix/Linux Examples 
System 
Files 
Basic input/output system (BIOS) setup 
Boot Records 
- Master boot record 
Volume boot sector 
Event/System Logs 
- MAC times 
(mtime – time of last modification, 
atime – time of last access, ctime – 
time of last status change)  
 
System Registry 
Basic input/output system 
(BIOS) setup 
Boot Records 
- Master boot record 




- Modification time 
- Access time 
- Change of status 













- Bookmarks (favourites) 
C:\Documents and Settings\[user]\ 
Favourites 
- Cookies 
C:\Documents and Settings\[user]\ 
Cookies 




Each Linux flavour, build, 
or browser might put the 
data in a slightly different 
place. 




Table 2.1: Persistent Data Types (modified from Nolan et al., 2005)(continued) 
 
Data Avenue By Operating System 
Windows Examples Unix/Linux Examples 
Web 
Artefacts 
- Temporary Internet files 
C:\Documents and 
Settings\[user]\Local 







- URL history  
history.dat (a Berkeley DB file) 
- Temporary Internet files 
- Web Cache 








- Random Access Memory (RAM) slack 
- Disk Drive slack 





While there are some 
differences, Windows and 





Files can be assigned an attribute so that 
they will not be displayed with normal file 
system viewing methods. Files may be 
marked as hidden to protect files from 
being corrupted by casual users or to hide 
illicit data or activities. 
 




2.4.2 Volatile Data  
According to Carvey (2004), “Volatile data ceases to exist when power is 
removed from the system (either by unplugging the system or shutting it down), 
and generally includes (but is not limited to) information regarding system 
processes and applications or services running on the system, network 
connections to and from the system, and the contents of the system clipboard”. 
 According to Bejtlich et al. (2005), ‘‘analysing volatile data of a victim 
computer usually contains significant information that helps determine the 
‘who’, ‘how’ and possibly ‘why’ of the incident’’. This is becoming increasingly 
important due to the expanding size of volatile memory contained in many 
computer systems. At the time of writing, desktop systems commonly have 4 
Gigabytes of RAM while high end systems may have 16, 32 or even 64 GB 
(Dell, 2010). Table 2.2 shows the volatile data types and avenues contained in 
the computer system.  
Table 2.2: Volatile Data Types 
(in Carvey, 2004; Bejtlich et al., 2005; and Nolan et al., 2005) 
 Volatile Data Types and Avenues  
System date and time 
Logged on user(s) 
Process information 
Network connections 
Open Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)  
or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports 
Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram                                                                   

















2.4.3 Digital Evidence 
Digital evidence itself needs to be clearly defined. According to Craiger et al. 
(2005), “In 1999, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) 
defined digital evidence as: Information of probative value stored or 
transmitted in binary form”. Digital evidence is electronic in nature and can be 
found as data on computer systems that can refer to documents or events that 
occur within a computer system or network and also on media. In line with 
this definition, examples of digital evidence could be common application files 
(e.g. word processing), graphical files, audio and video recording files, server 
logs, and application executables.  
Additionally, operating systems and computer programs also store 
digital evidence in a variety of places and at a variety of levels. This is seen in 
Carrier (2005) where data in a volume is analysed to determine where file 
system and hidden data might reside. The file system can be analysed to find 
files and recover deleted files. Then a specific file can be analysed to determine 
what programs were running or to determine content, which may be of 
evidential value, for instance, the picture contained in a JPEG image file.  Any 
digital evidence that has been recovered can be categorised during analysis 
into one of three major categories of evidence (Carrier, 2002): 
• Inculpatory evidence: that which supports evidence of guilt 
• Exculpatory evidence: that which supports evidence of innocence 
• Evidence of tampering: that which suggests evidence of tampering   
Digital evidence may be sought in a wide array of computer-related crimes, 
and computer forensic examinations use a variety of methods for discovering 
data that resides in a computer system, or for recovering deleted, encrypted, or 
damaged file information. Computer crime includes, but is not limited to, the 
theft of intellectual property (copyright), child pornography, threatening 
letters and fraud. All of these crimes would leave varying types and degrees of 
digital material which can be investigated and may be used to link a suspect to 
the crime.  




The ability to access and analyse the content of files is important to the 
success of an investigation. As a result of different file types and formats of 
data, and where the data resides, the investigator is faced with the need to be 
equipped with tools, techniques and approach to the acquisition and processing 
of digital evidence.  
2.5 Methodologies, Tools and Techniques 
The unique requirements of computer forensics have stimulated the creation of 
special software designed to either collect relevant data or to analyse that data 
in order to find information related to a specific case (Kruse II and Heiser, 
2002). A number of forensic tools have been created aimed at achieving the 
different requirements of the investigation methodology outlined in the 
previous sections and the requirements of these tools and some examples are 
discussed in this section. 
In many cases, information is gathered during a computer forensics 
investigation that is not typically accessible by the computer user. Therefore, 
investigators use a variety of techniques and both open source and proprietary 
forensic applications to examine a forensic copy of the original media. The 
investigator’s objective is to examine all of the available areas on the drive for 
possible fragments of data; this includes system data, deleted, encrypted, 
hidden or damaged files (Hailey, 2003; Carrier, 2005).  
There are tools and techniques for each stage of the investigation: the 
identification, extraction, preservation and documentation of computer data. 
When considering the various types of electronic storage media capable of 
holding digital information that may be subject to forensic analysis there is a 
need for a wide range of functionality. The required tool capability can be 
implemented as a single tool or as a series of specific tools that are used to 
handle specific data. These tools differ in cost, functionality, and complexity 
and maybe open source or closed source proprietary tools. Typically, 




the majority of tools available can be divided into two categories: those that 
acquire evidence and those that analyse evidence. Normally, an acquisition 
tool will contain some internal verification mechanism, to prove that the copy 
is exact and has not been altered. In addition, a degree of presentation 
functionality is often included in analysis tools. There are examples of software 
tools suites which provide most of the functionality required for an 
investigation: EnCase from Guidance Software, and the Forensic Tool Kit 
(FTK) from AccessData.  
The process of verification to ensure evidence has not been modified is 
an essential part of many forensic tools, where it is vital for verifying data 
integrity, providing continuity and assure provenance. This is usually achieved 
by a hash function, where it is used to verify the integrity of the original media 
after imaging, and used to verify the integrity of working copies against the 
original media. This ensures chain of custody, protecting the integrity of the 
evidence demonstrating that it has not been altered or tampered with while it 
was in custody. Current best practice for the forensic acquisition process is to 
make a forensic copy, to capture all of the user addressable portions of the 
storage device. Problems have arisen due to the possible manipulation of the 
storage device at a firmware level (Sutherland et al., 2010), and also as a 
result of dealing with diverse kinds of evidence. The latter problem is being 
explored with approaches that attempt to standardise the format used to store 
digital evidence (Garfinkel, 2006; Turner, 2005). 
2.5.1  Digital Evidence Formats 
The evidence collection in digital forensics investigations includes the 
methods, techniques and procedures used in retrieving evidence (Newman, 
2007). To facilitate the analysis and interchange of data, some sort of data 
organisation attributes must be considered. One aspect is a standard format to 
digital evidence storage. The Common Digital Evidence Storage Format 




Working Group (2006) states ‘‘without standards that are both open and 
technically sound, the risk is that evidence may be lost, cases may be 
compromised, and innocent people may be improperly convicted-or guilty 
parties let free”.  
The most commonly used forensic formats copy a disk drive: one 
method is for the forensic tool to make an exact copy of the original material by 
creating a bit-stream data copy of the disk. The Linux / Unix based ‘dd’ image 
file which copies chunks of data from one file and writes it to another referring 
to the file systems or file content This is sometimes referred to as a ‘raw’ 
image, a sector by sector copy of the data of a device into a file (The Common 
Digital Evidence Storage Format Working Group, 2006). 
An alternative method is to capture evidence not in the form of a raw 
image but rather as an embedded image format. This is commonly a forensic 
tool producing a proprietary format by making a bit-stream copy that contains 
data from the source device with additional descriptive data such as the date 
and time of capture and associated case details. There may also be one or more 
hash values or cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) to assure data integrity.  Some 
tools also create a raw image and a separate file is used to save the additional 
details.  S01: the SMART evidence file also uses compression (AccessData, 
2009). The EnCase Evidence File Format is a proprietary format that has 
become the de facto standard for forensic files. The E01 EnCase evidence file 
format contains the evidential data, possibly compressed and numerous CRC 
checks that serve to preserve the chain of custody (Guidance Software, 2005). 
The implementation consists of series of compressed pages of a disk images. 
These pages can be individually retrieved or searched and decompressed thus 
allowing random access to the contents of the image file. Besides using other 
files for additional information, EnCase embed additional information in their 
files to provide integrity checks. 
Related work in digital evidence storage methods and metadata 
specifically relating to storage methods for digital evidence includes EnCase, 
(2005); Garfinkel, (2006); and Turner, (2006). Notable is work by Turner on the 
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use of Digital Evidence Bags for the acquisition and processing of digital 
evidence obtained from different digital devices and sources. The method relies 
on the container used to store the captured information. The unification of 
digital evidence from different sources automatically creates three types of file 












Figure 2.2: A Digital Evidence Bag Comprising Three Files (Turner, 2006) 
The additional descriptive data for a bit-stream copy, also referred to as 
metadata for the hard drive copy, is contained in the plain text file of a tag file. 
The index file is a text based tab delimited file and detailing the contents of 
the corresponding bag file, such as folder paths, a list of filenames, and 
timestamp information. The ‘bag’ component of the file contains the actual 
evidence captured in the format of raw binary information, files, structured 
text or categorised files.  
Garfinkel (2006) employed the term Advanced Forensics Format (AFF) 
to describe an approach where imaged disk storage and compressed data were 
used to store any type of forensic data, such as disk images and exported files. 
A series of pages or segments of an imaged hard drive are compressed before 
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being stored with associated metadata. In addition to laying out information, 
the AFF creates a variable-length structure called an ‘AFF segment’ that 
consists of a header, segment name, flag, data payload area and footer as 
shown in Figure 2.3. The AFF considers metadata as a separate file, and also 











Figure 2.3: An Overview of the Advanced Forensics Format (Garfinkel, 2006) 
Similar to the work undertaken by Turner (2006), a study group formed 
by the Telecommunication Standardisation Sector from the Republic of Korea 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2009) proposed a common digital 
evidence exchange file format for communication between digital evidence 
sites and between different types of forensic tools. Examples of digital evidence 
sites are: digital evidence extracted from electronic devices, disk image for 
electronic device, disk image for physical part of electronic device, digital 
evidence extracted from disk image and digital evidence being transmitted via 
network. The definition used for disk image is a single file containing the 
complete contents and structure which represents a data storage device, such 
as a hard disk, CD, or DVD; and electronic device is any probative information 
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may use at trial. In this digital evidence exchange file format, as shown in 
Figure 2.4, a file header, data segment and trailer (containing a hash) are 
included. The File header includes the information about electronic evidence 
for exchange and method for integrity check and sender verification. In the 
data segment, the subject for exchange is included which can be one of the 
sites of digital evidence. The file trailer is comprised of two kinds of hash 
value: Data Hash and File Hash for integrity check and File Signature for 










Figure 2.4: An Overview of the Digital Evidence Exchange File Format 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2009) 
While there are a number of methodologies and techniques that can be 
applied and tools which investigators may use, the tools tend to focus on 
specific problems and have varying different functionality. For example, 
ThumbsPlus for displaying images files (Kruse II and Heiser, 2002); SafeBack 
is primary used for imaging the hard disks (Solomon et al., 2005); and 
Password Recovery Tool Kit (PRTK) for recovering password (Middleton, 
2002). It has been suggested that Richard and Roussev (2006), “digital 
forensics tools need to employ more sophisticated data analysis techniques and 
better collaborative functions to allow digital forensics investigators to perform 




investigations without becoming overwhelmed by low level details, such as 
physical disk organisation or the specific file structure”.  Therefore, there is a 
potential for the development of an architecture designed to be extensible and 
an initial prototype implementation focussed on developing an automated 
approach for the investigators to sift through System Generated Artefacts. The 
proposed approach also visualises the System Generated Artefacts in a way 
that the investigator can easily see what data is available within these areas 
of the Windows Operating system. This work focuses on the analysis of these 
artefacts. 
2.5.2 Tools and Framework 
Computer forensics is concerned as much with following prescribed procedures 
for evidence collection as with the technical aspects of collecting digital 
evidence. There are several guides that discuss the collection and acquisition 
of evidence: 
• Best Practices for Computer Forensics (SWGDE, 2006) 
• Electronic Crime Scene Investigation – A Guide for First Responders 
(USDOJ, 2001) 
• First Responders Guide to Computer Forensics (CERT, 2005) 
• Fundamental Computer Investigation Guide for Windows  (Microsoft 
TechNet, 2007) 
• Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 
2003) 
However, these guides are aimed at the most common scenarios, along 
with these the investigator needs to have skill, techniques and tools. 
Furthermore, with the ever-expanding role of digital evidence in civil, criminal 
and employment case, it is not possible to specify guidelines for each type of 
case. It is necessary for computer forensics organisations and agencies to have 




a comprehensive policies and procedures (Volonino et al., 2007).  
The need to combat computer crime requires the creation of 
investigative and forensic tools. Furthermore, recent advancements in 
computer technologies where capacities at the time of writing area are around 
2 terabytes and are estimated to reach 4 terabytes in size by the end of 2011 
(Hitachi, 2008), and the advanced techniques for hiding, wiping, encrypting 
and deleting digital data leave the investigator with an increase in both the 
number and complexity of cases. They also leave digital forensics in need of 
tools that are significantly improved, both in richness of features and in speed 
of operation. Advanced forensic tools are needed to reduce the tedious effort of 
forensic examiners, especially when searching large hard drives. Richard and 
Roussev (2006) highlight the need of the digital forensics community for new 
tools and strategies for the rapid processing of large forensic data sets, which 
can now originate from numerous sources. Methods for exploring this data 
including using visualisation techniques help to display information about 
computer data can help forensic examiners.  
Gillam and Rogers (2005) developed a tool that has four basic functions: 
the ability to search a hard drive for image files; present an interface for an 
examiner to browse through the images found and select those that are 
relevant; generate a report of the search function that include the full logical 
path of the file; and minimal training for the user to utilise the tool. This tool 
uses recursive directory search, pattern-based search and header-based search 
to search images in a file. Pattern-based search is done by using asterisks as 
wildcards that make simple or complex filters possible. Header-based search is 
used to overcome the problem of file name or file extensions being changed to 
hide the images. This search is done first by using ImageFormat class in .NET 
and next by an algorithm that tests the raw format of a file during a search 
process. This example tool by Gillam and Rogers (2005) highlight the basic 
functions that need to be performed by a tool when searching a hard drive for 




images files, and shows the methods used in creation of investigative and 
forensic tools.  
In the creation of investigative and forensic tools, Vlastos and Patel 
(2007) focus on the problem of how to visualise digital evidence in an intuitive 
view, easy and constructive manner for deleted files, wiped files, encrypted 
and transformed files because of the advanced techniques for hiding, wiping, 
encrypting and deleting digital data. The tool uses a 3D visualisation 
technique for displaying the data in the specific block or square of a hard disk 
drive images. The hard drive’s image is split into blocks, partitions and files 
which have their own view associated with them: the block view, the explorer 
view and the tree view. Splitting the tool into two smaller modules, one for the 
extraction of data and the other for the presentation of the data, has proven to 
be very effective in implementing a visualisation system that offers flexible 
and extensible capabilities. From this, it has also been learned that XML is 
more effective for the interchange of data from any forensic tool and storing 
the data, suggesting this may be a possible technology for implementing a 
prototype tool in this project. 
Besides creating tools for investigative purposes, Bos and Knijff (2005) 
and Petroni et al. (2006) presented frameworks which can be used as guides to 
acquire, decode and report evidence. These frameworks work by not containing 
specific functionality of low-level data extraction. Bos and Knijff (2005) 
extended the framework concept by making it easy to add functionality 
without having to think about user interface and repeating common 
programming tasks. The TUL2G by Bos and Knijff (2005) offers the plug-ins 
method for adding plug-ins to perform investigation-related tasks without any 
strict interface to follow through. The FATKit by Petroni et al. (2006) is a 
framework for system memory’s digital forensic data extraction and analysis. 
The forensic analysis approach of the FATKit is based on system abstractions 
which are sets of analysis modules that can be added where appropriate. 




2.6 An Overview of Computer Forensic Analysis and 
Data Collection  
As data can be in many types and contained within different structures, 
analysis of data can be from many different places as mentioned by Carrier 
(2005) in Figure 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Layers of Analysis Based on the Design of Digital Data 
(in Carrier, 2005) 
 
 Carvey (2007) demonstrated that  knowing the multiple locations where 
information is maintained within  a particular system, allows an investigator 
to link information that is found in other areas and to reduce the uncertainty 
in the analysis. According to Reyes et al. (2007), the analysis phase of the 
digital forensic process is the point at which the data is explored in more detail 
and where the data is drawn together and the analysis is the sum of all data 
applied towards the resolution of the incident. For example, in an intellectual 
property theft case, the data from a collection of systems were pulled together. 
The file server audit logs were reviewed and the user list it provided was used 




to query the proxy server logs. When the log files for the users were reviewed, 
a short list was created by focusing on webmail and forum traffic. The short 
list was used to triage and prioritise the examination of the user workstations, 
which quickly revealed the individual responsible for the criminal activity 
when the webmail messages were pulled from the Internet cache, and 
recreated.  
The collection of digital evidence involves preparing the digital evidence 
to facilitate the analysis stage. The process of collection can be either physical 
or logical. In physical collection, data is recovered and identified across the 
entire physical drive without regard to the file system. In logical collection as 
described by Carrier (2005), data is recovered and identified based on installed 
operating system(s), file system(s), and/or applications(s) (Figure 2.5). Once 
the data is extracted, it is analysed, that is to interpret the extracted data to 
determine its significance to the case.  
The following sections explore the collection and analysis process in 
more detail. 
2.6.1 Logical Collection 
In the literature (Carrier, 2005), several analysis types of physical storage 
media to translate various types of usable structure have been found to form 
the basis for further analysis of physical storage media. We present related 
work on forensic analysis based on data structure and data organisation as 
defined in Definitions 2 and 3 in Chapter 1.  
Sansurooah (2006) suggests logical collection as an approach for 
collection based on the installed operating system(s), file system(s) and/or 
application(s): 
• Extraction of the file system information: these are methods that reveal 
distinctive characteristics such as directory structure; file location, 
names and attributes; and date and time stamps.




• Data reduction: these are methods to identify and eliminate known files 
through the comparison of hash values. 
• Extraction of files pertinent to the examination: these methods are based 
on file location, name and extension, and file attributes. 
• Recovery of deleted files: these are methods to recover files that have 
been deleted, which the content of the file remains until the space 
occupied by the file is re-used by newer files.  
• Extraction of password-protected, encrypted, and compressed data: these 
are methods used to perform an in-depth analysis of a case which is 
possible through finding the backup copy of the file which is not 
password-protected, and finding the cleartext versions of encrypted 
documents, and finding the cache cleartext password, and brute force 
attacks for passwords. 
• Recovering data from the unallocated storage space. This unallocated 
storage space exists from the end of a file to the end of the cluster 
assigned to a file which has not been intentionally manipulated by 
suspects.  
• Data recovery of the unallocated space: these are methods to extract data 
based on when files are erased or deleted. The content of the file is not 
actually erased only referenced to the data within the File Allocation 
Table (FAT) that is actually deleted.  
 




2.6.2 Physical Collection  
It is fair to say that most existing forensic analysis identifies and recovers files 
and data based on installed operating system(s), file system(s) and 
application(s). For example, the ils tool from the Sleuthkit first recovers the 
boot sector, then calculates the start of the data region, and finally iterates 
over chunks of data in the data region when run against a FAT file system 
(Murr, 2007). An alternative is to identify and recover data across the entire 
physical drive without regard to the file system. Sansurooah (2006) suggests 
that approaches undertaken in physical collection use the following methods: 
• Keyword searching: this method searches for text or hexadecimal values 
on the disk. Files including specific words may be of interest and can be 
found through keyword searching. 
• File carving: this method extracts a collection of data from a larger 
binary object where file system structures are not used during digital 
investigations, thus, recovers a file from unstructured digital forensic 
images. This technique carves files from unallocated space using type-
specific information, such as footers, headers, and internal structures. An 
example of this type of tool is the Scalpel (Richard and Roussev, 2005).  
• Examining the partition table: this method locates the partition tables 
and processes them to identify file system structures, including where 
the file system starts and ends. 
• Examining the unused space: this method checks and determines where 
else evidence can be located in each partition. Two categories of checks 
can be performed. The first check looks at the last partition and 
compares its ending location with the end of its parent volume, and if the 
final partition ends before the end of the volume, there are sectors that 
can contain hidden data. The next checks compare the start and end 
sectors of consecutive partitions. If the second partition does not start 




immediately following the first partition, the non-partitioned sectors can 
have been used to hide data and should be analysed. 
Nevertheless, only work undertaken using extraction of files pertinent to the 
physical collection method is elaborated upon in this thesis.   
2.6.3 Analysis of Data 
The analysis of data refers to the interpretation of the recovered data and 
placement of it in a logical and useful format, and the correlation and 
corroboration of possible evidence. Hence, the analysis phase is the phase 
where the acquired data may be described as ‘of evidential value’ (Sansurooah, 
2006). Digital evidence can in addition to identifying the object and its source, 
be used to sequence events, determine locations and paths, and establish the 
time of the action. Analysis of extracted data leads to a more complete picture 
of a crime – what happened, who caused the events, when, where, how, and 
why.   
In Volonino et al. (2007), approaches undertaken in performing the 
analysis of extracted data are categorised as: timeframe analysis; data hiding 
analysis; file analysis; and application analysis. The timeframe analysis 
method is useful in determining when events happened on a computer system, 
which can be used as a part of associating usage of the computer to an 
individual at the time the events occurred. Files are associated with file 
attributes such as creation date and time, modified date and time, accessed 
date and time for information as to when the file was used. A user is 
represented by username and password to log into a system. User and files are 
used to link the suspect and the data by producing the timeline of named files 
created, modified or accessed. 
Data hiding analysis is useful in detecting and recovering hidden data, 
which may indicate knowledge, ownership or intent of the data. Files contain 
information and provide perception of the capability of the system, and the 
knowledge of the user. This is therefore, an analysis that requires further 




steps to be taken when involve file in file analysis. Application analysis is 
useful when a program exists without the data file on the storage device or a 
file has no apparent application associated with it. 
These four methods can also be categorised into one of three categories 
of analysis: relational, functional and temporal (Casey and Turvey, 2004). 
Temporal analysis is conducted to create a chronological list of events by 
sorting events and actions in the order that they have taken place. This is done 
with the help of date-time stamps indicating creation, modification and access 
times to files and folders. Functional analysis is performed to understand how 
a particular application or system works and to comprehend the meaning of 
the data it creates. This information can be used to determine what has 
happened based on the knowledge of how the application responds to a specific 
event. It is often useful to consider what conditions were necessary for certain 
aspects of the crime to be possible. Relational (or link) analysis is done in an 
effort to identify relationships between suspects, victim, and crime scene. 
Relational analysis can provide information about the geographical locations of 
suspects, victims, computers and the interactions that have taken place. 
Determining where an object or person was in relation to other objects or 
people is very useful when investigating crimes involving networked 
computers. Relational evidence also includes locations of files and folders on a 
computer, and location of hidden and missing data.  
These categories of analysis include all the methods mentioned above 
for performing the analysis of extracted data. Timeframe analysis correlates to 
temporal analysis; data hiding analysis and application analysis and file 
analysis correlates to relational analysis; and application analysis, file 
analysis correlates to functional analysis. Correlation between types of 
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Figure 2.6: An Overview of Correlation Between Types of Analysis 
The categories of analysis of data that were described in the previous 
section are further elaborated in the next section. These example works 
highlight the type of analysis used, methods, and terminologies followed for 
each author.  
2.6.3.1 Timeframe or Temporal Analysis  
Casey (2004) discusses the need to create a time line of events to identify 
patterns and gaps, shedding light on a crime, and leading to other sources of 
evidence. Hosmer (2002) states “The time lime of ‘computer events’ may provide 
a critical piece of information relating to the prosecution of involved persons. 
This information can help to pinpoint the location of certain individuals, can 
assist with the determination of alibis, can uncover conversations and 
correspondences, and can possibly help to ultimately determine the guilt or 
innocence of those facing criminal charges”. The research that has been 
conducted on the specific use of applying timeframe analysis to digital 
evidence includes the work by Harms (2006); Murphey (2007); and Kahvedzic 
and Kechadi (2008). 
Harms (2006) considers a timeframe analysis approach when seeking to 
understand how a computer system had been compromised and for solving an 
intrusion case through reviewing System Restore points in Windows XP. The 
approach relied on the time line creation of events on a compromised laptop 
which exposed how the system had been exploited, subsequent key logger 
Relational Analysis 
Functional Analysis 




installation, key logger application execution time, and information on key 
logger application uninstall date. The timeframe of the attack has been 
identified as a method of analysis which has answered the questions about this 
incident. This highlights the value of performing a time frame analysis on 
system generated artefacts. 
A work conducted by Murphey (2007), suggests that the idea of using 
time frame analysis in correlating events in Windows shortcut (.lnk file) with 
events in event logs. The event logs in this study were recovered in unallocated 
space. It was achieved by identifying events during the period of interest and 
showing specific operation of specific services in an event logs. The attributes 
of a .lnk file and to be more specific the timestamps are used to correlate the 
shortcut file and the time series of the event logs. This time series of events 
illustrates the motivation for timeframe analysis, and even can be viewed as a 
requirement of forensic analysis toolkits.  
In the work undertaken by Kahvedzic and Kechadi (2008), a System 
Restore Point in Microsoft Windows that archives the Registry and stored the 
log of changes that happened to the system is used in the analysis of digital 
evidence. Past user activity in the Windows Restore point have been extracted 
by comparing multiple Registry hives found within the Restore points. It is 
done by extracting a Most Recently Used (MRU) key from the Registry, 
comparing it across different Restore Points and extracting the user activity 
that the MRUs held. The MRU is the list that stores evidence of files names, 
applications and other information that has been opened by the user in the 
previous. Each MRU lists particular user activity and updates its content if this 
activity occurs. RPCompare is one tool developed to address the issues raised 
in comparing Restore Points (Kahvedzic and Kechadi, 2010). The RPCompare 
tool was executed on the OpenSaveMRU key to extract user activity and a 
timeline of the different timestamps of this MRU was created. This timeline 
shows where peaks that indicate a higher amount of new MRU 




entries were created and therefore means more user activity during the peaks.  
This category of methods in analysis of data is shown in Figure 2.7.  
2.6.3.2 Data Hiding Analysis 
Data hiding is the technique whereby a file is changed or manipulated in an 
attempt to conceal information from the examiner. Simple examples include: 
changing the extension of a filename; setting a file’s attribute to hidden; or 
using encryption to keep the contents secret (Nelson et al., 2004). There is a 
body of research investigating techniques that can aid in identifying and 
assisting in the processing of digital evidence. One such technique attempts to 
recover data hiding or ways data is hidden is by changing the applicable file 
extension to hide the file. For example, child pornographers may hide 
pornographic images by designating them as text files, .JPG or .TXT by simply 
changing their names (Britz, 2004). Methods employed to hide data are 
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Table 2.3: Data Hiding Methods 
Methods Descriptions 
Password   
Protected Files 
These are methods that depend on a password the suspect uses 
and prove the suspect intended to keep the contents of a file 
from everyone else. 
Compressed Files 
These are methods that depend on file compression used to 
hide information and make it unreadable by anything other 
than the compression utility used to save space. An algorithm 
used to compress a file is used to reverse the compression 
process to get the uncompressed version of the file. The main 
reason for file compression is to save a storage device or space 
in transmission across the networks, but in computer forensics, 
file compression can also be used to hide information (Volonino 
et al., 2007). 
Encrypted Files 
These are methods that depend on encryption used to hide 
data. In this context, encryption is a method used to conceal 
incriminating evidence. Files are changed to the point that they 
are unreadable until the software used to encrypt is used to 
reverse the process. The most commonly recognised use of 
encryption is to maintain the confidentiality of information, but 
if criminals use encryption to conceal their behaviour, an 
investigator may well be confronted with the data encrypted by 
them. 
Steganography 
These are methods that depend on the ability to hide data 
within another file. This is done by substituting or replacing a 
small portion of the existing file with the embedded or hidden 
file or hidden message. This embedded or hidden file or hidden 
message can be hidden in a sound file, a graphic file, or on 
unused spaces on a hard disk. The goal of steganography is to 
avoid drawing attention the transmission of a hidden message. 
For example, someone who saves pornography to their hard 
drives may choose to hide the evidence through this method 
(Solomon et al., 2005).   
 




Criminals can use encryption to prevent access to incriminating data: 
when they need to obfuscate their illegal activity, they encrypt their 
communications and the files they exchange. For example, the possible use of 
Skype that encrypts communication between criminals (Simon and Slay, 
2010).  
In the work undertaken by Casey (2002), three approaches were 
involved in recovering encrypted files. First, the examiner needed to find the 
unencrypted copies of the data that existed before the data was encrypted. To 
find this data, searches were conducted by the examiner in the disk or from 
the RAM. This is a further example why system generated artefacts are so 
important in forensic analysis. Another approach to gaining access to 
encrypted data was to obtain the passphrase that protected the private key. 
This passphrase can be obtained from the computer using memory dumps that 
disclose information relating to encryption or using a systematic method that 
generates a list of keywords found on the disk. If the passphrase cannot be 
obtained from the computer, the investigator may be able to obtain the 
decryption passphrase by searching for slips of paper containing the 
passphrase or interviewing and persuading the suspect to cooperate. There are 
various examples of legislation that can be applied to legally require a suspect 
to surrender encryption keys. An example from the United Kingdom (UK) is 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA, 2000). This 
legislation also sets out the legal framework for another approach to obtain the 
passphrase, that is, to monitor the suspect’s machine using software or 
hardware in an effort to obtain the desired passphrase. The software approach 
works by enabling key logging, remote file access, and screen captures, thereby 
helping the investigator to obtain encrypted files remotely. The hardware 
approach works by recording keystrokes into its




internal memory when the hardware is connected between the keyboard and 
the CPU.  
The third approach in recovering encrypted files was to guess the 
passphrase used to protect a private key. Manual passphrase guessing is only 
suitable for a small number of passphrases used is likely, and is feasible to all 
types of permutations. The automated approach used: a list of common 
passphrases, a dictionary in the language(s) of the suspect; and more 
sophisticated permutation techniques (Casey, 2002).  
2.6.3.3 File Analysis 
File analysis approaches utilize the methods described in Table 2.4. This 
category of analysis of data is shown diagrammatically above in Figure 2.7. 
A possible sequence of activity that took place on the system is the 
result of a detailed file analysis.  It may also possibly result in locating more 
evidence. Research that has been conducted on the specific use of applying 
application and file analysis to digital evidence includes that conducted by 
Gillam and Rogers (2005); Mee et al. (2006); Turnbull et al. (2006); Dongen 











Table 2.4: File Analysis Methods 
Category of Methods Descriptions 
File content These are methods that depend on the content of a file 
where obvious files are examined for evidentiary content.  
Metadata 
These are methods that depend on the metadata 
information. This metadata information is used by the 
authority to support evidence which links the user to the 
action that he/she has taken. 
Application files 
These are methods that depend on the existence of an 
application without the data file on the storage device or a 
file that has no apparent application associated with it. 
When either scenario exists, this indicates that there may 
be offsite storage or another storage device being used that 
contains data files or application software. 




These are methods that depend on standard file format and 
standard folder or directory to store files. For example, the 
Microsoft operating system has a directory structure 
different from that of the directory structure of a 
Macintosh operating system. 
Patterns 
These are methods that depend on human habits or 
patterns particular to the suspect. The way files are named 
or saved as well as time and date indicates patterns. 
User configurations 
These are methods that depend on what the user has 
customised on their computer system that leads to finding 
evidence. For example, questions regarding the 
configuration that should be asked are: ‘Does the user 
password expire?’, ‘Is there a remote login feature 
enabled?’ and ‘What kind of network settings are in place?’. 
 




In the work undertaken by Turnbull et al. (2006), Google Desktop was 
used as the source of file analysis in order to find digital evidence. Google 
Desktop is an application that provides a searching utility on a single 
Windows desktop computer. As Google Desktop is a searching utility program, 
the storage files of the Google Desktop hold local emails and store remote 
emails, HTML Internet pages visited, thumbnail images and certain cached 
file types such as text. Unique features of Google Desktop are that it caches, 
indexes and stores Internet sites visited in much the same way as Windows. 
All the information in the storage files of the Google Desktop can provide 
information to the forensic investigator during file analysis. Although the 
storage files of Google Desktop are not humanly readable format, the data that 
is stored in the storage files of Google Desktop is still accessible.  
Forensic analysis of file content produced by Google Desktop is limited 
to the Google Desktop user interface. The forensic analysis of metadata 
produced by Google Desktop may not provide an accurate representation of the 
files contained in the machine in which it is situated. The cause of this is that 
Google Desktop is meant for indexing and retrieving user created data and not 
indexing all files on a machine. Google Desktop does not search or index all 
files used to operate and maintain the machine, but search space that are 
more liable to contain documents stored by the user. However, Google Desktop 
interface is provided with browse timeline functionality. This timeline 
functionality allows a user to view the times at which files were opened and 
cached by the system. This is useful since it can provide a timeline of events 
internally rather than having to do time frame analysis separately.  
The limitation of most concerns to Turnbull et al. (2006) is that most 
files created and used by Google Desktop are not humanly readable format, 
and this format is not known to the researcher. However, the data of the 
Google Desktop can be viewed by using the Google Desktop program




itself. But, this is not an optimal solution because the data has been filtered 
and contaminated by the Google Desktop program. Similar to the work 
undertaken by Mee et al. (2006), and Turnbull et al. (2006) used the Registry 
as the source of file analysis in order to find evidence for Internet usage. 
According to Mee et al. (2006), “The Registry is one of the main places to view 
various pieces of information relating to the operating system, applications that 
have been installed on the machine, and information about users who have 
access to the machine, their settings and the privileges they have to the 
applications and networks. For example, Microsoft Network (MSN) Messenger 
stores a cache of contacts for users”.  
The value of the Registry as a forensic artefact through the information 
it contains includes Websites viewed, network storage accessed, newsgroup 
accessed, list of users’ contacts for instant messenger programs and the Telnet 
program’s lists of recently accessed systems. Registry files are stored in a 
number of different locations within the Windows system. These files are 
known as hives, and contain binary format data in groups of keys, subkeys and 
values. The same as Google Desktop, the Registry data are examined using the 
Registry viewer for the hierarchical structure of its hives.  
Building on the work undertaken by Dickson (2006), and Dongen (2007) 
provided a further use of file analysis to examine artefacts left by Windows 
Live Messenger 8.0. There are eight types of artefacts which are left behind 
after the use of Windows Live Messenger 8.0 on Microsoft Windows XP: 
artefacts to identify which Windows Live Messenger (WLM) accounts have 
been used on the computer (checking Windows application event file – 
AppEvent.Evt); artefacts to show where the contact files of WLM accounts can 
be found and what useful information they contain (searching Member.stg, 
.WindowsLiveContact and .CONTACT file); conversation content and the 




condition in which it can be found (swap file, hyberfil.sys, Master File Table 
file); IP addresses for file transfers between sender and receiver; chat/message 
log files; traces of shared/transmitted files with a contact; audio and video such 
as voice clips and webcam sessions; and contact and user display pictures. 
Therefore, by analysing all of these traces it is possible to obtain an overall 
picture of a user’s WLM activities.  
2.6.3.4 Relational or Link Analysis 
Expanding on work in several areas of intrusion detection systems, attribution 
techniques and alert correlation, Wang and Daniels (2006) used relational 
analysis to identify members of an attack group and their relationship. 
Attackers, victims, stepping stones and background attackers are the most 
common members of an attack group. Through the attack group members’ 
identification and their relational links, Wang and Daniels (2006) contributed 
to network analysis by proposing a novel graph model and hierarchical 
reasoning framework. This category of methods in analysis of data is shown 
diagrammatically above in Figure 2.7.  
2.7 Conclusion 
Most of the work undertaken in forensic analysis focuses on identifying and 
employing data from a file system to be used as digital evidence.  This is due to 
the common practice of investigators viewing digital data objects that have 
content or substances that can be perceived. It has been demonstrated by 
Gillam and Rogers (2005); Mee et al. (2006); Turnbull et al. (2006); Dongen 
(2007); Murphey (2007); and Vlastos and Patel (2007) that the use of 




data extracted from the file system is beneficial in representing the 
significance of the file as forensic object. Nevertheless, such an approach may 
not be applicable to files that are not well-documented. Therefore, we need to 
include additional files that are not categorised as within the file system, as a 
forensic object. An example of such a file is the swap file, which is a disk-based 
file controlled by the Memory Manager (The NT Insider, 1998). Thus, we need 
to include provisions for analysing, searching and correlating other files 
without expecting the user to know the data structure and attributes of those 
files, i.e. little will be known about a given file. While many approaches have 
only a limited view of the file, nevertheless visual approaches that aid the 
interpretation process can be realised. 
Existing analysis of a file system uses a file viewer or editor to display 
the file contents. This means that a user has to obtain and access an 
appropriate viewer or editor to display and view the file contents.  However, 
since the viewer or editor is the interface by which the user primarily views 
and navigates through the file, there is a need to have a forensic analysis 
system that includes visualisation in assisting investigators to interpret data. 
This research differs from that in previous studies in that we are interested in 
analysing forensic objects by integrating data from different sources and in 
developing an interface capable of visualising file contents, file statistics and 
file information. We see the limitations of the existing viewers or editors to 
display the file contents, as a log viewer such as the Event Viewer only 
interprets the saved log if the type of log file is correctly set and the Registry 
Editor provides support only for keys and values of a live Registry logical 
structure (Anson and Bunting, 2007).  
My intention is to extend the analysis process supported by such file 
viewers or editors by including visualisation to represent information in a file. 




To gain insight a file’s content, analytical visualisation is employed, which 
enables us to scrutinise large numbers of data. Information on data structure, 
and a good understanding of the priority of the requirements to manipulate 
and visualise are inferred from the research of the system generated artefacts 
and the event logs and swap files be the focus, review of the state-of-the-art 
tools in examining these system generated artefacts; and later employed as 
requirements of the development of a flexible and extensible architecture to 
process the various system generated artefacts. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SYSTEM GENERATED ARTEFACTS 
AS FORENSIC OBJECTS 
This thesis is focused on the evidence contained in Windows system generated 
artefacts. As such the following chapter provides a general introduction to 
some of the artefacts generated by the Windows operating system. It discusses 
a number of traces which are left behind after the use of a Windows system 
which motivate further analysis of the artefacts and possible tools that can be 
applied to extract information of evidential value. Chapter 2 presented the 
background of computer forensic analysis, and discussed the theory and 
practice of examining artefacts extracted from the Windows operating system. 
This chapter will describe state-of-the-art tools available to the digital 
investigator. These are also examined and discussed including limitations and 
possible areas for improvement, and the generation of new forensic tools to 
analyse system generated artefacts are covered accordingly in this chapter. 
The intention is to demonstrate the need for an architecture that will 
specifically extract the information highlighted in the following sections of this 
chapter.  
 





In searching a digital crime scene for evidence, evidence can be recovered from 
various locations, most commonly from within a volume or file system. The 
emphasis is often placed on files and their content which involves numerous 
searching methods such as file names or naming patterns, keyword searches of 
file content or searching files based on the metadata such as the last accessed 
or written time listed. According to Carrier (2005), “The result of file system 
analysis can be file content, data fragments and metadata associated with 
files”.     
Volonino et al. (2007) states that ‘‘system generated artefacts are files 
methodically created by the operating system, such as the metadata, duplicate 
pointer files, link files, swap files, event logs, and temporary data/cache files. 
The users do not create these files, therefore contained valuable evidence. The 
fact that the files are not readily visible to the casual user also makes it more 
plausible that these files have not been altered”.  
Richard and Roussev (2006) describe “a forensic process model as 
follows: for each file in a given file system, perform a number of type-specific 
operations such as indexing, keyword searches, thumbnail generation, and 
others. Digital evidence, such as deleted files, file slack, directory structures, 
registries, and other operating system structures (which include system 
generated artefacts) are treated and represented as special file types in the 











3.2 System Generated Artefacts 
There are a number of possible files which can provide sources of digital 
evidence which have been discussed in previous sections, including hidden 
files, file recovery, web artefacts, temporary files and system files. However, 
some of these files are created by the user and so the user may be aware of 
their existence and may make some effort to remove them. These system 
artefacts, which are created by the operating system, are important for digital 
investigators as they capture a user’s activities and are often overlooked by 
users or intruders as they attempt to cover their tracks. These artefacts are 
normally hidden from the normal user and often require specific knowledge or 
specialised tools to find it and access the information. For example, assume a 
suspect is working on a spreadsheet and wants to check her e-mail. She does 
not close the spreadsheet window but instead opens a new window to read the 
e-mail. In order to free up RAM, the operating system places memory being 
used by the inactive window (spreadsheet) in the pagefile and then proceeds to 
address the active window. If the user goes back and forth between the 
spreadsheet and e-mail, valuable information is stored in the pagefile from 
both the spreadsheet and the e-mail program. Since users have so many 
generates for unrealised files (in above example, spreadsheet file and e-mail 
file created in the pagefile), it becomes necessary for the digital investigator to 
focus on these system generated artefacts’ evidentiary values.  
Based on existing work, system generated artefacts can play a 
significant role in aiding a digital investigation and when searching for 
evidence (Casey, 2000; Jones, 2003; Mandia et al., 2003; Anson and Bunting, 
2007; Carvey, 2007; Murphey, 2007) since they contain information concerning 
the activities that occur on a Windows system and may contain significant 
evidence available in a digital investigation due to the fact that specialised 
tools are needed to access them. In order to identif




artefacts, it is necessary to understand the information contained in these files 
and the various files’ internal structures. It should be noted that in some cases 
it may be clear how the files are structured due to metadata included in the 
files, in other cases the data may appear to be unstructured.  
Considering extant work by Casey (2000); Jones (2003); Mandia et al. 
(2003); Anson and Bunting (2007); Carvey (2007); and Murphey (2007), this 
project examines the six most commonly considered artefacts: Event Logs, 
Swap File, Registry, Cookie Files, Recycle Bin and Internet Explorer Activity 
Files. Table 3.1 provides a brief description of some of these artefacts. 
Table 3.1: System Generated Artefacts 
Windows Artefacts Brief Description 
Event Logs 
Event log files record information about which users have been 
accessing specific files, successfully logged onto a system, 
unsuccessfully attempted to log on to a system, track usage of 
specific applications, track alterations to the audit policy, and 
track changes to user permissions (Mandia et al., 2003). 
Swap File 
A swap file is a disk-based file controlled by the Memory 
Manager (The NT Insider, 1998). 
 
Registry 
“A central hierarchal database in the Microsoft operating 
system that maintains configuration settings for applications, 
hardware devices and users” (Carvey, 2007). 
 
Web Cookies 
A text file containing information about web sessions. This is 
placed by the web server on a user’s computer so the web page 




A file containing files marked as deleted on a Windows system. 
A file that has been deleted by mistake may be retrieved 
provided the Recycle Bin has not been emptied (Casey, 2000). 
Internet Explorer 
Activity File 
A Web browser (Firefox, Internet Explorer etc.) caches the 
content of visited web pages and cookies within system files 
named index.dat (Jones, 2003). 
  
Prefetch 
A Prefetch cache to speed up boot and application launch time. 
Prefetch caches take information from the boot process and 
from Scheduled Tasks (Hay, 2005).  




The artefacts of Microsoft Windows listed in Table 3.1 contain 
significant amounts of digital evidence that enable investigators to reconstruct 
activities that took place on a machine before it was seized. This chapter 
focuses on the Event logs and the Swap file, although it examines the 
usefulness of registry, web cookies, recycle bin and Internet explorer activity 
file in the forensic analysis of a system. The next sections consecutively discuss 
the features, evidentiary values, tools and issues related to event logs, swap 
files, registry, web cookies, recycle bin and Internet explorer activity file as 
sources for evidence collection. 
3.2.1 Event Logs As System Generated Artefacts 
The Windows operating system creates event logs in the process of recording 
day-to-day events that occur on a Windows system. This is performed by the 
Windows service named eventlog. The service starts when Windows loads on 
all platforms by default (Allen, 2005). 
3.2.1.1 Event Logs Features 
The Windows event logs files are, essentially, databases with the events 
related to the system, security, and applications.  These events are audited 
and written to one of three configurable event log files: AppEvent.Evt, 
SysEvent.Evt and SecEvent.Evt. These three files are stored in the 
SystemRoot folder of the system. Table 3.2 below illustrates the different 
default locations in which the various versions of Windows store the .Evt file. 
 
 




Table 3.2: Event Logs Organisation  
Windows Artefacts Brief Description, Windows Version and Location 
Application Event 
Log 
Contains a log of application usage and logged messages from 
the operating system and programs. 
AppEvent.Evt 
Windows NT 4.0 %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows 2000 %SYSTEMROOT%\WINNT\config\ 
Windows XP %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows Vista %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\winevt\Logs\ 
Security Event Log Records activities that have security implications such as logins. 
SecEvent.Evt 
Windows NT 4.0 %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows 2000 %SYSTEMROOT%\WINNT\config\ 
Windows XP %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows Vista %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\winevt\Logs\ 
System Event Log Notes system events such as shutdowns. 
SysEvent.Evt 
Windows NT 4.0 %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows 2000 %SYSTEMROOT%\WINNT\config\ 
Windows XP %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ 
Windows Vista %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\winevt\Logs\ 
The event logs consist of a binary structure, with a header and a series 
of event records stored in the file. The event log is maintained as a circular 
buffer since older event records are cycled out of the file whenever a new event 
record is added to the file. At the same time, there is correlation between the 
event logs, registry and many message files (DLL) on a system (Carvey, 2007).  
The location of event logs is dependent on the version of Windows 
running on the computer. According to Anson and Bunting (2007), in order to 
examine the contents of an event log, the event log header and event records 
contain structure, values and information as shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 that 
can assist an investigator in recognising and interpreting event log files. The 
event log records contain information about an event such as the date, time, 
user, computer, event ID, source, type and category (Microsoft, 2007). 
 
 












1 0 4 Size of the record; for an .evt file header, the size is 
0x30 (48) bytes. Event record sizes are 56 bytes. 
2 4 4 Magic Number (“LfLe”) 
0x654C664C, or 4C664C65 (LfLe) when the 
endianness is reversed. 
3 16 4 Offset within the .evt file of the oldest event record 
4 20 4 Offset within the .evt file of the next event record to 
be written 
5 24 4 ID of the next event record 
6 28 4 ID of the oldest event record 
7 32 4 Maximum size of the .evt file (from the Registry) 
8 40 4 Retention time of event records (from the Registry) 
9 44 4 Size of the record (repeat of DWORD at offset 0) 
Table 3.4: Event Log Records Data Structure  
Field Name 





RecordSize 0 4 Beginning of Record Size Marker (4 bytes – 32 
bit little endian integer) 
MagicNumber 4 4 Fixed Value Delineator or Object Marker (4 
bytes – 0x4C664C65, which is ASCII “LfLe”) 
RecordNumber 8 4 Record Number (4 bytes – 32 bit little endian 
integer) 
TimeGenerated 12 4 Created time stamp (Unix 32 bit little endian 
time stamp) 
TimeWritten 16 4 Written time stamp (Unix 32 bit little endian 
time stamp) 
EventID 20 2 Event ID (2 bytes – 16 bit little endian integer) 
EventType 24 2 Event Type (2 bytes – 16 bit little endian 
integer value used as an index to return 
“Event Name”) 
(0x01 = Error; 0x10 = Failure; 0x08 = Success; 
0x04 = Information; 0x02 = Warning) 




Table 3.4: Event Log Records Data Structure (continued) 





EventTypeName 26 2 String Count (2 bytes – 16 bit little endian 
integer – describes number of strings in the 
event record)  
EventCategory 28 2 Category (2 bytes – 16 bit little endian integer) 
EventCategoryName 30 2 Generated by looking up the associated Event 
Category number 
LastRecordNumber 32 4 Closing record number 
OffsetDescription 36 4 String offset; offset to the description strings 
within this event record 
LengthSID 40 4 Length of the user SID; size of the user SID in 
bytes (if 0, no user SID is provided) 
OffsetSID 44 4 Offset to the user SID within this event record 
DataLength 48 4 Data length; length of the binary data 
associated with this event record 
OffsetData 52 4 Offset to the data 
SourceName 56 - Source Name (Variable length Unicode text 
with padding and null terminator 0x0000) 
ComputerName  - Computer Name (Variable length Unicode text 




Field 15 Field 14 SID of Security Principal or Group (may or may 
not be present). If 1-5, which is S-1-5 (NT 
Authority – unique identifier), then full SID 
follows 
-  If SID follows 14, then this is security authority 
of SID that follows (0-5) 
-  If SID follows 14, then this is remainder of SID, 
appearing in 5 sets of 32 bit integers 
Message - 4 Strings – Depending on the number of defined 
strings (Field 9), strings will be in Unicode and 
separated by an ending with null terminators 
0x0000. 
Data Field 17 Field 16 Data – an optional field used when message is 
unique (typically containing an offset or value 
for an error, etc). Data is regular text (non-
Unicode) with each string separated by 0x20 
(space) and ending with 0x0D0A (carriage 
return) and null terminator 
EndRecord 241 4 End of record size marker (4 bytes – 32 bit 
endian integer) 




Windows registers and records events in the Application log, System log 
and Security log and each of these logs stores different information based on 
the type of events. Types of event in the Application and System logs are 
different from the types of event in the Security log. Information, warning and 
error are the types of event entries that are recorded in the Application and 
System logs while success and failure are event entries that are recorded in the 
Security log. These types of event are used in an attempt to troubleshoot 
system anomalies and used with other column fields to find indicators of 
attack.  
As indicated in the above section, there are three categories of event 
logs within Windows. The Application log contains actions that particular 
software applications identify as events. For example, the antivirus 
applications use this log to record when the program gets updated and the 
Microsoft Security Centre will write a record to this log. The Security log 
contains detail regarding logon events. Such events logged include successful 
logon attempts as well as unsuccessful logon attempts. The System log 
contains events logged by the Windows system component. The System log is 
used by the operating system to track events such as driver failures or when a 
system component does not start up correctly. For example, when a Windows 
service fails to start, details will be found in the system logs (Microsoft, 2005a). 
One useful piece of information that can be gained from Event logs is a 
record of which accounts have been used to access the systems and how these 
accesses have been made. Such accesses are called logon events (Anson and 
Bunting, 2007). Logon events are generated and recorded in the Security log 
and these events grant an account access to a computer’s resources. In 
Windows, each of the different versions of the operating system uses a logon 
type to indicate different kinds of logon events. A logon type can be classified 
into one of the nine types. Windows logon types are values to indicate the way 
in which the account logged on to the system. The values for logon types are 
shown in Table 3.5 below. 




Table 3.5: Values for Logon Types (Anson and Bunting, 2007) 
 Logon  
 Type 
Logon Title  Description 
2  Interactive A user logged on to this computer at the console. 
3  Network A user or computer logged on to this computer from the 
network. 
4  Batch Batch logon type is used by batch servers, where 
processes might run on behalf of a user without the user’s 
direct intervention. 
5  Service A service was started by the Service Control Manager. 
7  Unlock This workstation was unlocked.  
8  NetworkCleartext A user logged onto a network and the user password was 
passed to the authentication package in its plain text 
form. 
9  NewCredentials  A process, thread or program cloned its current token 
and specified new credentials for outbound connections. 
The new logon session has the same local identity, but it 
uses different credentials for other network connections. 
10  RemoteInteractive  A user logged on to this computer remotely using 
Terminal Services or a Remote Desktop connection. 
11  CachedInteractive 
 
A user logged on to this computer with network 
credentials that were stored locally on the computer. The 
domain controller was not contacted to verify the 
credentials. 
3.2.1.2 Evidentiary Value of Event Logs  
Event logs record and reveal information about activities that occur on a 
Windows system. These logs can be used to diagnose and troubleshoot 
problems on a Windows system as the logs record information about hardware 
and software problems. According to Mandia et al. (2003), by reviewing the 
System log, Application log and Security log, the following information of 
possible evidentiary value can be obtained: 
• Which users have been accessing specific files? 
• Who has been successfully logging on to a system? 
• Who has been trying unsuccessfully to log on to a system? 




• Usage of specific applications. 
• Alterations to the audit policy. 
• Changes to user permissions. 
Logs may contain event entries with specific information about the 
recorded event represented by fields that are typically of investigative interest 
and many activities that happen within a Windows system can be 
reconstructed by analysing these events. For example, Date, Time, IP 
addresses and/or Computer Names of involved system fields can be used to 
determine which computer was used to perform a specific action, what time 
someone logged into a computer, and from where (Casey, 2000).  
An event identifier is assigned to each event whenever an event is 
audited on the Windows system. The Event ID column contains a number 
which corresponds to the type of event that has occurred; most commonly 
associated with logon and authentication activity. An Event ID associated with 
remote desktop events is useful in identifying the name and IP address of the 
originating computer for the remote connection. This is used in determining 
successful remote desktop connection and reconnection, so in some cases Event 
logs can play an important role in addressing intrusion cases. In cases 
involving remote desktop connections, Event logs may be the best source of 
evidence regarding the attacker.  
3.2.1.3 Event Logs Tools and Related Issues 
Since the logs are stored in proprietary binary format and not in a text-
readable format, a special tool is needed to interpret the data and to display 
the content in a Human Readable form. The contents of the event logs can be 
viewed using the event viewer tool supplied with the Windows operating 
system. The Event Viewer tool provided by Microsoft depicts the three 
classifications of event logs within Windows in two different panes. One pane 
shows the list of the available log files and the other provides a list of each of 
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the different event entries, one line per entry. Figure 3.1 shows the two panes 
of Event Viewer and shows a list of event entries in the 
Application/Security/System log. Figure 3.2 shows an example of the opened 
Event Properties dialog whenever a selected entry is double-clicked. There are 
other tools that include functionality to view event entry by relying on the 




















Figure 3.2: An Example of the Opened Event Properties Dialog                        
in Event Viewer 




Another free tool provided by Microsoft to process and view event logs is 
the Microsoft Log Parser (Microsoft, 2005). It can be downloaded from the 
Microsoft Download Centre1 and is able to process a number of different types 
of log format. The Log Parser tool processes Event logs in three parts using 
different components: input, query and output. Its query component uses SQL 
queries to parse, filter and analyse logs. The Log Parser uses SQL for the 
searching function and so it can be difficult for users who are not already 
familiar with SQL. The input component is the specified input type of interest, 
while the output component is the defined output type that is wanted to be 
displayed.  
There are commercial tools that perform some basic log analysis 
functions. For instance, the LANguard Security Event Log Monitor 
(LANSELM), from GFI (2007) is an event logs monitor that retrieves event 
logs from networked NT/2000 servers and workstations and alerts the 
administrator of possible intrusions. 
Read (2009) mentions several tools that work with many different log 
formats for detailed log analysis, such as the Spotfire (TIBCO, 2011) and 
Sawmill (VisiData, 2011). Such a commercial tool is based on an Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) and there is a need to undertake more in-depth 
analysis of event logs, such as fusing or correlating event logs from multiple 
computers. The ability to identify a set of interesting log events across 
different systems can be a useful function; and data mining tools can be used 
to extract a pattern of repeated yet unusual events from the event logs.  
One possible issue in examining data from multiple systems in 
correlation of the data is the question of the reliability of the timestamp. 
Jeffrey and Clark (2000) noted that event logs store the date that the entry 
was made and time that each entry was written in the log. Windows saves 
                                                           
1 Log Parser available at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=
890cd06b-abf8-4c25-91b2-f8d975cf8c07. 




time stamps in FILETIME format. FILETIME format is the number of ticks, 
in 100ns increments, since 00:00 1 Jan, 1601 (Microsoft, 2007). This 
FILETIME format needs to be translated to Unix time format since the Event 
logs measure the time in Unix format (Carvey, 2007). Unix time format is the 
number of seconds since 00:00 1 Jan 1970. The timestamp is stored in GMT 
and no information about the time zone setting for the computer is recorded. 
The timestamp therefore has to be adjusted in order to analyse it when 
considering logs that originated from computer systems in different time zone. 
This compounds the problem of possible variation between the clocks of 
various systems and the need for system administrators to resolve these issues 
to compare and analyse events (Carvey, 2007). 
In addition to the timestamp issue, there is also the possibility of data 
loss. According to Anson and Bunting (2007), data loss happens when an event 
ID has been updated on a newer version of the operating system, and an older 
version of the operating system is used to interpret it. This happens when 
analysis is done using an older version of the operating system and the event 
logs has been created with the newer version of the operating system. It also 
happens to the username where a username is represented by the SID when a 
log from a different computer is analysed instead of the log from the local 
machine. This occurs because the SID of the log for the different machine is 
interpreted as a username by querying the list of usernames stored on the 
local machine. 
The evolution of the Windows operating system can also complicate the 
issue (Anson and Bunting, 2007).  The operating system controls the way in 
which the logs are generated, so the evidence found is the consequence of the 
version of the operating system used by that victim (Anson and Bunting, 




















Figure 3.3: Windows Operating System History (Microsoft TechNet, 2007) 
3.2.2 Swap Files As System Generated Artefacts 
According to Lee et al. (2007a), “System memory analysis aims at gathering 
information from the contents of a computer’s memory with the purpose of 
finding which processes were running, when they were started and by whom, 
what specific activities those processes were doing and the state of active 
network connections”. Kornblum (2007) reports that virtual memory 
implemented by the operating system allows a larger range of memory or 
storage addresses for stored data than physical memory. The computing 
system maps the virtual addresses to real hardware storage addresses and 
also manages storage swapping between physical memory (RAM) and hard 
disk (swap file).  
A swap file can be defined as part of virtual memory and is a disk area 
where memory pages belonging to various processes can be swapped in or 




swapped out, depending on how this is handled this can provide a useful 
source of activity including material which the user did not intend saving to 
disk. The intermediate characteristic of a swap file, i.e. containing certain 
processes from memory but located in a hard disk can be used by a digital 
forensic investigator to solve the investigation, by using such information in 
order to acquire critical information such as passwords and credit card 
numbers that being ‘swap out’ from main memory to swap file. 
A portion of the hard disk is used as additional memory and data is 
swapped from the physical memory to this space on the disk as memory as 
needed in the physical memory. This data is held in a file called the Swap file. 
This file is created automatically by the operating system. Swap files are 
created by the operating system in a default location.  
3.2.2.1 Swap Files Features  
Caloyannides (2001) described the swap file as the portion of the hard drive 
used by Windows system to temporarily store data that would normally be 
stored in the volatile RAM, but the RAM is currently in use by other processes. 
This file contains all sorts of data, including e-mails, web pages, word 
processing documents and any other work that has been performed on the 
computer during the work session (Shinder, 2002). Consequently, the swap file 
will include residual information; examples include previously opened files and 
print spooling (Mohay et al., 2003). In other words, a swap file is simply 
dedicated space on a hard drive whose contents are temporary and overwritten 
as needed. A swap file is generated at each boot session and remains unless it 
is configured to be cleaned each time the system is powered down. However, 
the shutdown period increases when the swap file is configured to be cleared 
out by setting the registry value to 1 for 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionM
anager\MemoryManagement\ClerPageFileAtShutdown.  




Table 3.6: Swap File Default Name and Location 
 File Name Windows Version Location 
Win386.swp Windows 95/98/ME %SystemDrive%\ 
pagefile.sys 
Windows NT/2000/XP %SystemDrive%\ 
Windows Vista %SystemDrive%\ 
3.2.2.2 Evidentiary Value of Swap Files  
When a computer’s RAM is full and the operating system must allocate 
memory for an application that doing some processing, Windows creates the 
swap space as a single file and this is known as a swap files on the root folder 
of the system drive to make room in RAM. The default swap file name and the 
location within the file system is outlined above, Table 3.6. The swap file is a 
collection of memory pages which belongs to various processes (Lee et al., 
2007a), threads (Schuster, 2006) and also stores CrashDump data. This 
CrashDump data is essentially a dump of the physical memory when a ‘blue 
screen of death’ (BSoD) occurs (Ruff, 2007). A commonly used forensic method 
is the searching of unallocated space for deleted files (Shinder and Tittel, 
2002); and this approach can also be applied in searching the swap files for the 
deleted files and other digital object through the detection of file headers and 
footers (Casey, 2004). Thus, swap files can include a great deal of information, 
specifically passwords that were never intended to be recorded onto the hard 
drive (Lee et al., 2007b), drafts of documents that were never saved to disk, 
and so on.  
Accordingly, there is the possibility of swap files containing a wide 
range of data including passwords, user IDs, credit card numbers, messenger 
chat logs and contents of recently used files, such as address books and URLs 
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(Lee et al., 2007a). An example is displayed in Figure 3.4, where a password is 









Figure 3.4:  Result of pagefile.sys Analysis 
3.2.2.3 Swap Files Tools and Related Issues 
The pagefile is locked by the kernel when Windows system is running. 
However, the pagefile can be accessed using a specially crafted driver or 
special device. This special device or crafted driver must be brought onto the 
target or have been installed previously. Another way to collect the pagefile is 
to unplug the system and access the pagefile through the standard forensic 
process hard drive extraction. 
An application will fail to operate when the system runs out of virtual 
memory as a result of insufficient swap file space being provided. Swap file size 
depends on how much RAM there is, and how much additional memory space 
that workload requires. For computers with small amounts of RAM (256MB), it 
is possible to configure the swap file 1.5 times the 
A sample of the 
password present in 
the swap file.  




size of the installed RAM, but for computers with a large amount of RAM, 
there is not much point in allocating a swap file that is 8 GB, if the computer 
has 8 GB of RAM. There is little point in allocating a large minimum size of 
swap file, since it typically won’t be used (Sanderson, 2004).  Even if the 
minimum and maximum swap file size is not the same, fragmentation occurs 
and this can lead to additional performance degradation. The best way to know 
the size needed for swap files is to monitor how much of the swap files in use 
and the associated system paging activity.  
The contents of swap files are not easily readable by the investigator. 
The investigator can view the swap files’ contents, but not in a manner that 
makes the viewing or extraction of valuable data easy. Looking for leads in the 
swap file by viewing it with standard binary editing utilities is tedious and will 
most likely be unfruitful because of the volume of data involved. In order to 
unravel the contents of swap files, more productive, specialised tools are 
needed so that numerous fragments of page file data can be extracted and 
assembled (Schweitzer, 2003). There are, however, various computer forensic 
filters designed to automatically identify computer investigation leads stored 
in Windows swap files. The identified leads are used to craft lists of key words 
and strings of text for use with computer forensic tools. Winhex (Vyavhare, 
2009) is a freeware tool and is promoted (Volonino et al., 2007) as a tool that 
can be used to examine swap files in forensic investigations.  
3.2.3 The Registry As A System Generated Artefact 
The Windows Registry is a database that stores hardware and software 
configuration information, user preferences, and setup information. It uses a 
binary format and is optimised to be machine, rather than human readable 
and so cannot be viewed with a text editor. The Registry has a hierarchical 
structure similar to the directory structure on the hard disk.  




3.2.3.1 The Registry Features  
The registry is a system-defined binary database designed to store and retrieve 
configuration data required by applications and operating system components. 
The binary nature of the Registry means that the registry files cannot be read 
from a DOS prompt text editor or the Recovery Console and locating the 
registry files depends on which Windows platform is installed (Russinovich, 
1999). 
In Windows 95, 98 and ME there are only two registry files, which is 
the system.dat and user.dat. In Windows XP, 2000 and Vista there are 
several registry files. The files are stored in the Windows\System32\Config 
folder. When looking at an offline Registry, the files are: Software, System, 
SAM, Security and Default (no file extension is used). One more registry 
file is NTuser.dat and it does have a file extension. Table 3.7 illustrates the 
registry files from different Windows platforms and their locations. Windows 7 
includes further refinements including virtualisation to ensure compatibility 












Table 3.7: Registry Files From Different Windows Platform  
and Their Locations 








































The Software, System, SAM, Security, Default and 
NTuser.dat files have various functions. The Security stores information 
about security. This file contains information regarding various service 
accounts for the operation of Windows. For example, the system stores the 
credentials for service accounts and launches them automatically under the 
appropriate account since services run without being openly activated by a 
logged in user. The SAM file is a security database of hashed passwords and 
usernames which stores information about the Security Accounts Manager 
(SAM) service. For example, each user, group and machine in Windows are 
assigned a security identifier (SID) and this SID is used as a means of 
identification. SIDs to users for logon is resolved by parsing the SAM. The 
System stores all the information about hardware, software, and the default 
Windows setting. For example, each 




service that starts upon Windows booting is listed in the Registry key 
HLKM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and the settings for the 
Windows Firewall are stored in the Registry key 
HLKM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Paramet-
ers\FirewallPolicy in the SYSTEM file. The Software file stores 
information about software and how Windows will perform and the default 
Windows setting. The HLKM\SOFTWARE key in this file contains software 
settings relating to installed software and uninstalled software; and even who 
last logged on to a system. The Default file stores all the default user 
settings. A number of Registry keys are used to track user activities and can 
be found in the NTuser.dat file and are updated when a user performs 
specific actions. The NTuser.dat file stores all settings that each user selects 
and these settings will override settings stored in the System file. 
The structure of the Registry itself contains the keys, subkeys and 
values at a physical level (in an offline Registry). There are five root level keys. 
Keys are the master keys (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and HKEY_USERS) which 
are two in number and derived keys (HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG),  meaning they are linked to 
the master keys which are three in numbers. Table 3.8 below shows the 
different keys, subkeys, and locations of the Windows registry file. Values are 
the Registry values which are associated with Name, Type and Data 
attributes. All values have names and value’s name is analogous to a file’s 
name. Each value contains data of a specified data type specified by a number. 
Figure 3.5 shows the Registry editor with a series of values in the value pane. 
 




Table 3.8: Registry Organisation (Anson and Bunting, 2007) 
Root Key Name Brief Description 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE  
(HKLM) 
Used to establish the pre-computer settings. 
Hive Key Hive File and Location 
HKLM\SAM %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\SAM 
HKLM\SECURITY %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ SECURITY 
HKLM\SOFTWARE %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ SOFTWARE 
HKLM\SYSTEM %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\ SYSTEM 
HKEY_USER  
(HKU) 
Used to contain the user environment settings for the 
console user as well as other users who have logged on to 
the system.  
Hive Key Hive File and Location 
HKU\.DEFAULT %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config\default 
HKU\S-1-5-19 Documents and Settings\LocalService \ntuser.dat 
HKU\S-1-5-19_Classes Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\ 
Application Data\Microsoft\Windows \UsrClass.dat 
HKU\S-1-5-20 Documents and Settings\NetworkService\ ntuser.dat 
HKU\S-1-5-20_Classes Documents and Settings\NetworkService\ Local 
Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\                      
Windows\UsrClass.dat 
HKU\SID Documents and Settings\UserName\ ntuser.dat 
HKU\SID_Classes Documents and Settings\UserName\Local 
Settings\ApplicationData\Microsoft\Windows 
\UsrClass.dat 
 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT  Used to associate file types with programs that open 
them and also to register classes for Component Object 
Model (COM) objects. This key is derived from two keys, 
HKLM\Software\Classes and HKCU\Software \Classes. 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER  Used to configure the environment for the console user. 
This key is derived from a link to HKU\SID. SID is the user’s 
security identifier. 
















Figure 3.5:  Registry Editor Showing Registry Values in the Value Pane 
Table 3.9 below shows each of the data types, their corresponding 
number and a brief description of what the data type means. 
Table 3.9: Registry Value Data Types (Anson and Bunting, 2007) 
Data Type    Number Description 
REG_NONE 0  Data type is not defined. 
REG_SZ 1  Fixed length text string expressed in user   
friendly format, normally describes 
components. 
REG_EXPAND_SZ 2  Variable length data string. 
REG_BINARY 3  Binary data that is displayed in the editor as    
hex. 
REG_DWORD 4  32 bit double word values. 
REG_DWORD_LITTLE_INDIAN 4  32 bit double word values with bytes in 
reverse order. 
REG_DWORD_BIG_INDIAN 5  32 bit double word values with bytes in  
normal order with the highest bit appearing  
first. 
REG_LINK 6  An internal use only data type for a Unicode 
symbolic link. 
REG_MULTI_SZ 7  Multiple string fields in which each string is 
separated by a null; two nulls mark the end of 
the list of strings. 
REG_RESOURCE_LIST 8   Listing of resources lists of devices or device 
drivers.  
Name, Type and Data 
attributes for Registry 
values.  




The Windows registry is organised in a tree structure and is analogous 
to a file system. However, the internal structure of Windows registry hives is 
different from typical file systems. Registry hive files contain a header and 
continue with a series of hive bin blocks. Hive bins are linked together and 
within each hive bin can be found a series of variable length cells. Figure 3.6 
illustrates the layout of a typical hive bin. The data portion of each cell 
contains either value data or one of several different record types such as: key 
(NK) records, subkey-lists, value-lists, value (VK) records, security (SK) 
records, big data records and big data indirect offset cells (Morgan, 2009). 
Figure 3.6 below depicts the Registry hive files contain a header and 
continue with a series of hive bin blocks and within each hive bin can be found 
a series of variable length cells.  
Hive Bin Header 
Cell 1 Length 
Cell 1 Data 
Cell 2 Length 
Cell 2 Data 
Cell 3 Length 
Cell 3 Data 
. 
. 
Figure 3.6: Hive Bin Structure (Morgan, 2009) 
Table 3.10 through Table 3.12 illustrates data structures for all of the 
elements in the registry: header, hive bins, and cells. Table 3.10 below depicts 









Table 3.10: Registry Header Data Structures (Morgan, 2009) 
Offset Size (bytes) Type Description 
0x0 4 String(“ref”) Magic number 
0x4 4 Unsigned Integer 
Sequence Number 1: matches next field if 
hive was properly synchronised. 
0x8 4 Unsigned Integer Sequence Number 2: matches previous 
field if hive was properly synchronised. 
0xC 8 Unsigned Integer 64-bit NT time stamp 
0x14 4 Unsigned Integer Major version 
0x18 4 Unsigned Integer Minor version 
0x24 4 Offset Pointer to the first key record 
0x28 4 Offset Pointer to the start of last hive bin in file. 
0x30 64 String Hive file name 
0x90 4 Unsigned Integer Flags 
0x1FC 4 Unsigned Integer Checksum of data to this point in header. 
Within the Registry hive file, a series of hive bin blocks that follows 
after the header contains offsets to additional data structures, such as lists of 
other hive bins, as well as lists of cells. Table 3.11 below depicts the Registry 
hive bin data structure with the offset values. 





0x0 4  String(“hbin”) Magic number 
0x4 4  Unsigned Integer 
This bin’s distance from the first hive 
bin 
0x8 4  Unsigned Integer This hive bin’s size (multiple of 4096) 
0xC 16  Unknown Unknown 
0x1C 4  Unsigned Integer Relative offset of next hive bin  
0x20..[bin size] Variable  Structure List 
List of cells used to store various 
records 




The Registry hive file contains data that is stored in cells. A cell holds a 
key, a value, a security descriptor, a list of subkeys, or a list of key values. 
Table 3.12 below depicts the Registry cell data structures with the cell header; 
that is a field that specifies the cell’s size, and the cell’s value.  






0x0 4 Signed Integer Cell length (including these 4 bytes) 
0x4 Variable Varies 
Contains one of: NK record, VK record, SK 
record, subkey-list, value-list or raw data blocks 
Furthermore, the data portion of each cell contains either value data or one of 
several different record types such as: key (NK) records, subkey-lists, value-
lists, value (VK) records, security (SK) records, big data records and big data 
indirect offset cells (see Appendix B).  
3.2.3.2 Evidentiary Value of the Registry 
The Registry on Windows operating systems is a rich source of evidence and 
contains data relating to the configuration of the operating system, and most 
of the applications present on the system. In addition to system configuration 
data for the operating system and applications present on the system, the 
Windows Registry holds information regarding user activities including 
recently accessed files. Software used by attackers creates a footprint within 
the Registry, leaving the investigator clues about the incident (Carvey, 2007). 
Due to the binary format of the registry, a specialised tool is required to view 
the contents. Some, but not all, of the registry information can be accessed 
using the Registry editor supplied with the operating system. In Figure 3.7, 
DefaultUserName shows who last logged on to a system in the 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\Current\Version\Winlogon\De-
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faultUserName. Similarly Figure 3.7 illustrates another value which can be 
obtained by looking at the DefaultDomainName in the same key, which 













Figure 3.7:  The Last-logged-on User and Domain are Stored in the Key HKEY_ 
LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon   
According to Morgan (2009), “The Windows registry stores a wide 
variety of information, including core system configurations, user specific 
configuration, information on installed applications, and user credentials, and 
is therefore a potentially rich source of evidentiary data”. This can be seen in 
the information regarding installed software, last logon and banners. A 
Registry entry is created and shows software information when programs are 
installed on a computer, and this information persists in some cases even 
when the software is removed or uninstalled. The information can be found in 
HKLM\SOFTWARE. An example of the information held in the Registry 
relating to users would be the information identifying when the last-logged-on 
user was doing so using a local account, an account from the local site’s 
domain, or an account from another trusted domain. The information can be 
DefaultUserName shows who last 
logged on and DefaultDomainName 
describes the last account used to logon. 




obtained from HKLM\SOFTAWRE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion-   
\Winlogon.  Information regarding the location and contents of banners are 
useful in investigating a network intrusion. The registry key in which they are 
stored is HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\-
Policies\System and contains the caption and text of a logon banner that is 
set on the local system. 
3.2.3.3 Registry Tools and Related Issues 
The interface by which the user primarily views, searches, or modifies the 
Registry is with the Registry editor tool (regedit.exe), which is installed as part 
of the Windows operating system. However there are several additional 
available tools that can be used to examine the Registry: the Advanced 
Registry Tracer by Elcomsoft (2005) for live Registry, while Guidance Software 
has EnCase (2005) and AccessData has Registry Viewer (2009) for performing 
research on compound files of the Registry hives. The built in Windows utility, 
registry editor (regedit) can be accessed from the run command.  
In the registry editor, the left pane is used to view the keys for the 
registry and the right pane is used to view the values for the registry. It is 
possible to navigate the hierarchy of the various registry keys and examine the 
series of values associated with each key. The Windows registry editor has a 
search function to search for keyword data within the keys, values or data 
areas of a registry. The Registry editor will not however allow access to the 
protected areas of the registry where security information is recorded.  
The registry is easily damaged (Nelson et al., 2004) and should not be 
edited or altered via manual editing unless this is essential and the impact of 
the changes is clearly understood. As the impact of a mistake can render the 
system inoperable, it is good practice to back up the Registry before making 
any changes. Furthermore, the registry hive files in an offline mode 




are different from the live registry as seen in Windows. The differences are 
non-volatile keys such as the HARDWARE hive file key under HKLM (live 
registry) and the CurrentControlSet key for the offline environment (Anson 
and Bunting, 2007). The operating system displays local times to the user as 
an offset to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) based on the user’s local time zone 
offset stored in the Registry. So, an adjustment will need to be made to the 
timestamps if the time zone of the machine used to examine media is different 
to the time zone of the examined media (Carvey, 2007). 
3.2.4 Web Cookie Files As System Generated Artefacts 
Web cookies are files that are created by the Web sites visited and sent to the 
web browser along with the web pages viewed. These web cookies reveal the 
fact that the user has visited that particular web and may also hold a range of 
other information.  
3.2.4.1 Web Cookie Files Features  
The purpose of a cookie may be one or more of the following (this list is not 
exhaustive):  
• To notify the Web site that you have visited it in the past.  
• To store a username and password to enable an automatic login when 
returning to a Web site. 
• To record personal user information relating to the website, e.g. name, 
personal preferences, advertising information, etc. 
• To record preferences from previous visits to enable a site to display 
appropriate adverts. 
Web cookies are stored in a specific folder in the hard disk. The location 
of this folder depends on the version of the Windows and relate to a user 
account. Table 3.13 shows the typical location of cookie files.  




Table 3.13: Web Cookie Files Location 





















Microsoft\ Windows\Cookies\ Low 
Cookie files are in human readable ASCII format and in line by line 
format. The first line contains the variable name and the second line contains 
the value for the variable name. The third line contains the website name that 
issued the cookie and the fourth line contains flags. Lines five and six are 
concatenated and reassemble the expiration time. The next two lines (lines 
seven and eight) are concatenated and reassemble the creation time. Table 
3.14 summarises web cookie files’ format.  
Table 3.14: Summary of Web Cookie Files Format (Jones, 2003) 
Line Number Fields Description / Summary 
        1 The variable name 
        2 The value for the variable  
        3 The website of the cookie’s owner  
        4 Optional flags 
        5 The most significant integer for expired time, in FILETIME format 
        6 The least significant integer for expired time, in FILETIME format 
        7 The most significant integer for creation time, in FILETIME format 
        8 The least significant integer for creation time, in FILETIME format 
        9 The cookie record delimiter (a * character) 
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3.2.4.2 Evidentiary Value of Web Cookie Files 
The website usually places information in a cookie in a user’s computer to 
record information about a web session, so it may be requested back at a later 
date. Cookies are useful as they can be used to automatically sign a user into a 
specific site and also can hold information about a user’s purchases in a web 
shop. For this reason, cookies aid digital investigators by providing insight into 
a suspect’s Internet activity. For example, after visiting a website such as 
www.play.com, a cookie will be generated on the user’s computer that looks 
similar as to that illustrated in Figure 3.8.  
Cookies can also be used for nefarious purposes since malicious web 
sites can upload malware masquerading as a cookie to a user’s computer 










Figure 3.8: Web Cookie File Content 
3.2.4.3 Web Cookie Files Tools and Related Issues 
There are a number of possible tools that can be used to parse and extract 
information from cookie files. Attempts can be made to secure cookies and to 
prevent tampering and exploitation by malware, usually by some form of 
A generated cookie after 
www.play.com was visited.  




encryption (MacVittie, 2010). One example of a tool to parse information in a 
cookie file and return the results in a field delimited format is the Galleta tool 
developed by Jones (2003). Output from this tool, which is in field delimited 
format, can be imported to a spreadsheet program so it can be sorted, searched 
and filtered. This spreadsheet program can also format the data so that it is 
appropriate for a report.  
3.2.5  Recycle Bin As A System Generated Artefact 
A copy of a deleted file is moved to the Recycle Bin directory when a user 
deletes a file through Windows Explorer. Although the deletion date and time 
of a file is not stored in the folder entry, the date and time of deletion is stored 
in the file. The exact file location again depends on the version of Windows 
installed on the system.  
3.2.5.1 Recycle Bin Features  
When a user deletes a file, it is moved to the Recycle Bin. All the original 
information about the file is stored in a hidden index file, called INFO/INFO2 
that is located in the Recycled folder. The process is: (1) deletion of the file’s 
folder entry in the folder in which the file resides; (2) the creation of a new 
folder entry for the file in the Recycle Bin; and (3) the addition of information 
about a file in a hidden system file named INFO/INFO2.  INFO is the file for 
the Windows 95, 98, and ME while INFO2 is the file for the Windows 
NT, 2000, and XP. The Recycle Bin is a hidden system folder and this 
Recycle Bin directory location is dependent on the version of Windows running 
on the local machine as shown in Table 3.15.  
 




Table 3.15: Recycle Bin File Location 
 File Name Windows Version Location 











%SystemRoot%\$Recycle.Bin\      
<USER SID>\ 
When a user sends a file to the Recycle Bin, Windows records the date and 
time of deletion and other information, such as the file’s location prior to being 
sent to the Recycle Bin, its index number in the Recycle Bin, and the new 
filename in the Recycle Bin in the INFO/INFO2 file. Only files deleted by the 
user and not files deleted by the operating system are in the INFO/INFO2 file. 
Therefore, the INFO/INFO2 file record indicates that a user knowingly deleted 
the file. Table 3.16 shows the structure within the INFO2 file.  
Table 3.16: The Structure Within the INFO2 File (Jones, 2003) 
Offset (bytes ) Size (bytes) Description 
0xC 4 Recycle Record Size 
Start of Record+0x04 Variable Recycle File Name (Null terminated) 
Start of Record+0x108 4 Recycle Record Unique ID 
Start of Record+0x10C 4 Drive Number for Recycled File 
Start of Record+0x110 8 Deletion Date and Time 
Start of Record+0x118 4 Deleted Physical File Size 




3.2.5.2 Evidentiary Value of the Recycle Bin 
In order for Windows to restore the file from the recycle bin, certain 
information must be stored in records so that the original information in the 
file may be restored. In the case where a digital investigator wishes to 
determine if a file has been used by an attacker and discarded, the recycle bin 
is the starting point to recover the file. Examining the recycle bin can 
determine when a user deleted a particular file, the sequence of deletion and 
other important file metadata. 
The Recycle Bin INFO/INFO2 file records metadata pertaining to a 
particular file, such as the date of deletion and the original path, and may be 
useful in confirming or refuting computer users’ explanations regarding the 
presence or history of computer files recovered from their drives.  
3.2.5.3 Recycle Bin Tools and Related Issues 
There are a number of possible tools that can be used to restore the files that 
have been deleted and stored in the Recycle Bin. In many cases, this data is 
not entirely over written and by using tools such as ProDiscover (2003); 
EnCase (2005); FTK (2009); and PC Inspector by Convar Deutschland GMBH 
(www.convar.de), the files can be restored. When a file is deleted and stored in 
the Recycle Bin, it has not physically moved to the Recycle Bin. The file 
remains in the original location, but its directory entry has been moved and 
placed in the hidden folder called Recycled and the deleted file renamed. When 
a Recycle Bin is used to recover the files, the original path is read from the 
INFO/INFO2 file, the file renamed and its directory entry restored. This makes 
recovery from the Recycle Bin possible (Whitehead, 2010).  




3.2.6 Internet Explorer Activity Files As System 
Generated Artefacts 
Internet Explorer is a free web browser from Microsoft. A web browser is a 
software application used to locate and display web pages. The normal data of 
Internet Explorer browser includes Cookie records, History records and Cache 
records. These records are saved in files (index.dat) in different directories. 
Internet Explorer caches websites that a user visits. It stores cached files in 
the C:\Windows\Temporary Internet file folder. Internet Explorer uses file 
named index.dat for this purpose in the newer version of Internet Explorer, 
starting with Internet Explorer 4 and so on. The records in the index.dat file 
contain the Uniform Resource Locator (URL), the date that the page was last 
modified by the server, and the date that the URL was last accessed by the 
user. 
3.2.6.1 Internet Explorer Activity Files Features  
The index.dat is a file hidden from computer users that contains every URL 
and every web page that users have ever visited. The index.dat file in Table 
3.17 lists additional areas of the file system where index.dat files can be 
located. The large scale structure of an index.dat file is the header followed by 
an array of fixed sized blocks (Chappell, 2010). The index.dat file contains a 
header that gives important information about the file’s properties such as the 
file length, the HASH table offset and the Internet cache directory names. This 








Table 3.17: index.dat File Location 




















Settings\Temporary Internet Files\ 
Content.IE5\ 
%SystemRoot%\Document and 
Settings\ <username>\  Cookies\ 
%SystemRoot%\Document and 











The HASH table is an array of data that contains entries pointing to the 
relevant activity data within the index.dat file (Kale, 2007). The HASH table is 
the “master lookup table” to find valid activity records within the index.dat 
file. If an index.dat file is large enough, it can have multiple HASH tables which 
contain a pointer to the next HASH table (Metz, 2009). Each HASH table 
contains the HASH table length, the pointer to the next HASH table, the activity 
record flags, and the activity record pointers as in Table 3.19. 











File Length 0x1C 4 
This field contains the length of the index.dat file, in 




This field contains the offset (in bytes) for the 




This field contains the directories where files are 
stored that make up the content of the cache. Each 
directory is 12 bytes long, although only the first 8 
bytes are relevant. 
Table 3.19: Fields in the HASH Table of index.dat File (Thomas, 2003) 
Field Name 
Offset from the 








This field contains the length of the HASH 




This field contains the offset (in bytes for the 
beginning of the file) where the next HASH 
Table can be located. If the value is zero, this 
is the last HASH Table in the index.dat file. 
Activity 
Record Flags 
16 + 8*n;         
where n = 
0,1,2,3… 
4 
This 4 byte field contains the flags for the 
activity record. If the first byte equals 01, the 
following field does not represent a valid 




20 + 8*n;         
where n = 
0,1,2,3… 
4 
This is an activity record offset, in bytes, 
from the beginning of the file. 
 
The activity records contain the main information to be recovered from 
the index.dat file. The activity records contain important data fields such as 
type of activities, length of the activity record, and the data field that is 
dependent on the type of activity record. REDR, URL and LEAK represent 
types of activity for the activity records (Mil Incorporated, 2010).  
REDR stands for redirection and REDR records are very simple records. 
The REDR activity record is a statement that the subject’s browser was  




redirected to another site, there is only simple Internet Web sites data 
(Thomas, 2003). Table 3.20 shows relevant fields in the REDR activity record. 




Offset (in bytes)   
from the beginning 




1  Record Type 0x00 4 
This is the field that 
contains the “REDR” string. 
2  Record Length  0x04 4 
This is the field that 
contains the number of 
0x80 byte sized blocks that 
make up the REDR record. 
3  URL 0x10 variable 
This is the URL, terminated 
by a NULL (0x00) character. 
The URL activity record is a set of data that represents the website a 
user has visited. A URL activity record contains the record length, the last 
access and modified times for the activity, the URL offset and data within the 
record, the filename offset and data within the record, the cache directory 
number, and the http header offset and data. The LEAK record is generated 
when an error occurs during the deletion of a URL cache entry (Murr, 2009). 
The LEAK activity record has exactly the same internal structure as the URL 
activity record.  
In both URL and LEAK types, each record contains an abundance of 
information, such as record type; record length; last modified time; last access 
time; the user name; Internet web sites; and cache file path information 
(Haiping et al., 2009). The fields in the URL and LEAK activity record are 
summarised in Table 3.21.  
 
 




Table 3.21: Fields in the URL and LEAK Activity Record (Haiping et al., 2009) 
Field Name Offset (in bytes) from the 





(version 5) (version 4) 
Record Type 0x00 0x00 4 This is the field that contains the 
string “URL” or “LEAK”.  
Record 
Length  
0x04 0x04 4 This is the number of 0x80 (128) byte 
blocks that the URL or LEAK record 
contains. 
Last Modified  
Time Stamp 
0x08 0x08 8 This is the last modified time stamp, in 
FILETIME format. 
Last Accessed  
Time Stamp 
0x10 0x10 8 This is the last accessed time stamp, in 
FILETIME format. 
URL or LEAK 
Offset 
0x34 0x38 4 This is the URL or LEAK offset, from 
the beginning of the record. 
Filename  
Offset 
0x3C 0x40 4 This is the filename offset, from the 
beginning of the record. 
Local Cache 
Directory   
Index 
0x38 0x3C 1 This is the index (starting with zero) of 
the local directories containing the 
cache files. 
HTTP Header  
 Offset 
0x44 0x48 4 This is the offset, from the beginning 
of the record, where the HTTP 
Headers are located. 
3.2.6.2  Evidentiary Value of Internet Explorer Activity 
Files 
One of the potential sources of information that helps to determine the intent 
of a computer user is to review the Web sites that the individual has visited. 
Internet Explorer (IE) caches URLs that a user visits in the browser history 
files and in binary form. When IE is used to browse the web, it keeps a history 
of its activity that the investigator can use to develop an understanding of the 
user’s activity as well as obtain evidence (Carvey, 2007). 
When a user visits any Web site, Internet Explorer first checks to see if 
it has already stored a local copy of that Web site in the Temporary Internet 
Folders on the hard drive. If a local copy exists, Internet Explorer uses the 




local cached file rather than downloads a fresh copy of the information from 
the Internet. It also assigns each cached file with an alphanumeric name, and 
maps the new filenames to the actual filenames in system files. The index.dat 
file is used to map the cached alphanumeric names to the actual URLs. 
3.2.6.2 Internet Explorer Activity Files Tools and Related 
Issues 
The Internet browser history of a live system can be parsed using the 
WebHistorian tool (Mandiant, 2006) and the ProDiscover tool (2003) can be 
used for an image. These tools consolidate the browser history information into 
an easy to view and understand format. Index Dat Spy (Gould, 2004) and 
Index.dat Analyser (Systenance, 2006) can also be used to view the index.dat 
contents. Also available is a free viewer, namely Free Internet Window 
Washer (2010). It works by choosing ‘View History’ to view the physical 
index.dat file. A tool to parse information in an index.dat file and return the 
results in delimited text is called Pasco. It was developed by Jones (2003). 
Pasco can be run in two different modes: standard methodology and undelete 
mode. The difference is that the undelete mode ignores the information in the 
HASH table and reconstructs any valid activity records. The output of this tool 
will be sent to the standard out (console) by default and can also be imported 
to a spreadsheet program of choice so it can be sorted, searched and filtered. 
By importing the output to a spreadsheet program, further analysis of the 
index.dat is possible and more visualisation techniques can be applied to this 
data.  
3.3 Digital Forensic Tools and Techniques 
Digital forensics includes tools as well as techniques that assist in the digital 
investigation process. Numerous digital forensic tools may be used by digital 
investigators to search, examine and analyse digital evidence. The 




identification and analysis of digital evidence poses unique challenges to 
digital investigators. A computer system may contain thousands of files any 
number of which can contain pieces of digital evidence. Each piece of digital 
evidence may be analysed to identify ownership, location and timing. A 
number of computer forensic tools are available today that provide a necessary 
framework for data acquisition and analysis. Britz (2004) categorised these 
tools into five groups: boot disks, data duplication, verification and 
preservation tools, data recovery tools; and data analysis tools. 
Svensson (2005) used level of operation to group these tools into five 
categories: 
- Bootable Environments Tools: Software that you can use to boot a suspect 
system into a trusted state. 
- Data Acquisition Tools: Tools used to collect data from a suspect’s system. 
- Media Management Analysis Tools: Tools used to examine the data 
structures that organise media, such as partition tables and disk labels. 
- File System Analysis Tools: Tools used to examine file systems and disk 
images to recover and view the content of files and folders. 
- Application Analysis Tools: Tools used to analyse the file content, for 
example, viewing log files, images etc. 
A tool is used during the acquisition phase to copy data from the 
suspect hard disk to a trusted device or file. This tool must also preserve the 
suspect storage device data. In the analysis phase, tools are used to examine 
acquired data in order to identify pieces of evidence that support or refute 
hypothesis regarding any incident. In the presentation phase, data from the 
analysis phase is arranged into a useful format; furthermore, conclusions and 
corresponding evidence from the investigation are presented. In the forensic 
process when facing digital investigation tasks, tools are used to look deeper 
into the data and the analysis is the sum of data applied towards the 
resolution of the incident (Reyes et al., 2007), therefore these tools among 




others should have the functionality of recovering and viewing the content of 
files.  
Table 3.22: Category of Tools by Britz (2004) and Svensson (2005) Studied 
 







































- File managers 
 
Once all the data considered pertinent to the investigation has been 
preserved, data analysis should be conducted by examining the contents of the 
files and analysing slack/free space. According to Britz (2004), data analysis 
tools may be grouped in five general categories: indexing, text searching, 
viewers, time/data verifiers, and file managers regardless of approach. 
Existing tools such as the Microsoft tools supplied as part of the 
operating system, such as Event Viewer and Registry Editor and others tools 
explained in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 that can be used for examination of 
each of the suggested system generated artefacts. Table 3.22 shows categories 
of tool by Britz (2004) and Svensson (2005) that are available for analysis of 
the system generated artefacts of the Windows. This thesis will follow the 
process suggested by Svensson (2005) and describe tools in the data analysis 
category. 
 




The next sections provide an examination of commercialised forensic 
tools and open source forensic tools to provide an insight into what they can 
offer an investigator. These are specialist tools that are forensically sound that 
can be used to analyse these generated system artefacts. For example, EnCase 
and FTK both include facilities to process and examine the Registry. In FTK 
the Registry Viewer provides the investigator with an expedient and efficient 
means to view the Windows. The following section reviews tools in term of how 
they deal with the information stored in Windows system generated artefacts.  
3.3.1 Commercial Forensic Tools 
A number of commercial vendors provide tools that can be used in computer 
and electronic investigations and examinations. Among others services 
included in these tools are: data recovery, indexing/searching and graphical 
display of results, hashing calculations, and administrative uses. Many 
commercial products provide online resources that make their use more 
acceptable in a court of law (Solomon et al., 2005). 
3.3.1.1 EnCase 
EnCase available from Guidance Software (2005), provides investigators with 
tools to authenticate, search and recover computer evidence. That is boot disk 
tools, data duplication tools, verification and preservation tools, data recovery 
tools; and data analysis tools. EnCase allows investigators to manage 
computer evidence, to view relevant files including deleted files, file slack, and 
unallocated space. This is done by decoding and mounting these files so they 
are displayed in a logical or hierarchical format (Bunting and Wei, 2006). 
There are EnCase solutions for acquiring Windows, DOS and Linux.
 Guidance Software originally developed EnCase Forensic Edition 
software, a stand-alone software for acquiring and examining static forensic 




images. A further development was EnCase Enterprise, which adopted a 
server/client model for the business environment. A client side tool would run 
on the target host so that it could communicate with the forensic examination 
host over a network connection. This is to avoid changes to the target system if 
placing the code on the target host and running it (Anson and Bunting, 2007).  
 EnCase Enterprise Edition also supports volatile data support. This 
feature takes a snapshot of Random Access Memory (RAM), the Windows 
Registry, open ports, and running applications. It provides potentially valuable 
information that is lost when a machine is shut down (Solomon et al., 2005). 
According to Bunting and Wei (2006), “Encase is a fully integrated 
Windows based computer forensic software application that provides 
investigators with means of analysing all electronic data contained on 
computer drives for forensic evidence purposes”. EnCase allows an investigator 
to deal with the information stored in Windows artefacts through its following 
features: read multiple file system format (FAT, NTFS, ext2, ext3, ReiserFS, 
UFS and JFS); read multiple disk image formats (Raw (dd), VMware, EnCase 
(.E01) and Safeback); acquire disk images from networked computers; create 
hash value for files in the case; disk browsing; keyword searching;  an 
integrated viewer allows viewing of many file formats; indexes zip files for 
analysis of compressed files/folders; and EnScript programming language 
which automates almost any functionality with complete control over the 
details. 
EnCase uses CookieView as a viewer to examine the cookie folder. 
CookieView is written by Craig Wilson and when it is installed as a viewer, a 
right-click on a cookie in EnCase and use the Send To feature will pass the 
cookie file to CookieView, which will open externally and decode the values in 
the cookie (Bunting and Wei, 2006). 
EnCase can be used to examine the user root folders. However, it does 
not pull out vital information that the investigator should know, such as what 
operating system is installed. The folder name that contains the Windows 
system 




files varies with Windows system versions. The investigator still needs prior 
knowledge of the system artefacts in order to pull out information crucial to an 
investigation.  
Searching features in EnCase are more powerful than those of Sleuth 
Kit and FTK, but require training to use their full capabilities (Manson et al., 
2007). EnCase needs to be customised when using string conditions, EnScript 
commands, and GREP commands. 
3.3.1.2 Forensic ToolKit 
The Forensic Toolkit (FTK) by Access Data (2009) is available to the forensic 
investigator to acquire, decrypt, analyse and report on digital evidence. When 
an investigator uses the FTK, it allows the system artefacts to be loaded from 
the image file and this is done through its following features: read file system 
format (FAT, NTFS, ext2, ext3); read multiple disk image formats (Raw (dd), 
EnCase (.E01), SMART, Snapback and Safeback); email clients analysis; 
search feature using keywords; analysis of compressed files/folders by using 
indexes of zip files; and create hash values for any file in the case. 
The FTK has Known File Filter (KFF) feature with multiple different 
pre-programmed filters for evidence viewing which aids the investigator in 
focusing on items of interest. For example, an internal viewer allows the 
investigator to view Microsoft documents (Word, PowerPoint, and Excel); 
various image files; internal email viewer allows investigator to navigate email 
from various email storage formats; registry viewing; and password recovery. 
Viewer for the registry and password recovery come from other company 
products. 
FTK reads various image formats: EnCase, SMART, SnapBack, 
SafeBack and Linux dd and generates CRC or MD5 hash values (Solomon et 




al., 2005). It provides a number of filtering options, including file slack, file 
system slack, and unallocated space. This can be done through the File Filter 
Manager of the FTK that enables the user to select which types of files to 
include (Casey and Larson, 2004). According to Manson et al. (2007), “the FTK 
is identified by certain characteristics: substantially less time commitment to 
training is required to use the program; intuitive GUI design for speedy 
analysis; lengthy importing process restricts time for analysing of contents of 
the image; and less customisable compared to EnCase and Sleuth Kit and 
Autopsy”.  
EnCase and FTK are promoted to withstand scrutiny in a court of law, 
and hence these are widely acceptable and used by law enforcement and 
government bodies.  
3.3.2 Open Source Forensic Tools 
This thesis is concerned with developing an open architecture for the forensic 
analysis of system artefacts. For this reason an appraisal of open source tools 
will provide a review of the currently available capability of this type of tool. 
The development of open source tools usually results from an idea to improve 
on something that already exists or to create something totally new. If the tool 
is adopted by a significant body of users / developers then it can rival some of 
the commercial tools. Open source tools provide alternatives to commercial 
Windows-based forensic tools as they are released under a public licence and 
can be downloaded from various Internet software development sites 
(Kavanagh, 2004; POST, 2005; OSI, 2010). One example, ExifTool by Harvey 
(2004) is free and platform independent software used for reading image 
metadata, writing and manipulating images. It is both a Perl library and 
command-line application. Since these types of tool are offered free of charge, 
this enables them to spread even farther and attract even more developers and 
the cycle continues (Howlett, 2004).  




Open source tools cost very much less compared to commercial tools. 
The acquisition costs for open source tool is based on time and network 
thoughput spent downloading the software including cost for burning CDs for 
the acquired software. Therefore, investigators using open source tools can 
perform their acquisition and analysis at a very low cost. However, the support 
for open source tools can be limited where public community support for 
troubleshooting exists but not professional support (Manson et al., 2007). 
According to Carrier (2002), “open source tools document the procedures they 
use by providing the source code, thus allowing the community to accept or 
reject them. Having access to a tool’s source code will improve the quality of the 
testing process because bugs can be identified through a code review and by 
designing tests based on the design and flow of the software” (Carrier, 2002). 
Open source tools are not so easy to learn to use in a short time unless, 
the user has had previous experience with Linux, and users familiar only with 
Windows operating system were definitely find them hard to use. Open source 
allows validation of the source code. Sleuth Kit and Autopsy are both open 
source tools, promoted as aiding in forensic investigation. Both tools can 
examine system generated artefacts. Autopsy is able to find web cookies and 
URLs in the Registry by extracting the SAM file from the Registry, and then 
Registry Viewer is used to see the web cookies (Manson et al., 2007). According 
to Manson et al. (2007), “Open source tools are a very good verification of 
evidence found using other products and should be included in the academic 
environment”.   
3.3.2.1 Sleuth Kit and Autopsy 
The Sleuth Kit and Autopsy Forensic Browser (Autopsy) are both open source 
tools and run on the Unix and Mac OS X platform (TSK, 2003). Built on The 
Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT, 1999), The Sleuth Kit contains command line system 
tools and volume system forensic analysis tools (Solomon et al., 2005). These 
tools do not rely on the operating system to process the file systems and 




therefore deleted and hidden content is shown (Manson et al., 2007). With the 
volume system tools, partitions are located and extracted and then analysed 
with the file system analysis tools.  
Autopsy is a forensic browser with a graphical interface to the Sleuth 
Kit. Autopsy is HTML based and shows details about deleted data and the file 
system structures. Both Sleuth Kit and Autopsy are run in dead analysis and 
live analysis mode (Solomon et al., 2005). Evidence search techniques used in 
these two tools are: file listing, file content, hash databases, file type sorting, 
timeline of file activity, keyword search, metadata analysis, unit data analysis, 
and image details (Carrier, 2010). However they do have some drawbacks as 
noted by Kleber and Galvao (2006), “we identified two negative factors with 
regard to efficiency: the investigated partition type is limited; and the web 
interface is not user friendly. These should be considered when adopting them 
as a main solution for uncovering erased data system audits”. 
Many investigators tend to steer clear from open source software tools, 
as they are seldom fully supported by their developers, therefore if any 
problems are faced during an investigation, the investigator may not have the 
expertise to solve problems posed by the software. However, full commercial 
licence controlled tools may also face these problems, as often available 
support is limited.  
3.4 Problems Facing System Generated Artefacts 
Analysis 
According to Fry (2007), “in analysing data, the goals are to highlight its 
features in order of importance, reveal patterns, and simultaneously show 
features that exist across multiple dimensions”. For example, ‘customer’, ‘date’ 
and ‘product’ are all fields that can be applied meaningfully to a sales receipt. 
Achieving the goals involves a large quantity of data and the representative 
nature of the data makes it extremely difficult to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of its meaning. Each of the system generated artefacts




illustrated and described in the above sections (Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6) 
have these data issues that need to be overcome to be effectively processed and 
successful forensic investigations.  
The collection of tools available to the investigator continues to expand 
and developers update the tools regularly to enable them to work with the 
latest technologies. Furthermore, some tools provide a reporting functionality 
which allows computer forensic examiners to generate reports regarding 
digital evidence items found, but some tools do not offer a reporting facility. It 
is the task of the examiner to judge that tools are appropriate for an 
investigation, and ideally to provide an effective investigation using tools to 
cross validate the findings rather than highlight differences. Table 3.23 
summarises the various key functions present, partially present or, in some 
cases not present in the tools examined.  
So far, the architecture studied in the previous sections does not 
indicate how data extracted from the system will be interpreted and presented 
to the investigator. Teerlink and Erbacher (2006); Vlastos and Patel (2007); 
and Read et al. (2009) have been using visualisation techniques to display 
information about computer data which can help forensic specialists direct 
their searches to suspicious files. Such techniques will also prove useful if 
implemented into forensic tools, allowing the investigator to view data easily, 









Table 3.23: Comparison of Various Functionalities Provided by the 
Commercial and Open Source Tools Studied 
 Function EnCase FTK SleuthKit and 
Autopsy 
1. Read only mode √ √ √ 
2. Uses Hash Value for individual file √ √ √ 
3. Easy navigation √ √ √ 
4. Search facility √ √ √ 
5. Includes Hex level viewer  √ √ √ 
6. Shows file modified / accessed / created time √ √ √ 
7. Prior knowledge of system artefact required √ √ √ 
8. Locate system artefact files automatically  * *  
9. Visual representation of data    
10. Reporting facility √ √  
 
√ - denotes the presence of the functionality 
* - denotes partial support of some system artefacts, example: Registry 
 
Table 3.23 extends work by Manson et al. (2007) that shows the main 
issues regarding the tools available for analysis of the system generated 
artefacts of the Windows. These tools provide reasonable functionality to the 
user, but there are a number of areas in need of improvement. Researching the 
Windows system generated artefacts using the tools available revealed that, in 
particular, there is a lack of tools for the investigator that can easily extract 
the information, and present it in a readable form.  
Many artefacts are compound in nature. They can be flat files that 
contain objects (Swap files), they may be flat files that have a hierarchical 
structure (Registry hive files and Event log files), they may be files that are 
plain text (web cookie files), or they may be files that are binary (Swap files, 
Registry hive files and Event log files). This can be further complicated by the 
format of the data within the files. Unfortunately, the internal structures of 




some of the Windows system artefacts are not well known. Only when there is 
a firm grasp of how data is stored, searching for the data can be performed. 
Since there is ASCII, binary, hexadecimal encoding and various file formats 
including extended log file format in specific artefacts, the information 
contained therein requires deeper analysis. 
According to Carrier (2003), “there are two problem types in analysing 
acquired data: the issue of data complexity and problem of the quantity of data. 
The complexity problem arises due to the fact that acquired data is typically in 
the lowest and most raw format, which is often too difficult for human 
interpretation. To solve the complexity problem, tools are used to translate data 
through one or more layers of abstraction until it is understood. The quantity 
problem arises from the fact that the amount of data to analyse can be very 
large. Data reduction techniques are used to solve this, by grouping data into 
one larger event or by removing known data”.  
Through understanding the internal construction of Windows system 
generated artefacts, investigators will be able to locate them, search the data, 
present the data, and deliver the information related to them.  Investigators 
will also gain the knowledge necessary to correlate the data among them when 
they are suspected as avenues of digital evidence, as well as reporting or 
communicating the results of forensic analysis clearly to decision-makers such 
as members of a jury, or executives in a company. In short, investigators must 
have this set of skills if they are going to effectively work with Windows 
system generated artefacts. 
With every new operating system and new version thereof, there are 
requirements to uncover new system generated artefacts and other such 
information that proves valuable to the forensic analysis process. For example, 
in the case of Event logs in the Windows Vista system, besides the three main  




categories of event log (Application, Security and System), there are a number 
of other categories under which different events can be logged. They include 
Internet Explorer Event Log and Hardware Event Log. Therefore tools and 
techniques need to be developed that allow forensic analysts to extract 
relevant and pertinent information from the Windows Event Logs on the Vista 
system (Carvey, 2007).  
The fact that users are not aware of the existence of system generated 
artefacts leaves the latter open to exploitation. In the case of a system 
compromise, for example, Microsoft’s Internet Information Server (IIS) web 
server has a number of vulnerabilities that may allow an intruder access. One 
of the ways to uncover attempts to compromise the IIS web server is to 
examine the logs generated by the web server. The lack of interaction of the 
user with these files means these system generated artefacts are an excellent 
source for an investigator to determine what exactly the user has been doing 
on the computer. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, artefacts generated by the Windows operating system have 
been introduced. The complex structures of each artefacts and their value as 
sources of evidence to the investigator have been highlighted as it is the aim of 
this thesis to develop a new architecture capable of integrating forensic data 
from the known and not known internal data structure of the artefacts. The 
decision has been taken to examine Event logs and Swap files as they are both 
examples of this type of file. It is therefore proposed that the Event logs 
(known data structure) and Swap files (not known data structure) be the focus 
of the thesis and considered for the architecture.  




 Free forensic tools, open source forensic tools and commercial forensic 
tools that can be used to examine files related to system generated artefacts 
have also been described. It has been shown that each tool has its own 
particular strengths and weaknesses. Some tools provide adequate 
functionality for the investigative purposes but the investigator needs to have 
prior knowledge and understanding of the system generated artefacts. The 
tools cannot support users who lack such knowledge and understanding and 
hence such ones will be unable to find the data required.  
It is this evident that there is potential for the development of a tool 
that is capable of extracting information from Windows system generated 
artefacts automatically and providing the results in a manner whereby the 
investigator does not require prior knowledge of the internal structure of the 
evidence at hand. Extracting crucial data without the investigators’ prior 
knowledge of such internal structures will also speed up the analysis process 
and allow investigators to include vital data in their reports. To aid the latter, 
a reporting facility will be useful to investigators. Chapter 4 explores the 
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CHAPTER 4 
SYSTEM GENERATED ARTEFACTS 
FORENSIC ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
DESIGN 
This chapter focuses on a System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis 
(SAFTool) system design. A proposed architecture is introduced which deals 
with the underlying internal data structure of Windows system generated 
artefacts. The chapter also discusses the development of that architecture with 
reference to the hypothesis of the thesis. The architecture requirements and 
objectives are formalised from issues highlighted in the review of the state-of-
the-art tools described in Chapter 3. 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the number of traces left behind after the usage of the Windows 
system was explained, highlighting their potential evidentiary value. Chapter 
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3 also reviewed the current tools available for a digital investigator to process 
and analyse system generated artefacts. A number of areas where additional 
functionality could expand the information available to the investigator or 
increase the efficiency of the investigator were also indicated, the intention 
being to demonstrate the need for an architecture design that will specifically 
extract the system related information reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Casey (2010) emphasises that investigators not only need to know how 
to obtain data using forensic tools, but should also be able to analyse the 
available data for useful characteristics and possible flaws. However, there are 
concerns over users’ knowledge of the location of an artefact, their ability to 
extract relevant information from the evidentiary sources and make use of 
presentation techniques or visualisation of data. Although every forensic 
analysis will have differing aspects based on the dataset, objectives, resources 
and other factors, the underlying process remains fundamentally the same. 
Furthermore, the requirements of any digital forensic investigation must also 
be taken into consideration when designing the tool, so that the tool really is in 
line with the needs of the investigator in analysing system artefacts.   
4.2 Existing Structure and Requirements of 
Digital Forensic Investigations  
Chapter 3 highlighted the general process of a digital forensic investigation; 
the stages of extracting data and information from computer storage media 
and the need to assure their accuracy and reliability.  
Whether serving customers, clients, prosecutors, or defendants, a 
computer forensic investigator is required to use the best tools or practices for 
the given task. According to Bryson and Stevens (2002), the basic 
requirements for any digital forensic investigation are the collection and 
preservation of evidence; formulation of leads; focused searches; temporal 
analysis; and evidence recovery. Through the use of myriad tools or 
techniques, and the basic requirements for any digital forensic investigation, 
the core requirements, which are elaborated upon below can be met. The 
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objective of this thesis is to devise an architecture and tool to identify digital 
evidence using scientifically derived and proven methods. According to 
Marcella and Mendenez (2008), “scientifically derived and proven methods can 
be used to facilitate or further the reconstruction of events in an investigation”.   
4.3  Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic 
Analysis System Architecture 
The architecture for the project is required to fully support the 
hypothesis of finding a solution for the development of a flexible, 
multiplatform and extensible architecture, which may be used for the analysis 
and visualisation of Windows artefacts to improve the forensic process. The 
statement of requirements for the architectures based on the issues and a 
discussion of the failures of the current-state-of-art tools identified in Chapter 
3 are as follows: 
• The software to be designed is a program that can be used to 
investigate/examine a system generated artefact. A system artefact holds 
a collection of entries, each recording an artefact data structure.  
• It must be possible to locate the artefact, access the artefact, extract data 
from the artefact (locate data structure, extract fields of the data 
structure, decode fields, interpret the fields of the data structure and 
reconstruct the fields),  
• It must be possible to examine new artefacts using the menu option, to 
check the availability of a data store, to create a data store, to open a 
data store containing an existing artefact’s data structure, and to close 
an artefact’s data store. 
• It must be possible to visualise the data of an artefact in an intuitive 
format. 
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Key features of the proposed architecture are as follows:  
Flexible and Extensible 
The architecture can be defined as flexible and extensible, as it is designed to 
be used with various Windows system generated artefacts. The data store 
must also be extensible to accept all sizes of data, and cater for different data 
types, even without knowing the structure. Someone has to know the structure 
to develop the database. So the system can be adapted by someone that does 
know the structure for an investigator who may not know the detailed 
structured. This includes Windows system generated artefacts that have 
known internal data structures and not known internal data structures. A 
modular approach is more appropriate to enable maintenance and improve 
reliability in use, and to make it easier to upgrade as long as replacement code 




Multiplatform promotes the portability of the architecture. This means, the 
use of a development programming language(s) that allows the system to be 
run on different hardware with a different operating system. 
 This architecture concentrates on the examination of the system 
artefacts’ data structures and transforming the data into structured form, 
thereby, helping the investigator by automating the time-consuming aspect of 
low-level analysis of the system file format and related data complexity.  
The proposed architecture is broken into four key stages, each stage 
deals with a process of the architecture:  
i. The first stage deals with the plugin for the analyser and visualiser 
of the artefact to enable investigator to analyse and visualise data of 
an artefact. This stage of the architecture develops various plugins 
to analyse and visualise data in different artefacts and represent 
this data using various techniques. The plugin can be developed 
independently of the architecture and plugged into the architecture 
at this stage.  
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ii. The second stage will be the analyser to identify and extract data in 
each of the artefacts being processed. The analyser will need to be 
easily reconfigurable to interpret the variety of artefacts. Before this 
stage, the artefact to be processed is prepared. The artefact to be 
processed comes in one of these formats: exported from imaged hard 
drive using tools such as Mount Image Pro or FTK, acquired from a 
Digital Evidence Bag container of digital evidence obtained from 
disparate sources, or stored using the Advanced Forensics Format 
(AFF) to indicate imaged disk storage and compressed data used to 
store digital evidence. It Section 3.4, it was outlined that the current 
state-of-the-art tools require the user to have a degree of prior 
knowledge of the complex structure of the artefact they are 
examining. If the user does not know the details of the complex 
structure, areas of the structure may be omitted during analysis by 
mistake, and vital data may not be found. Locating the complex 
data structures automatically does not require the user to know the 
exact location of information within the original files. The aim of 
this stage is to extract all the data from any data structure and 
parse the raw data ready for insertion into the database.  Next, is to 
invoke the database as a data store that enables data to be stored, 
queried and retrieved. The database is used because the data needs 
to be shared, updated, and enable rapid query and retrieval for 
further analysis and scrutiny. This stage of architecture provides an 
interface by which the user can insert and extract data to and from 
the architecture. The database will have read-only privilege, 
therefore, no data can be changed while being stored in the 
database. The architecture will incorporate mechanisms to ensure 
that no data in the original complex structure will change to ensure 
that forensic integrity is maintained during the investigation. The 
architecture will hash the files before entering the database, thus 
allowing checks to ensure the data is not altered. Once the data is 
processed (stage one), a data store must be available to store the 
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data. The data store must be available to store data in a manner to 
enable rapid query and retrieval. The data store must also be 
extensible to accept all sizes of data, even without knowing the 
structure. It must be flexible to store all data processed from all 
data structures (known and not known) with recursion and without 
recursion. The rapid query and retrieval of data will support the 
search functionality of the architecture, visualisation of the data, 
and extraction of the data for reports or visualisation for future 
analysis. All data retrieved from and inserted to the data store will 
be in a standardised format to enable tools to operate independently 
of changes to the database format.  
 
iii. The third stage in the process is to transform the data into an easily 
readable format. It is a mechanism whereby data is queried from 
the database, data representation and further analysis. This is used 
to structure the data into a narrative construct. It is proposed that 
the architecture will present the data in the structure visually in 
many formats. The method in which the data will allow for further 
analysis and finally present the data in graphs, charts or 
illustrations. This range of formats will allow the user to easily 
identify valuable meaningful data in the investigation thus reducing 
analysis time. This stage deals with visualising the data that is 
retrieved in an intuitive format to enable investigators to extract 
evidence. This stage of the architecture represents data using 
various visualisation techniques and aids such as graphs, charts 
and keyword searching function.  
 
iv. The fourth stage, it is proposed that the architecture provides the 
investigator with a reporting feature. This will allow the 
investigator to tag various pieces of data; shows visual 
representations of data; correlate various search results; add 
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various notes and other data related to the case; and compile all 
information into meaningful reports.  
The architecture was chosen based on the assignment of functionality to 
stages/components of the architecture as it proved to be the most usable, 
extensible, and did not complicate any structures further. These stages of the 
architecture were established by breaking the end result into building steps. 
Each step of the architecture can be developed independent of the next. Each 
stage of the architecture must provide functionality to the rest of the 
architecture. Each stage of the architecture is a step towards to the end result 
and each were used during the development of the architecture. 
The use of a file within a file system for keeping data and other possible 
database designs are not used as this file is only appropriate for a simple 
application and for storing data that does not need to be shared and updated 
by many users; and other database designs tested did not include the use of 
recursion and resulted in more fields being added to the database records. For 
example, such records included use of identifiers, keeping note of the parent 
child relationship found in the artefact complex structure (e.g. Registry).  
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The top level design of the Windows System Generated Artefacts 









Figure 4.1: High Level Description of Overall Architecture 
The key features of the proposed architecture are therefore the 
analyser, the database, and the visualisation subsystem. This design enables 
the design and development of a subsystem independently of other 
subsystems. The analyser component first reads in the evidence item and 
extracts the data that exists in the original native format in complex structure. 
This stage will extract all the data from the complex structure. The user 
should not need prior knowledge of the structure. This performs the automated 
analysis. Once processed, the data is sent to the database to allow for later 
visualisation.  
Part of the initial system configuration for processing a particular 
artefact, in addition to providing the analyser with information on the 
structure of the artefact, will be configuring the database. The database must 
be available to store data and this data should be able to be rapidly retrieved 
and queried. It must be extensible in terms of accepting data without any 
knowledge of the structure and extraction of the data for display or report. 
This database can be regarded as an interface between the two components to 
Analyser – read in, 
processed data and 
put data into the 
database
Visualiser –














4.3 Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis System Architecture       121 
 
                                                                                                    
 
communicate in a common language that overcomes any specifics related to 
the syntax and semantics of the data set. 
The proposed design of the visualiser module is intended to support the 
investigator in analysing, interpreting and understanding the data generated 
from the analyser component and to output the data for the investigator to 
explore in more detail. This visualiser provides the interface to the database, 
to display the artefact data in selective views and thus focus on particular 
aspects of the data or logical flow of interest to the investigator.  
Design Justification 
The development of a layered architecture for a system is proposed, dividing 
the software into a number of subsystems. A subsystem typically groups 
together elements of the system that share some common properties or 
possibly some common functions (Rational Software Corporation, 2003). An 
object oriented subsystem encapsulates a coherent set of responsibilities in 
order to ensure that it has integrity and can be maintained. Furthermore 
applying the concept of multiple subsystems produces smaller units of 
development. If these have clearly defined roles and boundaries this can help 
to maximise reuse at the component level. This also improves maintainability, 
aids portability between platforms and can assist the software developers in 
understanding the complexity of large software systems.  
The development of multiple subsystems and smaller units of 
development, enable the design and development of a subsystem 
independently of other subsystems. It can also enable the extensibility of the 
final application with additional subsystems being included where an interface 
has been clearly specified and an overarching design permits the expansion of 
the application to include new functionality. Dividing a system into 
subsystems is an effective strategy for handling complexity and splitting a 
system into subsystems helps to maximise reuse at the component levels, as 
each subsystem may correspond to a component that is suitable for reuse in 
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other applications. An effective design in terms of the decomposition of the 
application into subsystems can reduce the impact on the overall system of a 
change to its requirements; therefore the use of subsystems can improve 
maintainability. Moving an application from one implementation platform to 
another platform can be much easier if the software architecture is 
appropriate. For example, the conversion of a Windows application so that it 
can run in a Unix environment requires changes to the software that 
implements the human computer interface. If this is dealt with by specialised 
subsystems then the overall software change is localised to these subsystems. 
As a result, the system as a whole is easier to port to a different operating 
environment. 
It is proposed that the architecture for the Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis system have four layers: the presentation layer, 
the application logic layer, the domain layer and the database layer, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. The presentation layer will be responsible for the 
differing user interface needs of different artefacts; the application logic layer 
will be responsible for the control; the domain layer will be responsible for the 
common functionality, or, to retrieve and store data; and the database layer 
will be responsible for the data management in order to get data from a 
database. The approach that has been adopted during the analysis activity of 
use case realisation results in the identification of boundary, control and entity 
classes. These boundary classes are mapped onto the presentation layer, the 
control classes onto the application layer, and the entity classes on the domain 
layer. Control classes reside on the user machine and manage the interaction 
between users and the boundary classes and handle the interaction between 
the business logic of the application and the entity classes and the associated 
data management classes. A design based on the Broker pattern will be used 
to handle this (see Section 5.3.4).  
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The idea of separating out user interface classes from the business and 
application logic classes and from mechanisms for data storage is to keep the 
behaviour of the interface separate from the behaviour of the classes that 
provide the main functionality of the system. The database layer provides 
access to a database. This four layer architecture separates responsibility for 
the user interface, the application logic, the domain classes, and the database. 
Each layer corresponds to one or more subsystems, which may be 
differentiated from each other by differing levels of abstraction or by a 
different focus of their functionality. For the Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis system, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, the Artefact 
Database layer provides access to a database that contains all the details of 



















Figure 4.2: Four Layers Architecture  Figure 4.3: Four Layers Architecture  
Applied to Overall   Applied to Windows System  
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The Artefact Domain layer uses the Artefact Database layer to retrieve 
and store data in the database and provides common domain functionality for 
the layers above, that is the Artefact Details subsystem in the Application 
Logic layer. The Artefact Details subsystem uses some of the same common 
domain functionality when detailing an artefact. Each application subsystem 
has its own presentation layer to cater for the differing interface needs of the 
different artefact types. In the presentation layer design, one of the aims is to 
isolate the entity classes in the system from the way that they are presented 
on screen and in reports and documents. By this means the reusability of the 
classes can be maximised. With all the design justification mentioned in the 
above section, the architecture in Figure 4.4 illustrates how the layer 
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Figure 4.5 below shows the architecture model based on different views 
(the package view of the architecture) in order to reason out the proposed 






















Figure 4.5: Package Architecture Applied to the System 
The architecture is required to fully support the hypothesis of finding 
a solution for the development of a flexible and extensible architecture, open 
source and prototype tool, which may used for the analysis and visualisation of 
Windows system generated artefacts to improve the forensic process. The 
different layers within the architecture reflect the processing of data that 
takes place as it is extracted, stored, queried, and visualised. 
In order to produce the explicit architecture, the non-functional 
requirements, the context of the system and how it and its components are 
used and may be further developed in the future are taken into consideration.  
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4.4 System Analysis  
The analysis activities produce the model, and this model shows what parts 
are in the system and how those parts are related to one another in the 
system. The analysis model for the Windows System Generated Artefacts 
Forensic Analysis system is illustrated in Figure 4.6. This model is used to 
come out with the requirements and specification of what the proposed system 
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4.5 Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic 
Analysis (SAFTool) System Requirements  
The specific forensic analysis requirements need to be clearly understood when 
analysing the requirements for the system design. The key requirements 
highlighted in the previous Section 4.3, is the need for the system to analyse 
and visualise data of Windows system artefacts. This may require some form 
of data storage to enable the user to query and then visualise the data in an 
intuitive format to enable users to extract evidence.  
Using the previously stated evidentiary values, features and issues of 
windows system artefacts tabled in Chapter 3, a list of requirements can be 
generated. These requirements can be divided into functional requirements, 
and non functional requirements (security requirements, software quality 
requirements and other requirements). What a system does or is expected to 
do is the system functional requirements, while non functional requirements 
include security requirements, software quality requirements, and other 
requirements later describe how well these non functional requirements 
support the functional requirements.  
Considering the focus of this project is data analysis, the software 
development process begins with a statement of requirements, the process 
then proceeds through analysis, overall design, detailed design and 
implementation. La Bella (2004) suggested the purpose and value of data 
analysis was being able to extract different types of data and then turn that 
data into valuable information. A discussion of the weaknesses of the current 
state of the art tools used to extract and analyse data was identified in 
Chapter 3. These weaknesses and other considered issues regarding the 
artefacts can be used as the requirements of the architecture.  
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4.5.1 Functional Requirements 
At this stage, the functional requirements are set out to establish what the 
system must do. The functional requirements include:  
• Descriptions of the processing that the system will be required to carry 
out. 
- The Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis system 
automates (gets data into the system, controls of the system, and gets 
data out of the system) the analysis of evidence items (system 
generated artefacts).  This automated system helps the investigator to 
glean the content information (which is textual data resident in the 
evidence item) of an evidence item rather than usage information 
(which indicates how the evidence item or data on it was used) in a 
forensic analysis investigation.  
- The Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis system 
automates the analysis and visualises the system generated artefacts, 
thereby relieving the investigator from the time consuming and 
tedious aspect of low-level analysis. The Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis system is designed to facilitate the 
analysis and visualisation of forensic data in various types of file 
format and data complexity. 
- The Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis system 
must be able to locate the internal structure of each artefact file for 
analysis. Locating the internal structure automatically does not 
require the user to know the exact location of information within the 
native files. 
- The Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis system 
must facilitate data extraction, data interpretation, and data 
4.5 Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis (SAFTool) System 
Requirements                                                                                                                      129 
 
                                                                                                    
 
reconstruction from the internal structure of the artefact without the 
user’s prior knowledge of the internal structure. 
- Additional functionality should be added through plugins or modules, 
as well as scripting capability via an extensive API.  
• Details of the inputs into the system.  
- The main function of the system is to analyse forensic evidence 
(system generated artefacts) that are extracted from hard disk images.  
- The system should be flexible by being able to analyse evidence items 
collected from a number of platforms, and from many different 
sources. The design shall be modular; it should be easy to extend to 
support new kinds of targets and new types of analysing or processing 
of data. 
• Details of the outputs that are expected from the system.  
- Presentation functionality and reporting functionality are required. 
• Details of data that must be held in the system. 
- The Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis system 
must store data in a forensically sound manner whereby no changes 
can be made to the original data. Forensic integrity is maintained by 
ensuring no data in the original internal structure of the system 
generated artefacts will change. 
- No data can be changed while being stored in the system.  
In Chapter 3, a discussion of the limitations of the current state-of-the-
art tools were identified. These limitations can be used to inform the 
requirements of the system, thus the system must satisfy these and in doing 
so, demonstrate an advance on the currently available software tools. Further, 
the non-functional requirements are also formulated. These non-functional 
requirements are concerned with the how well the system performs rather 
than what it does.  
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4.5.2  Security Requirements 
Data confidentiality:   
The data within the evidence item is considered sensitive in nature, where an 
attacker can gain access, through accessing the database. Possible methods 
shall be considered to protect data within the evidence item from being 
disclosed to unintended parties. 
Data integrity:  
No data in the original complex structure of the evidential artefact will 
change.  
4.5.3 Software Quality Requirements 
Verifiability: The system should support the established, standard 
procedures for handling digital evidence as outlined in Section 
2.3 in Chapter 2.  
Scalability:  The architecture should also be scalable. It should be possible 
to add visualisation techniques capability to additional 
evidence items as the need arises. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
with every new operating system and new version thereof, 
there are requirements for uncovering new artefacts and 
other such information that proves valuable to the forensic 
analysis process.  
Usability-1: The system must be easy to use by non-expert users 
(simplicity). 
Usability-2: The system must be easy to use by using keyboard and mouse 
to control the system. 
Accuracy: Accuracy of the generated information output from the 
analysed files and shown using a textual visualisation 
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technique is paramount. As this is a key requirement of 
forensics tools as outlined in the discussion in Section 2.6 in 
Chapter 2, the analysis phase of the digital forensic phase is 
the point at which the data is explored in more detail and 
where the data is drawn together and the analysis is the sum 
of all data applied towards the resolution of the incident. 
Reliability:  The system must be reliable, that is no major break on 
underlying core functionality, which is the resistance to 
failure of the system.  
Extensibility-1: The system must be extensible. It should be easy to add 
support for new types of data sources for analysis. As this is a 
key requirement of forensics tools as outlined in the 
discussion in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2, this is critical since 
new versions of operating systems and applications are 
continually developed and the system has to be able to plug in 
these new sources with as little work as possible.  
Extensibility-2: Additional functionality can be added through plugins or 
modules, as well as scripting capability via an extensive and 
usable API. As integration with other products, allowing the 
architecture to be used freely with other product. 
4.5.4 Other Requirements 
OR- 1: The system must allow dynamic reconfiguration. This making the 
plug and play features possible which increased the system flexibility 
as it is designed to be used with various Windows system generated 
artefacts. 
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OR-2: The architecture and implementation should be independent of 
underlying software as possible. 
OR-3: Authentication software is used to prove that the evidence has not 
been changed. Algorithms like MD5 or SHA-1 are required. 
OR-4: There are many document formats and it can become very tedious to 
try and find the correct program to read the file. So, a document 
examiner that will read many different file formats should be used. 
OR-5: The tool must be designed in such a way that it provides a form of 
integrity assurance or record when its utilities are executed, such as it 
provides an audit record about timestamp or actions taken, or results 
return from running those utilities. This requirement needs to be 
addressed, as this is compliant with the best practice requirements for 
forensics tools as discussed in Chapter 2.  
Comparison of the architecture with current state-of-the-art methods 
shall prove the superiority of the architecture over the available solutions. It is 
possible to evaluate the outcome of the architecture by: 
- Compiling a list of objectives for the architecture and those that will be 
addressed in the prototype tool.  
- Ensure that the architecture satisfies all the objectives outlined. Prove 
that no such approach is available to date that satisfies the list of 
objectives to date, therefore, clear proof of contribution of science. 
- Perform comparison of the prototype tool against the outlined tools.  
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4.6 Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic 
Analysis System Design 
According to (Bennett et al., 2006), “design is about producing a solution that 
meets the requirements that have been analysed and the design activity is 
concerned with specifying how the new system will meet the requirements; 
system design is concerned with the overall architecture of the system and 
setting of standards; and design is about translating every aspect of the 
analysis model into a design model that will effectively implement the 
requirements”.  
According to Zhu (2005), an effective system design is:  
Well structured: The design should be consistent with chosen design 
principles. This is to organise the structure of the design. 
Simple: The design should be as simple as possible.  
Adequate: The design should meet the stated requirements. 
Efficient: The functions provided by the design should be computable by 
using the available resources. 
Flexible: The design should be able to accommodate likely changes in the 
requirements if there are requirement changes. 
Practical: Each module in the design should provide the required facilities, 
neither more nor less. 
Implementable: The functions offered by the design should be theoretically 
computable with the information available and achievable using currently 
available software and hardware technology. 
Standardised: The design should be represented using standard or well-
defined and familiar notation for any documentation. 
The system design should provide a solution to the problems outlined in 
the previous chapter. The architecture design should give an insight into the 
high-level design of modular components and how they interact, thus 
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providing a foundation to build the solution to solve the problems outlined. 
Further, the design of the system should addresses the requirements outlined 
in the previous section of this chapter.  
The functional requirements for the system are documented in the use 
case (see Appendix C). The system is structured as an assembly of interacting 
objects. This use case captures an element of functionality of the system, 
whereas requirements that apply to the whole system are captured in a list of 
requirements. Each use case is a different way to use the system and the 
completion of each use case produces a different result accordingly.  
The initial documenting of the use cases suggests that the following will 
be part of the system as shown in Figure 4.7 below: 
• Artefact (entity object): representing the current artefact which the 
software program is working with. 
• Artefacts (entity object): representing one of the artefacts that is in the 
current artefact where there is an arbitrary number of entity objects. 
• ArtefactGUI (boundary object): representing the interface between the 
artefact system and the user. 
• ArtefactDbaseSystem (boundary object): representing the interface 
between the artefact system and the database system. 
• ArtefactController (controller object): carries out the use cases that user’s 
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Figure 4.7: Collaboration for the Windows System Generated 
         Artefacts Forensic Analysis System 
 
The various use cases work with these objects, as follows (see Appendix C): 
• The Analyse New Artefact Use Case involves creating a new Artefact 
object, obtaining the new information, and then instructing the Artefact 
object to add the new artefact with this information to its collection.  
• The Visualise Artefact Data Use Case involves getting a database 
specification (all data retrieved from and inserted to the data store will 
be in a standardised format to enable tools to operate independently of 
changes to the database format) from the user, then telling the 
ArtefactDbaseSystem object to read in an Artefact object from this 
database, and then display the current information about the desired 
artefact.  
In the model-view-controller design pattern, responsibilities are 
assigned to the various classes. The two entity classes, Artefact and Artefacts 
serve as the model. The GUI class, which is the ArtefactGUI, serves as the 
view. The controller class, ArtefactContoller, serves as the controller. 
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The view, ArtefactGUI, needs to be made an observer of the model, Artefact, so 
that it always reflects the current state of the model.  
Class Responsibility Collaboration (CRC) cards, as used by Bennett et 
al., (2006) and shown in Table 4.1 are used to assign responsibilities to various 
classes and the collaborations that are necessary to fulfill the responsibilities 
for the tasks required by the various use cases.   
Table 4.1: Class Responsibility Collaboration for the Main Classes 
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The classes discovered during system analysis and additional classes 
discovered during design, suggest that the following will be the classes 
required in the class diagram for the Windows System Generated Artefacts 
Forensic Analysis system: 
• ArtefactApplication – responsible for creating the ArtefactDbaseSystem 
and GUI objects. It is the main class for the application and starts up the 
application. 
• ArtefactListener (a utility class) – responsible for the user’s choice of 
action.  
• AnalyseNewArtefact – action for analysing artefact objects (used for 
recovering data structure). 
• VisualiseArtefactData – action for visualising artefact objects (used for 
visualising data) 
Figure 4.8 is the class diagram for the system where only the name of 
each class is shown, the attribute and behaviour compartments are omitted. 
The relationships hold between the objects is follows: 
• ArtefactApplication object is responsible for creating ArtefactController 
object. 
• ArtefactDbaseSystem responsible for saving and reloading an artefact.  
• ArtefactController object responsible for creating ArtefactGUI object and 
this ArtefactGUI object is responsible for keeping track of its current 
artefact object displayed. 
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• Artefacts object is responsible for creating and keeping track of record 
objects, where there is an arbitrary number of entity objects. 
• ArtefactListener object is used by the ArtefactController to allow the 
user to choose which action to perform in examining an artefact. 







Figure 4.8: Objects for the Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis System 
4.7 Operation and Control Specifications 
Operation specifications are detailed specifications of the behaviour of a 
system model. An operation specification is a framework for a more detailed 
design specification, which can then be used to derive an appropriate 
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implementation of the operation in code. It can also be used to verify that the 
method does indeed meet the original specification, which in turn describes 
what the users intended, thus checking that the requirements have been 
implemented correctly. 
An operation that translates a stream of bytes into a usable file 
structure of an artefact and recovers the content of the file is invokes during 
the use case Analyse New Artefact (in Appendix C). For ease of reference, 
the use case description is repeated below:  
The artefact’s data may be recovered from a stream of bytes of the 
internal structure of an artefact to perform artefact analysis.  
A sequence of steps for this operation will include the following steps for 
recovering data structure. 
1. Locate: Locate the fields (the units of information) within the 
structure. Different method of locating fields for different files of the 
Windows system generated artefacts. Examples of the methods used 
are: 
i. Fixed offset 
ii. Calculation 
iii. Iteration 
iv.  Location by outside knowledge from some source 
2. Extract: To extract the data of the internal structure out of the stream 
of bytes.  
3. Decode: After the relevant data has been extracted from the internal 
structure, it is still possible that further extraction may be necessary, 
specifically the bit fields. It will use a list of bit fields to check on each 
field in the stream of bytes. Examples of bit fields are: flags, 
attributes, date field, time field, etc. 
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4. Interpretation: Takes the output of the previous step or the extract 
step and performs various computations. Examples: the value for the 
years of date field and second of time field need to be interpreted.  
5. Reconstruction: Information from the previous step 
(interpretation) is used to reconstruct a usable representation of the 
internal structure or fields.  
Figure 4.9 shows the activity diagram for the use case Analyse New 













Figure 4.9: Activity Diagram for Use Case Analyse New Artefact 
The operational process that maps data to a visual form, that is, the 
data representation is invoked during the use case Visualise Artefact 
Data (in Appendix C). For ease of reference, the use case description is 
repeated below:  
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The artefact’s data may be examined to identify valuable meaningful 
data and allow for further analysis. The mapping of data to a visual 
form presents the data in a more human friendly format by the use of 
graphs, charts or illustrations.   
A sequence of steps for this operation will include the following steps for 
understanding data. 
1. Acquire: Obtain the data, whether from a file on a disk or a file over 
a network; or database. 
2. Parse: Give some structure for the data’s meaning, that is, to 
change it into a format that tags each part of the data with its 
intended use. Each record of the file must be broken into fields.  
3. Filter: Remove any extraneous data. 
4. Mine: Add methods as a way to shows patterns. 
5. Represent: Determines the basic form of a visual model that a set of 
data will take. 
Example: Bar graph, tree, table and so forth. 
6. Refine: Design methods are used to improve the basic 
representation to make the information presented clearer and more 
visually useful. 
7. Interact: Apply methods for manipulating or controlling the data. 
8. Output: The information file is translated into the required output 
format and output to the screen. 
Figure 4.10 shows the activity diagram for the use case Visualise Artefact 
Data and illustrates the internal operation logic of the process.  
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Figure 4.10:  Activity Diagram for Use Case Visualise Artefact Data 
 
The activity involved in the use case realisation of the system is next 
presented using the following UML diagrams: communication diagram and 
sequence diagrams that reflect understanding of the domain and of the 
requirements. The communication diagrams and sequence diagrams 
illustrating the design for the entire prototype tool can be found in Appendix 
D. The sequence diagrams show the interaction between users, systems and 
sub-systems; with the emphasis on the ordering of time of messages.  The 
communication diagram shows similar information as the sequence diagram, 
but emphasises the structural organisation of the objects’ send and receive 
messages; thus illustrates the dynamic view of the system.  
4.8 Data Management    
The application needs to store data between one execution of the program and 
the next. Data must be contained within a form of shared data storage system 
so that users can retrieve it when access is required. Requirements include the 
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storage of persistent data to operate independently of any changes made to the 
database, thus reinforcing the architecture’s extensibility.  
The aim of using a Database Management System (DBMS) is the 
DBMS organises and manages the data and decouples the storage mechanisms 
from the application programs. It is proposed that the object oriented system, 
that is, the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis System to 
be built, use a relational DBMS to provide the storage for the system. The 
classes are converted to tables, the classes are flattened into tables in order to 
design the storage structures. In this example, the a ProjectMember with 
EmpID, FirstName, LastName, and Rate properties; and a 
ProjectManager with SignatureLevel and BudgetAuthority  properties 
classes are flattened into a ProjectMembers table, which groups all 
properties defined in the class hierarchy table and contains an additional a 
EmpType column. Therefore, now ProjectMembers table has EmpID, 
FirstName, LastName, Rate, SignatureLevel, BudgetAuthority, 
and EmpType (Hautefeuille, 2011). When the system requires an instance of 
a class from the database, it will have to retrieve the data from all the tables 
that hold parts of that object instance and reconstruct it into an object. When a 
complex object instance has to be stored, it will have to be taken apart and 
parts of it will be stored in different tables. Data modelling and the 
normalisation approach will be used to flatten out the objects in order to store 
them in a relational database.  
Separate classes are introduced into the system, whose role is to deal 
with the storage and retrieval of the other classes. These classes are part of 
the data storage layer. The data storage classes are decoupled from the 
business classes. The business classes which contain metadata indicate how 
they are to be stored. The same business classes can be reused unchanged with 
different storage mechanisms. The classes that provide the data storage 
services are held in a separate package. The objective here is to separate the 
data storage mechanisms completely from the business classes. One of the 
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business requirements is to produce a report combining data from different 
applications, so there is a need to access the data in new ways.  
The database design will be capable of storing all an artefact’s file data 
from the Windows system. A composite of data will be placed in here based on 
definitions and methods in which the data is to be extracted, and will be 
specific to each of the artefacts.  
Once the data is processed by the analyser, a database must be 
available to store data so that this data can be rapidly retrieved and queried. 
The design of this database must be extensible in terms of accepting all sizes of 
data and extraction of the data for display or printout in the report without 
knowing the structure. This database can be regarded as an interface between 
the two components to communicate in a common language that overcomes 
any specifics related to the syntax and semantics of the data set.  
 
4.9 Object Oriented Approach to System 
Development 
The purpose of system design is to answer the question: (Stair and Reynolds, 
2008) “How will the system solve the problem?”. The primary result of the 
system design phase is a technical design that details system outputs, inputs, 
and user interfaces; and shows how these components are related (Arnott, 
2006). There are several approaches that can be followed today which have 
their own justification for users to adopt them, but all attempt to deliver a 
better system. Such approaches include: structured system analysis and 
design approach, the prototyping approach, the rapid application development 
approach, the extreme programming approach, the joint application 
development approach, the end user system development approach and the 
object oriented systems development.  
One of the important design considerations that can have significant 
consequences in all areas of the architecture is the choice of the system 
development approach.  The reason for choosing a specific approach is to avoid 
many of the problems and pitfalls in system development. 
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By adopting the object oriented approach for implementation of the 
architecture, the built-in beneficial features and advantages that come with 
this approach can be adopted and realised. These are the modularity 
advantages of the system on the ease of maintenance and upgrading, with 
software broken into smaller pieces instead of a monolithic block of code to 
deal with all the processes in analysing system generated artefacts; and the 
reusable advantages of the system is realised on the integration with other 
products, providing a standard and well documented process for other products 
for their integration.  This is further supported by the fact that this approach 
combines the logic of the system development life cycle with the capabilities of 
object oriented modelling and programming.  
The beneficial features and advantages of the object-oriented approach 
are discussed below (Bennett et al., 2006):   
Increasing abstraction  
Abstraction in object orientation means (Martin, 2001), “The elimination of the 
irrelevant and amplification of the essential”. The increase in abstraction 
applies both to the activity of programming and the tasks that computer 
programs are expected to perform.  
Event-driven programming  
The applications of object-oriented programming include event-driven systems 
such as simulation and graphical user interfaces (GUIs). GUI programs 
typically are created using event-driven systems and present the user with 
possible activities. This might include: clicking on a button at the top of the 
screen, pulling down a menu, and moving the mouse across an icon bar. The 
object-oriented approach encapsulates data and processing methods together, 
which is useful for this project in that the system can be informed that an 
event has occurred, and then manage this by asking a processing method to 
act on the relevant piece of data. The intended prototype system will had the 
objective of event-driven system that have the dropdown menu populated with 
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the names of all artefacts, so the users are allowed to select an artefact to 
examine from the dropdown menu on the interface. 
For example, if a simulation task is to be programmed in a procedural 
language, it is very difficult to program it effectively in a procedural language 
since program designs for procedural languages are based on the assumption 
that the program structure controls the flow of execution. Beside, for a 
program with functions to tackle the simulation task, it must have separate 
routines that test for; and respond to a number of alternative conditions. 
Therefore, object oriented techniques are most effective in event-driven 
systems such as simulation and GUIs. Before event driven programming, the 
event handler is implemented as subroutines and in event driven 
programming the event handler is implemented as processing methods of 
objects.  
Graphical User Interface  
Object oriented technology can be employed to anticipate every possible route 
that a user might take through a system’s interface. The number of possible 
options in a GUI can mean that the majority of desktop applications are now 
very difficult to design or control in a procedural way. The object-oriented 
paradigm offers a method to design software, each component of which offers 
clear services that can be used by other parts of the system quite 
independently of the sequence of tasks or the flow of control. The intended 
prototype system will present results using a GUI because the goal of GUI 
design is to make user’s interaction as simple an efficient as possible in terms 
of navigation, analysis and retrieval. 
Modular Software  
In an object-oriented system, classes have two kinds of definition: from an 
external and internal perspective. From an external, a class is defined in terms 
of its interface, other objects need only know the services that are offered by 
objects of that class and the signature used to request each service. From an 
internal, a class is defined in terms of what it knows and what it can do. 
Modularity means the implementation of each part of the constructed software 
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is independent of the implementation of other parts of the constructed 
software. This contributes to solving some of the most intractable problems in 
information systems development. Advantages of modular software are:   
• Maintaining a system built in a modular way is easier, as changes to a 
sub-system are much less likely to affect the rest of the system. 
• It is easier to upgrade a modular system. As long as replacement 
modules adhere to the interface specifications of their predecessors, 
other parts of the system are not affected. 
• It is easier to build a system that is reliable in use. This is because 
subsystems can be tested more thoroughly, and fewer problems to be 
addressed later when the whole system is assembled. 
• Implementation of a modular system can be in small, manageable 
increments. Provided each module is designed to provide a useful and 
coherent package of functionality, they can be introduced one at a time. 
Life Cycle  
Object orientation addresses system design by a cyclic development approach. 
The iterative process of this approach can repeat and this aspect is linked to 
the modular character of an object-oriented system and also the seamless 
development of models throughout an object oriented life cycle. 
Model Transitions  
A successful design is one that meets the requirements in a way that is 
functional, efficient, and economic. In structured approaches, the designs for 
new systems are hard to trace back to the original requirements.  
Object oriented analysis and design avoid these transition problems by using a 
set of models throughout analysis and design, adding more detail at each 
stage. In Unified Modelling Language (UML) (Shnitman, 2000), a modeling 
language used to support the object oriented approach, the fundamental 
analysis models are the use case and the class diagram and these continue as 
the backbone of the design, with other design models derived directly or 
indirectly from them. 
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Reusable Software  
Information systems are costly in the case where they are used to invent new 
solutions to old problems. This has led to the demand for reusable software 
components. Reusable software components can eliminate the need to keep 
inventing new solutions. Object oriented development methods offer 
developers software components that are reusable in other systems. This is 
achieved through the highly modular nature of object oriented software and 
also the way that object oriented models are organised. The intended prototype 
system will have the objective of developing reusable components that are 
reusable in other systems. 
The techniques and notation system chosen to support the object 
oriented approach is the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (IBM, 2011a). 
UML is chosen as it has become the industry standard for modelling 
information systems and consists mainly of a graphical language to represent 
the concepts that are required in the development of an object-oriented 
information system. In UML 2.0 (Object Management Group, 2005), a model is 
defined as:  “A model captures a view of a physical system. It is an abstraction 
of a physical system, with certain purpose. This purpose determines what is to 
be included in the model and what is irrelevant. Thus the model completely 
describes those aspects of the physical system that are relevant to the purpose of 
the model, at the relevant level of detail”. 
The thesis had the objective of developing a reusable architecture, as 
such object oriented development methods offer developing software 
components that are reusable in other systems. This is achieved through the 
highly modular nature of object oriented software and also of the way that 
object oriented models are organised.  
In order to assess the architecture and the system, a prototype tool was 
developed based on the architecture. Chapter 5 will discuss the 
implementation of the architecture in relation to the prototype in detail. 
Chapter 6 will discuss the evaluation and analysis of the architecture and the 
in relation to the prototype tool and state-of-the-art tools available. 
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4.10  Conclusion 
The contribution of this project lies not only in the ability to manipulate and 
visualise the event logs and swap files, but also in the development of a 
flexible and extensible architecture to process various Windows generated 
artefacts. This is based on a clear understanding of the priority of the 
requirements that have been identified from the highlighted evidentiary 
values, features of the artefacts, and issues associated with current state-of-
the-art tools explored in Chapters 1 and 2. 
This chapter has described the design of a software architecture for the 
forensic analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. Forensic analysis has 
a number of unique requirements that directly impact on the design of an 
architecture. For example, the need to interact with multiple disparate data 
sources led to the development of the plugins. The system architecture is 
flexible in the sense that other types of artefact (e.g. Registry, Internet 
Explorer Activity Files, Web Cookie files) could be easily added into the system 
in addition to Event logs and Swap files. Furthermore, different plugins may 
be used for processing each of the artefacts. The following chapter details the 
implementation of the architecture.  
An object oriented approach, is elaborated in activities to design the 
system architecture, identify objects in the system, describe the design using 





SYSTEM GENERATED ARTEFACTS 
FORENSIC ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In Chapter 4, the proposed architecture aimed at processing Windows system 
generated artefacts was introduced and the rationale for the design decision 
was discussed. This chapter outlines the development of that architecture in 
terms of a prototype implementation. The architecture requirements and 
objectives are formalised from the issues identified in the state-of-the-art tools 
review in Chapter 3. This chapter then highlights some of the key issues in 
creating a prototype implementation of that architecture. 
5.1 Introduction 
The initial section of Chapter 4 highlighted the requirements of the 
architectural design. In terms of the implementation of the prototype system 
the architecture necessitates the creation or integration of a number of 
components, including a database management system. The implementation of 
a prototype system requires a range of tools and languages and vitally a set of 
documentation to ensure the system can be understood and 
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extended by other programmers / users. UML provides a number of diagrams, 
two of which can be used to document the implementation of the system. 
Component diagrams are used to document dependencies between the 
different elements of the system. These component diagrams can then be 
combined with deployment diagrams to show how the software components 
relate to the physical architecture of the system.  
5.2 Software Development Tools 
A software development tool is a program or application that is employed in 
the development, repair, or enhancement of other programs or of hardware 
(Daintith, 2004). The software development tools used for the implementation 
of the prototype system include the use of Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) that is the NetBeans IDE; object oriented programming 
language, that is Java; and JavaDB that comes with database management 
system and connectivity (Java Database Connectivity (JDBC)), that is DBMS. 
NetBeans IDE is a platform that provides reliable and flexible application 
architecture. It provides a means to develop applications by the use of 
components provided with NetBeans IDE itself. NetBeans IDE allows the 
development of interfaces by allowing the developer to use the generic 
framework without the need to manually code the interface. Java is used as 
the programming language as Java is object-oriented. Java programming is 
object-oriented as is centered on creating objects, manipulating objects, and 
making objects work together. This allows the creation of modular programs 
and reusable code. JavaDB was the database used for the implementation of 
the prototype. This decision was based on the fact that it is an open source 
Java technology database. It support standards based SQL, and JDBC API 
that supports creating and executing SQL statements. 
These tools are used to support the implementation of the whole system 
and are discussed below in Section 5.2.1 through 5.2.3. 
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5.2.1 Integrated Development Environment 
An Integrated Development Environment (IDE) is a set of tools that aids 
application development (Nourie, 2005), essentially it is a software tool that 
can be used to keep track of all files containing source code, resource files and 
the dependencies between them, recompiling all those that have changed as a 
project is being built. Therefore, as the IDE combines the features of many 
tools into single development package, and as discussed in Section 5.2, it is 
used in the architecture implementation.  
Sun Microsystems supports three IDEs for the Java platform: 
NetBeans, Sun Java Studio Creator, and Sun Java Enterprise. IDEs are 
important as they provide comprehensive facilities to developers for software 
development for the implementation of the prototype. It consists of a source 
code editor, a compiler, an interpreter, build automation tools and a debugger. 
The IDEs for developing HTML applications are HomeSite (Adobe Systems 
Incorporated, 2011), DreamWeaver (Adobe Systems Incorporated, 2011) and 
FrontPage (Microsoft Corporation, 2011). The IDE selected for the 
implementation of the proposed system is NetBeans. The advantages of using 
NetBeans are:  the NetBeans IDE is open source, written in the Java 
programming language, and supported by Sun Microsystems. NetBeans, IDE 
provides the services for creating desktop applications, such as window and 
menu management features, setting storage and fully supporting Java 
Development Kit (JDK). NetBeans IDE incorporates a multi-window editor 
which is the mechanism for managing the files that make up a project, links to 
the compiler so that code can be compiled from within the IDE, and a debugger 
to help step through the code to find errors. NetBeans saves time by managing 
window, settings, and data. This is due to the hypothesis of this thesis was to 
develop an open source solution and a lot support from the Java community is 
there if a problem is encountered during the programming phase. 
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There are several popular IDEs as alternatives to NetBeans IDE, 
including Borland JBuilder, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse. These were not used 
for the development of the project because they are not as richly featured as 
NetBeans IDE. Moreover, NetBeans has a closer relationship with the 
programs it is developing than most other IDEs due to its managing window, 
settings, and data (Boudreau et al., 2003). In addition, NetBeans IDE contains 
drag and drop features that enable the rapid development and revision of 
graphical user interface components. Finally, to keep the architecture as 
maintainable as possible NetBeans IDE was the choice due to it incorporates a 
mechanism for managing the files that make up a project, links to the compiler 
that compiled the code from within the IDE, and a debugger to help through 
the code to find errors. 
Developing new toolkits requires modular applications. NetBeans IDE 
provides this feature by having facilities to built multiple modules and create 
dependency (communicate among themselves) between them effortlessly. A 
module suite can be created inside NetBeans IDE to create modular 
applications (Sun Microsystems, 2007).  
5.2.2 Object Oriented Programming 
An object oriented approach to the problem was considered the most 
appropriate method as object oriented programming model the physical world,  
in a way that the building of a computer applications represent how objects are 
assembled, that is to say, objects are made up of many kinds of smaller objects. 
By using this object oriented approach of development, the resulting software 
is understandable, reusable, and reliable (KayKeys, 2005). 
Object oriented programming focuses on the task for which the users 
are using the computers rather than the way a computer handles tasks. It is a 
software development methodology in which a program is conceptualised as a 
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group of objects that work together. Classes contain data and method. A 
method is how to use that data. These data and methods are used when 
creating objects.   
There is a number of possible alternative languages that could be 
employee to develop the proposed prototype system. The choice of an object 
oriented system suggests that Java, C++, C#, Python and Visual Basic are 
possible candidates. All these programming languages provide complex 
functionality and libraries to develop programs. However to keep the 
architecture as platform neutral as possible, Java was the language of choice, 
because this would enable the program to run on different platform without 
modification.  
According to Sun Developer Network (2010), “Java programs are 
compiled into a format called bytecode that is run by any operating system, 
software, or device with a Java interpreter. A Java program can be created on a 
Windows Vista machine that runs on a Linux web server, Apple Mac using OS 
X, and Palm personal digital assistant. As long as a platform has a Java 
interpreter, it can run the bytecode”.  
5.2.3 Database Management System (DBMS) and 
Connectivity 
The Database Management System is used to organise and manage the tasks 
associated with storing and providing effective access to the data. This will 
enable a degree of flexibility in accessing the data. Tools and features of the 
DBMS can be used to manage the data: Data Definition Language (DDL) is 
used to specify the data held in the DBMS and the structures that are used to 
hold it; Data Manipulation Language (DML) is used to specify updates and 
retrievals of the data; Security is used to control the access to the data and 
permissions granted to different users for different levels of access; and 
Integrity is used to specify constraints to ensure that the integrity of the data 
is maintained.  
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Structured query language (SQL) is used to provide both the DDL and 
DML for the relational databases and the main advantage of using this 
language is that it forms the basis for the user’s interaction with relational 
database systems. Once a user is familiar with the construction of SQL 
statements they can apply this knowledge to any database supporting the 
language. SQL is the industry-standard approach to accessing relational 
databases (IBM, 2006). 
The required interaction between the developed tools and the database 
is provided by the Java Database Connectivity (JDBC). JDBC is a set of 
classes, and when working with a database in developing an application, 
JDBC can be used. JDBC classes were developed by a number of organisations 
including Microsoft (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a), Sybase (Sybase, 2011), 
Oracle (Oracle, 2011), and Informix (IBM, 2011b). According to Cadenhead and 
Lemay (2007), “The JDBC library includes classes for each of the tasks 
commonly associated with database usage these include making a connection to 
a database, creating a statement using SQL, executing SQL query in the 
database, and enabling the viewing of the resulting records”. 
Database management systems provide various facilities that are 
useful in many applications. According to Bennett et al. (2006), “a DBMS 
typically offers support for: different views of the data by different users; control 
of multi-user access; distribution of the data over different platforms; security; 
enforcement of integrity constraints; access to data by various applications; 
data recovery; portability across platforms; data access via query languages; 
and query optimization”. The hypothesis of the thesis was to develop an 
architecture that is able to integrate forensic data from known and not known 
internal data structures of system generated artefacts by the Windows 
operating system and to design and implement a proof of concept prototype 
tool, with appropriate example artefacts. Considering DBMS appear to meet 
the main criteria of the architecture. 
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5.3 Implementation of the Architecture 
According to Stair and Reynolds (2008), “Systems implementation involves 
creating or acquiring the various system components (hardware, software, 
databases, etc) defined in the design step, assembling them, and putting the 
new system into operation”.  
 In Chapter 3 it was determined that the Event logs (a known data 
structure) and Swap files (a not known data structure) were the chosen 
Windows system generated artefacts selected for the prototype 
implementation, as they illustrate the types of complex internal structure 
found in Windows system generated artefacts. The following section discusses 
the implementation for each package of the architecture will be discussed, 
including the development of a class diagram and supporting series of 
interactions for the package illustrating how the data is extracted and 
processed throughout the architecture.  
The packages have been named in a way that allows the use of Java 
package notation for classes. For example, the boundary classes will be in the 
package SAFTool::Boundary, the control classes will be in the package 
SAFTool::Control, and the entity classes will be in the package 
SAFTool::Entity. Figure 5.1 shows the package diagram view for the software 
architecture of the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis 
system.  
The architecture can also be modelled using the structural view model 
and data view model. A data view is the same diagram as a structural view, 
but the architecture defines the type of data that is to be provided by one 
subsystem to another subsystem. Figure 5.2 shows structural and data view of 
the system under development. The data dictionary presented in Table 5.1 
explains the meaning of the entities shown in Figure 5.2. 
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5.3.1 Classes Identified 
As mentioned in Section 4.3 in Chapter 4, the package view of the architecture 
has four packages: entity domain package and entity business (entity data 
management) package; control package; boundary package; and database 
package. The entity classes that collaborate in the package are Artefact and 
Artefacts. The entity classes are in the package SAFTool::Entity::Domain. 
There is a need to be able to deal with the process of materialising instances of 
these classes from the database and, when required, materialising their links 
with other object instances or collections of object instances. The Broker 
pattern (see Section 5.3.4) is a way of making it possible to materialise the 
objects that are linked to other objects only when they are required. The 
brokers are in the package SAFTool::Entity::DataManagement, together 
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with any other necessary classes to handle the connection to the database. 
The control classes in the SAFTool::Control package create the 
boundary classes. The control class needs to have the first dropdown menus 
populated with the names of all the artefacts, so it creates an instance of the 
control class ListArtefacts and requests it to pass back the artefact names to 
the boundary class, making reference to the boundary class in the message 
vadUI. The ListArtefacts instance sends the message addArtefactName 
(name) repeatedly to the boundary class until it has finished. It then returns 
control to the VisualiseArtefactData instance and destroys itself. The main 
control class can now enable the boundary classes, allowing the user to select a 
particular artefact. Instances of VisualiseArtefactDataUI need to be able to 
respond to the message addArtefactName (name) and realise the interface 
ArtefactLister.  
Many other boundary classes will be needed to allow the user to select 
an artefact from the dropdown menu on the interface. Ideally the system 
should be able to reuse ListArtefacts in all the use cases where a list of 
artefacts has to be displayed in a boundary class.  Interface is used to specify 
the operations that this entire boundary classes must respond to, that is the 
interface ArtefactLister. The boundary classes that need to display a list of 
artefacts.  
In the SAFTool::Boundary package, the boundary classes 
AnalyseNewArtefactUI and VisualiseArtefactDataUI which handle the user 
interface will implement the ArtefactLister interface. An instance of the 
control class AnalyseNewArtefact is created first and that this creates a new 
instance of the AnalyseNewArtefactUI class to handle the user interface. This 
goes for the use case Visualise Artefact Data where VisualiseArtefactData is 
created first and this creates a new instance of the VisualiseArtefactDataUI 
class to handle the user interface. The sequence diagram presented in Figure 
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Figure 5.3: The Packages and Classes for the Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis System 
 
The class diagram for the architecture is shown in Figure 5.4. A full 



















Figure 5.4: The Class Diagram for the Windows System Generated 
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5.3.2 Interaction and State Behaviour 
An application in an object oriented technology application is a collection of 
objects. The behaviour of an object is what the object can do, each responsible 
for a small part of the system’s overall behaviour. These behaviours are 
contained in the methods of the object, and these methods are invoked by a 
message that is send to it, and these objects produce the required behaviour 
through interaction, by exchanging messages that request information, that 
gives information or that asks another object to perform some task.  
The sequence diagram that adds the boundary and control classes to a 
collaboration of the entity classes helps to show interaction occurrences. A 
detailed sequence diagram showing the various possible interactions can be 
found in Appendix D. 
Users’ primary objectives need to be taken into consideration when 
designing the user interface. In this project, the primary tasks are to recover 
data of possible forensic value from within an artefact and to visualise the 
artefact in order to display this information to a user. Figure 5.5 shows the 
interface of a Java program to implement the use case Analyse New 
Artefact for the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis 
System. In this use case, the user first selects the name of an artefact from a 
list box labelled Artefact Name and Path. At this point, no artefact is selected, 
and the user can click on the arrow at the end of the list box to view the list 
and select an artefact. When an artefact has been selected, the user can click 
on the button labelled Start. This interface works in a way that it can scan for 
the artefact file if the investigator does not provide the path to where the 
artefact file resides.  
Requirements to locate the artefact and access the artefact for the 
architecture are realised by using the exporting features of the forensic tool 
that imaged the target media during a typical investigation. Using this 
forensic image to extract the artefacts makes them available for further 
analysis. The user must save or export the artefacts to a location that can be 
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accessed by the tool. The user can provide the path to where the exported 
artefacts now reside. If the user does not provide the path to where the 
artefacts reside, the tool can scan for the artefacts. The architecture checks for 
the present of the artefacts. 
The tool will recover the data in the artefact and display the data 
contained in the artefact in a new window. In this interface design, the Start 
button has been disabled until an artefact has been selected. This method is 
used to ensure the reliability of the tool that is the resistance to failure of the 
system. State machine diagrams have been used to model the state of elements 
of the user interface in order to ensure that the behaviour of the interface has 
been specified correctly.  
The sequence diagram and the prototype dialogue window developed in 
Appendix D do not indicate the permitted states of the interface. The sequence 
diagrams show only the sequential view of the user working through the fields 
on the screen from the top to the bottom, but it is in the nature of GUI 
interfaces that the user can click on interface objects out of sequence. A state 
machine or event action table has been used to model all these issues. Table 
5.2 shows the event action table for the state machine of Figure 5.6 and outline 





















Figure 5.5: Interface for the Use Case Analyse New Artefact 
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Figure 5.6: State Machine for the Visualise Artefact Data Window 
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5.3.3 Data Management and the Database 
Data preparation involves making sure that all files and databases are ready 
to be used when the user wants to start using the system. During a typical 
investigation, a forensic image is created of the suspects’ media. For this 
project, it is assumed that the forensic image was made of the suspects’ media, 
and it is from this image thereof the Event log files and swap files were 
extracted by the investigator. 
Typical forensic software applications offer a facility to copy or export 
files, allowing the investigator to extract particular files of interest for further 
analysis. Both the main forensic tools, FTK (AccessData, 2009), and EnCase 
(Guidance Software, 2005), offer this facility.  To use the prototype tool 
developed as part of this thesis, the Event log files and Swap files the 
investigator wishes to examine must be exported to a location that can be 
accessed by the tool. 
An alternative method to extracting the files from a forensic copy would 
be to use the Windows API and virtual machine to provide access to a virtual 
copy of the suspects system. This could use a live GUI manager in order for the 
API calls to be executed and retrieve the data. An example or a similar tool is 
Regedit.exe used to view the registry and Event log viewer used to view Event 
logs, both of these tools are supplied with the Windows operating system. After 
some consideration this method was discarded as it inhibited the flexibility of 
the architecture as it relied on the use of an API for access to the desired 
artefacts for analysis. The decision was therefore taken to extract the files, 
parse the data, and store the data for further examination. 
With the information about the data structure of an artefact makes it a 
relatively straightforward process to parse the contents of an artefact, 
resulting in meaningful structure for the entries. Each artefact will have a 
different data structure, therefore, it is a requirement to have means to parse 
the various data structure and data types. For the not known data structure 
artefacts (swap file), the method will be every four megabytes of data from the 
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stream of bytes of data will be stored. This 4 is used due to, when the memory 
in used exceeds the amount of RAM available, the operating system will move 
pages (4KB pieces) of virtual address spaces to the swap file. 4MB is used 
instead of 4KB due to the size of the swap file used which averaged 555673KB. 
Plus, the stored data can be accessed in a read only manner, and this prevents 
making any changes to the original data.  
So, these capabilities: organise and manage the tasks associated with 
storing and providing effective access to the data; enable a degree of flexibility 
in accessing the data; control the access to the data and permissions granted to 
different users for different levels of access; and the integrity of the data is 
maintained, make a DBMS the choice of this Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis System and relational DBMS is appropriate 
because there are large volumes of data with varying access requirements for 
future reference (as mentioned in Section 4.8 and Section 5.2.3). The DBMS 
used by the application will be accessed from the programs using class 
libraries to provide the database access functionality and these class libraries 
are widely available for commercial DBMSs. 
A relational DBMS is the most widely used type of DBMS (Digitivity, 
2008). The relational database concept has been developed over a number of 
years and is robust, efficient and flexible for the kind of data it is designed to 
handle (Bennett et al., 2006). Examples of RDBMSs are Access, Oracle, SQL-
Server, DB2, Informix, Ingres, Progress and Sybase. In Java, Apache Derby or 
Java DB is a relational database management system and open source 
database and is written in Java. The JavaDB database can be used to suit the 
storage of data for known and not known data structures of Windows system 
generated artefacts and can be used further for data from different systems.  
By using the relational database, it is possible to extend the usage of 
the RDMBS to support various types of data for the internal structures of the 
artefact, for example, the Windows event logs and the swap files. To 
implement the JavaDB RDBMS for the Windows System Generated Artefacts 
Forensic Analysis system, this is built using NetBeans IDE, the following 
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must be developed in order for the system to store data from the internal 
structure of the artefacts:  
1. A database design must be designed to deal with the internal data 
structure of the artefacts. This should show all the tables and fields of 
the internal structures in the database. For each internal structure, the 
design is the structure of the tables to use to represent classes in the 
database. It is only the attribute values of the object instances that are 
stored in an RDBMS, the operations are implemented in the 
programming languages itself. 
2. Data is added to and retrieved from relational databases using SQL 
statements. 
3. Support the further extension and development of the database to 
include additional tables for other artefacts. In NetBeans this can be 
accomplished by two ways: using external SQL script, and a tool when a 
table from another database to be recreated in the new database you are 
working with.  The process used by the tool has two parts: copy the 
structure of the table definition of the table of the other database and 
then recreate the table in the new database.  
In order to store the objects from an object oriented system in a 
relational database, the objects must be flattened out (Hautefeuille, 2011). The 
approach by which classes are converted to tables in a relational database is 
‘flattening’ the classes into tables in order to design the storage structures. By 
mapping classes into tables, the collection classes for a set of objects of the 
same class are stored in tables. Selecting every row from the table is the way if 
it is necessary to iterate through every instance of a particular class. Objects 
do not have keys, so object identifiers are allocated to them and use an 
attribute that has a unique value of an instance of a class as a foreign key.   
Figure 5.6 shows the database design for the Event log and Swap file 
structures. Each structure can be added to the database, using the Artefact for 
the database name. For example, in Figure 5.7 the Event logs table and the 
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Swap files table has a foreign key that is ArtefactUID. This is the attribute 
value of that table that denotes its structure type is Event logs or Swap files. 
The Event logs or the Swap files have only one table associated with their 
structure. For the Event logs, the event records in the files are saved to the 
database for further analysis. Each event log category has its own table in the 
database with its file name and timestamp for the table name. The purpose of 
choosing a file name and timestamp for the table name is to make it unique 
and retrievable for further analysis. As the user does need to know the table 
name and where the table is stored, the prototype tool automatically shows the 
artefact name and the user simply selects the desired artefact to be analysed. 
This method has been demonstrated by Mee (2009) as an effective 
approach for storing information relating to system artefacts. Mee (2009) 
addressed the database design required to store elements of the Registry by 
introducing comparable underlying tables in which to store the data. The 
underlying tables were the Hive table, Key table and KeyData table. These 
dealt with the nested keys, and subkeys maintaining the hierarchy of the 
Registry data (keys may contain one or more subkeys).  
The database design for this should be able to cater for each of the 
system artefact’s different internal structures. The database can be designed 
and developed to suit different possible representations of the data, either 
linearly or hierarchically. In the case of mapping an inheritance hierarchy, the 
method used is to implement all the classes, both superclass and subclasses as 
separate tables. To retrieve the data for a subclass, both its own table and the 
table of its superclass is accessed. Each internal structure of a system artefact 
must go through this design as it is added to the database. The end user does 
not need to know the structure of the internal structure but the developers of 
the architecture must be able to identify and recognise the underlying 
structure in order to break the structure down to a database design. A full 
diagram of the database structure, including various internal structures, can 
be found in Appendix F which illustrates the database as a whole, including 
other system artefacts.   
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Figure 5.7: Database Design for the Event Logs and Swap Files Structures 
5.3.4 SQL Statements 
Each table in a relational database is made up of rows of data. Each row 
contains attribute values that are organised into columns. Each column 
contains data values of the same attribute type. Once the database design has 
been determined, the tables must be created in the database. Each attribute 
value in the table must be atomic, that is, it may not contain multiple values 
or be capable of being broken down further. Using the SQL Create statement, 
the tables can be inserted into the Database. Figure 5.8 below denotes the 
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Figure 5.8: SQL to Create Tables for the Artefacts and Event Logs 
Using JDBC to interact with a database makes creating a database 
independent application possible. This means another database can be used 
without changing anything in the application. To implement the JDBC for this 
system, RelationalBroker abstract class was used. Figure 5.9 shows 
associations between RelationalBroker abstract class and classes from other 
package for the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis 
System. 
 
CREATE TABLE Artefacts 
 ( 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  LoadedDate datetime NOT NULL, 
  CreatedDate datetime NOT NULL, 
  FilePath varchar(200), 
  FileType int NOT NULL 
  FileCRC varchar(200) 
 ); 
 
CREATE TABLE Eventlogs 
 ( 
  EventUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
  RecordNo int NOT NULL, 
  GeneratedTime datetime NOT NULL, 
  WrittenTime datetime NOT NULL, 
  EventID int NOT NULL, 
  EventType int NOT NULL, 
  EventCategory int NOT NULL, 
  StrCount int NOT NULL, 
  SourceName varchar(200) NULL, 
  ComputerName varchar(200) NULL, 
  Description varchar(200) NULL 
 ); 
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Figure 5.9: Associations Between RelationalBroker Class and Classes from 
Other Packages 
5.3.5 Fulfilling the Architecture’s Other Requirements 
Chapter 4 contained a discussion of digital forensics unique requirements and 
limitation of the current state of the art tools that are used as the 
requirements of the architecture (Chapter 3). Such review and discussion 
revealed that there are other requirements that the architecture must comply 
with.  
According to Walden (2007), “the process of obtaining forensic data is a 
significant technical challenge for investigators, since it may modify the source 
data or its related metadata, fatally undermining the evidential value of the 
forensic material”. A requirement for the architecture was therefore that the 
data stored would be deemed to be forensically sound data. This security 
requirement for the architecture is mentioned in Chapter 4. In order to 
implement this requirement, the MD5 message digest was calculated and 
stored in the database. MD5 is a computer algorithm that produces unique 
mathematical representations of the data through the creation of a 128 bit 
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message digest from the data input. The MD5 is calculated for both the 
original and the copy and then compared to verify data integrity (Newman, 
2007). At any stage to ensure the file has not been changed, the MD5 hashing 
algorithm can be applied again and the resulting hash compared to the 
original to prove the file has not been altered. If the file has been changed, the 
MD5 hash values will not match, thus alerting users that the files have been 
changed. This technique is used daily in computer forensic practice to ensure 
file integrity. 
According to O’Conner (2007), “An extensible application is one that can 
be extended easily without modifying its original code base. Its functionality 
can be enhanced with new plugins or modules”. A plugin is an assembly that 
registers itself with the main application framework and provides additional 
functionality through a defined interface. The main application framework will 
become the API that loads and runs plugins. The plugins communicate to the 
services through the main application framework API.  
It was proposed that the architecture be extensible, that it is easy 
(supported by the design and additional documentation) to add additional 
support for new types of data sources regarding analysis. This is critical since 
new operating systems and applications are being continually developed and 
the system ideally has to be able to support these new sources with as effort as 
possible.  
In this extensible architecture, new functionalities or application 
programming interfaces (APIs) can be added by simply adding a new Java 
Archive (JAR) file onto the application classpath or into an application specific 
directory. The JDBC is an API to unify work with any database. A developer 
just has to change the JDBC driver, which is the implementation of the JDBC 
API, and load the proper class.  
The architecture allows others to upgrade or enhance specific parts of a 
tool without changing the core application.  By using applications with 
extensible services, the architecture allows the user to provide service 
implementations.  Service implementations are developed as plugins that can 
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be installed and started during runtime which require no modifications to the 
original application. The architecture allows the user to add new providers to 
the classpath or runtime extension directory for the ServiceLoader class to find 
it. ServiceLoader is an API that helps to find, load and use service providers. 
The reason why ServiceLoader class is used over the use of other module 
systems was due to the building of modular application and much more 
maintainable application is achievable.  The service providers are registered 
by a configuration file in the JAR file’s directory. Figure 5.10 shows the plugin 
framework. There are a number of services that provide different types of 
























Figure 5.10: Plugin Framework 
 
According to Fry (2007), “whenever we analyse data, our goal is to 
highlight its features in order of their importance, reveal patterns, and 
simultaneously show features that exist across multiple dimensions”. According 
to Teerlink and Erbacher (2006), “using visualisation techniques to display 
information about computer data can help forensic scientists direct their 
searches to suspicious files”. According to Guillermo et al. (2007) “the use of 
visual representations to accelerate insight into complex data is a characteristic 
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of visual analytic software. Visual representations translate data into a visible 
form that highlights important features, including commonalities and 
anomalies”.  
Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) states the visualiser subsystem will deal with 
visualising the data that is retrieved in an intuitive format to enable 
investigators to extract evidence. Various techniques of visualisation include 
using illustrations of data such as timeline, data map, tree map, flow charts, 
graph and table. For example, if an investigator wishes to visualise data by 
chronological order, a plugin can be used to list the specified data for time 
stamps, and present the resulting to the user. It was proposed that the 
architecture present the data extracted from the artefacts’ internal structure 
visually. The architecture uses a plugin to graphically represent the data 
contained in the system. The plugin can represent the data in various formats 
tailored to the nature of the artefact. Other plugins can provide visualisation 
of data in a different manner to provide alternative ways to explore the data.  
According to Nelson et al. (2004), “a report is to communicate the results 
of computing forensics examination or investigation. A formal report presents 
evidence as testimony in court, at an administrative hearing, or as an affidavit. 
Besides presenting facts, reports can communicate expert opinion”. It is 
proposed that the architecture provide the investigator with a reporting 
feature. Since the architecture supports various plugin, a reporting plugin can 
therefore be used to export out the data to a report. This will allow the 
investigator to render their findings and information into a report (various 
tagged pieces of data, visual representation of data, correlated search results) 
and also allow the investigator to add in various notes and other data related 
to the case, thus compiling a complete report that could be presented alongside 
expert witness affidavits. Table 3.23 in Section 3.4 illustrates the limitations of 
existing tools. It also highlights that both commercial tools discussed in 
Chapter 3 supports a reporting facility for the user. 
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5.4 Implementation Diagrams 
According to Finkelstein (2000), “Software engineering focuses on the real 
world goals for, services provided by, and constraints on such system; the 
precise specification of system structure and behaviour, and the implementation 
of these specifications; the activities required in order to develop an assurance 
that the specifications and real world goals have been met; the evolution of such 
systems over time and across system families”.  
The implementation diagrams illustrate the physical implementation, 
that is, the components structure and the deployment for the runtime. There 
are two diagram types associated with implementation diagrams: the 
component diagram and the deployment diagram. The thesis had the objective 
of developing a multiplatform architecture, as such multiplatforms promote 
the portability of the architecture.  
The component diagram’s shows the structure of components with its 
relationships of a system. In the component diagram, the components of an 
application or system, interactions with their interrelationships, and their 
public interfaces are depicted. According to Ambler (2003), “UML component 
diagrams are great for identifying the architectural landscape for your system 
as they enable you to model the high level software components, and more 
importantly the interfaces to those components”. Figure 5.11 shows the 
component diagram for the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic 
Analysis System with the components wired together to form larger 
components and the connection between the internal subcomponents. The 
diagram shows the different components, such as Artefacts and Artefact in the 
Model layer and how the Controller layer component interacts with these 
components. The diagram also depicts a database access component that 
represents a library component that the Model layer components will use to 
interact with a database.  
The deployment diagram shows the run-time architecture of a system. 
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Each node represents either a physical machine node or a virtual node and the 
connections between the nodes show the system interactions paths. An 
example of a node is a mainframe node. The deployment diagram involves 
modelling the hardware configurations together with the software components. 
. Nowadays, software applications are complex in nature. Software 
applications can be stand alone, web based, distributed, mainframe based and 
so on. The application is assumed to be a desktop system based application 
which is in a standalone environment: deploys services locally, uses the 
services, and terminates the services when they are no longer needed. Services 
locally deployed by this application are not available to any other application, 
that is, no remote services are available.  
The nodes for the deployment environment and the relationships 
among them are as follows: 
• Application Server represents the computer that will receive and process 
user requests and send responses from the application. This node 
consists of different components of the Windows System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis System, such as View, Controller, Model, and 
Database Access. 
• Database Server represents the node that hosts the database server. This 
node used to store and retrieve the data by the Windows System 
Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis System components.  
Figure 5.12 shows the deployment diagram for the Windows System 
Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis System. The deployment diagram 
shows the two nodes SAFTool_APP_SERVER and SAFTool_DB_SERVER that 
represent the nodes application server and database server, respectively. The 
View, Controller and Model components are depicted in 
SAFTool_APP_SERVER node and the three are interconnected in the 































Figure 5.12: Deployment Diagram for the Windows System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis System 
 
 





















   







In this chapter, the implementation of the architecture was discussed and the 
justification for the tools and languages used was outlined. Further, the 
products used and created by the design workflow and implemented in the 
architecture seek to address the limitations of the current state-of-the-art 
tools. 
 The hypothesis of the thesis was to develop an architecture that is able 
to integrate forensic data from known and not known internal data structures 
of system generated artefacts by the Windows operating system and to design 
and implement a proof of concept prototype tool, with appropriate example 
artefacts with key features of the proposed architecture are: extensible, 
flexible and multiplatform to improve forensic process. Considering each of the 
proposed packages of the architecture, they only appear to meet the main 
criteria of the architecture: extensibility; flexibility; and multiplatform 
implementation.  
The implementation of the tool will enable the assessments outlined in 
Chapter 6 to be conducted and the hypothesis proposed in Chapter 1 to be 
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CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results of the evaluation methods applied to the 
system prototype and the proposed architecture.  
 As illustrated in the Table 6.1, it is evident that the architecture works, 
and that it satisfies all functions and the hypothesis of the thesis. The next 
section will deal with the evaluation of the architecture with a comparison of 
the use of other tools.  
The first evaluation analyses the results obtained from using the 
prototype tool to analyse nine different Event log files and nine Swap files. The 
analysis involves the correct parsing of system artefacts through the process of 
extracting data structures and visualising the results in the forms of narrative 
constructs and also in graphical form. The output from the system is compared 
to that of other available open source forensic software.  
 The second evaluation provides further empirical data relating to how 
well the system supports the analysis of Windows system generated artefacts 
through experts evaluation. The purpose of the empirical studies of the 
forensic analysis of Windows system generated artefacts was not to evaluate 
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the quality of system generated artefacts used as digital evidence, but to 
evaluate the functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software and to 
establish if it successfully assists the investigator to determine what data is 
available within the Windows operating system generated artefacts.  
Table 6.1: Requirements of the Architecture Revisited 
Illustrating the Architecture Satisfies Each 
 
Function   Architecture and System 
Facilitate the analysis and visualisation of forensic data in 
various types of file format and data complexity. 
√ Section 5.3.2 
Locate the artefact files for analysis.  Section 5.3.2 
Facilitate data extraction, data interpretation, and data 
reconstruction from the internal structure of the artefact. 
√ Section 5.3.3 
Visual representation of data from the data structures 
whether by graphs, charts or illustrations. 
√ Section 5.3.5 
Reporting facility √ Section 5.3.5 
Scalability: Facilitate the extending of supporting new kinds 
of kinds of target and new types of analysis. 
√ Section 5.3.5 
Data integrity:  
No data can be changed while being stored in the system.  
√ Section 5.3.3 
Data integrity:  
No data in the original complex structure of the evidential 
artefact will change.  
√ Section 5.3.3 
Verifiability: Uses Hash Value for individual file. √ Section 5.3.5 
Other Requirement:  
The architecture and implementation should aim at being 
as independent of underlying software as possible. 
√ Section 5.2.2 
Usability: Easy navigation, easy to use by using keyboard 
and mouse to control the system. 
√ Section 5.3.2 
Other Requirement: Authentication software is used to 
prove that the evidence has not been changed. Algorithms 
like MD5 or SHA-1 are required. 
√ Section 5.3.5 
Other Requirement: The tool must be designed in such a 
way that it provides a form of integrity assurance or record 
when its utilities are executed, such as it provides an audit 
record about timestamp or actions taken, or results return 
from running those utilities. This requirement needs to be 
addressed, as this is compliant with the best practice 
requirements for forensics tools as discussed in Chapter 2.  
√ Section 5.3.3 
√ - denotes the presence of the function and requirement 
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6.1 Research Evaluation  
In Chapter 1 an experimental method for the research project was proposed. In 
this section the research methodology for the evaluation of the architecture 
and the prototype system is examined. According to Kumar (as edited in 
Rutman, 1977) “Evaluation research is, first and foremost, a process of 
applying scientific procedures to accumulate reliable and valid evidence in the 
manner and the extent to which specific activities produce particular effects or 
outcomes”.  
In order to assess the proposed method to visualise information 
extracted from Windows system generated artefacts, a number of different 
approaches were selected. Experiments are proposed to measure the accuracy 
and questionnaires are prepared to verify functionality of the prototype. An 
experiment is a process or study that results in the collection of data. The 
results of experiments are not known in advance (SAS, 2010). According to 
Kumar (2005), “A questionnaire is a written list of questions, the answers to 
which are provided by respondents”. The questionnaire comprised questions 
designed to assess the prototype’s ability to process the selected system 
artefacts. An assessment of the prototype’s functionality against that of other 
open source tools was also carried out. Finally, a selection of expert opinion 
was sought on the key aspects of the architecture and prototype 
implementation. The detailed experimental setup is discussed in Section 6.5. 
A clear definition of the details of an experiment makes the desired 
statistical analyses possible, and almost always improves the usefulness of the 
results. Furthermore, the objective of designed experiments is to improve the 
precision of the results in order to examine the research hypotheses (SAS, 
2010). The data collection and analysis plan are very important to meet the 
specific objectives of an experiment. The data collection and analysis plan 
statements for this research were as follows: 
i. The experiment with swap files and event log files sourced from the 
ongoing disk study work at the University of Glamorgan.  
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Performance of the prototype software was evaluated through a series of 
experiments on a selection of Event logs and Swap files obtained from 
the forensic lab in which forensic images were taken during a disk study. 
A selection of Event logs and Swap files were selected among the 
readable hard disks images from different countries. These two types of 
system generated artefacts have different file sizes and come from 
different versions of the operating system. Furthermore, the Event logs 
and Swap files came from a large number of disks that have been                                               
purchased in a number of countries without knowing the background of 
their sources (Jones et al., 2009).  
ii. A comparison with current state-of-the-art tools. 
A comparison of the proposed system was to be made against current 
state-of-the-art tools used. Performing the same task using different tools 
can be used to verify the results (Nelson et al., 2004).  
The objective of this assessment was to obtain the right results with the 
relevant system artefacts and quantify the accuracy of parsing correctly 
organised records of system artefacts through the process of extracting 
known and not known data structures and visualising them in the forms 
of narrative construct and statistical graph. 
iii. A review of the key design features of the prototype. 
Besides quantifying the accuracy of the data extracted, verifying the 
functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software was done 
through eliciting expert opinion. The objective was to verify the ability of 
the implemented prototype software to visualise the known data 
structure of Event logs and the not known data structure of Swap files in 
such a way that the investigator could easily see what data was available 
within these system areas of the Windows operating system. It was also 
to verify that the architecture is extensible for extracting information 
from the Event logs and Swap files and to allowing some plug in features 
to be added to it such as visualisations and various forensic analysis 
capabilities. A qualitative review of the input from experts in the field of 
forensics would aid the assessment of the system’s functionality. 
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The experimental setup for accomplishing the data collection and analysis 
plan is detailed in Section 6.1.2 and the results are recorded as evaluation 
measurements.  
6.1.1 Data Interpretation and Analysis  
The results gained from the experiments were used to compare the developed 
software application with that of other tools. To date, there are no published 
evidence concerning experiments in analysing and presenting data for 
Windows system generated artefacts. Hence, the accuracy of the developed 
software application was compared with that of tools used for data extraction, 
i.e. Event Viewer and Carvey’s (2007) tools (evtstats.pl and lsevt.pl) for the 
Event logs and the WinHex for the Swap files.  
Experiments were performed to investigate the number of records 
parsed and the total size of data parsed; and processing time taken in parsing 
the contents of the files. These experiments were used to measure the accuracy 
scores of the data extracted and the time taken to process this data. Measuring 
the time taken to process the data is due to that informational visualisation 
would normally be reached after much data mining in the analytical tier. As 
well as quantifying the accuracy of the data structure extracted, verifying the 
functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software was achieved through 
questionnaires eliciting experts’ opinions. The results from the comparative 
study and the questionnaires were analysed using the Microsoft Excel 
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6.1.2 Experimental Setup 
Test Data 
To evaluate the prototype software (and to be able to make statements 
concerning the suitability of the architecture) a selection of test data was 
required. The test data consists of known data structure (event logs file) and 
not known data structure (swap file) system generated artefacts. This test 
data extracted from the Windows XP and Windows Vista operating systems 
was obtained from hard disk images that had been created as part of a disk 
study into data disposal practises at the University of Glamorgan Computer 
Forensics Research Laboratory (Jones et al., 2009). 
The test data preparation process was as follows: 
1. Hard disk images were selected among the readable disks from different 
countries. Only 10 hard disk images contained viable event logs files and 
swap files to be used as test data. Some of the hard disks had been 
deleted or corrupted and were unusable for this study. For some of the 
readable disks, attempts were made to remove the data from the disks by 
deletion, formatting or reinstallation of the operating systems. 
2. From 10 hard disk images, the following were extracted:  
a. 12 binary format of event log files; and  
b. 10 binary format of pagefile files. 
3. The 12 binary formats of event logs and the 10 binary formats of pagefile 
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Table 6.2: Numbering for Event Logs Files and Swap Files 


























The goal of the experiment was to evaluate the results after the developed 
software application had been tested to determine whether it was functioning 
as desired under normal conditions. 
The experimental process was carried out in the following steps: 
1. Use AppEvent04.Evt with Prototype Software.  
Measurement used: 
- Successful operation 
- Unsuccessful operation
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2.  Use SecEvent04.Evt with Prototype Software. 
Measurement used: 
- Successful operation 
- Unsuccessful operation 
3.  Use SysEvent04.Evt with Prototype Software. 
Measurement used: 
- Successful operation  
- Unsuccessful operation 
4.  Use pagefile10.sys with Prototype Software.  
Measurement used: 
- Successful operation  
-  Unsuccessful operation 
Experiment 2 
The goal of the experiment was to evaluate the results of the prototype 
software application against those produced by other tools. The prototype tool 
needed to be examined in terms of its effectiveness in dealing with not known 
data structure (swap file) and known data structure (event log) files. The tools 
selected for this comparison were the Carvey (2007) Perl script (evtstats.pl) 
and Event Viewer for the event log files. evtstats.pl was used as this script 
parses through the Event log files in binary mode, bypassing the Windows API 
altogether, by doing it this way the Event log files can be parsed on a platform 
other than Windows, although Event Viewer gives error messages that a file is 
somehow corrupted. Event Viewer is a GUI manager for the Event logs and is 
available from Microsoft as a component of the operating system which 
interprets the event data and displays it in a readable fashion. The various 
ways in which the user can display; work with; and place conditions on an 
event is a real benefit and getting used to it is relatively easy. 
For the pagefile files, the tool selected for this comparison was the 
WinHex application. The WinHex application was used as it provides a 
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convenient and simple interface for random access to files and disks at the 
sector level through its hexadecimal editor in analysing files.  
A. For Event Log files 
1. Using evtstats.pl 
This experiment was conducted to retrieve and examine the data 
using evtstats.pl 
i. This experiment used 9 binary format of event log files 
(AppEvent01.Evt until AppEvent03.Evt, SecEvent01.Evt 
until SecEvent03.Evt and SysEvent01.Evt until 
SysEvent03.Evt) described in Table 6.2 to run with evtstats.pl 
to collect information from each event log files.  
ii.  evtstats.pl displays simple statistics for each event log files as 
shown here: 
- Max size of Event Log file = 
- Actual size of the Event Log file = 
- Total number of event records (header info) = 
- Total number of event records (actual count) = 
- Total number of event records (rec_nums) = 
- Total number of event records (sources) = 
- Total number of event records (types) = 
- Total number of event records (IDs) = 
iii.  Statistic used: 
Total number of event records (actual count) = Xn, where 
n = 01, 02, 03 
2.  Using Event Viewer 
This experiment was conducted to retrieve and examine the data 
using Event Viewer. 
i. This experiment used  9 event log files (AppEvent01.Evt until 
AppEvent03.Evt, SecEvent01.Evt until SecEvent03.Evt and 
SysEvent01.Evt until SysEvent03.Evt) described in Table 6.2 
to run with Event Viewer to ascertain how many records are 
present in each event log file. 
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ii. Statistic used: 
Total number of event records displayed = Yn, where     
n = 01, 02, 03 
3.  Using Prototype Software  
This experiment was carried out to retrieve and examine the data 
using the Prototype Software. 
i. This experiment used 9 event log files (AppEvent01.Evt until 
AppEvent03.Evt, SecEvent01.Evt until SecEvent03.Evt and 
SysEvent01.Evt until SysEvent03.Evt)  described in Table 6.2 
to run with the Prototype Software and obtain the number of 
records present in each event log file. 
ii.  Statistic used: 
Frequency of event records display = Zn, where 
n = 01, 02, 03 
4.  Results 
The experimental results are presented in tabulated form below: 
Table 6.3: Event Logs Experimental Results for Experiment 2 
Test Data File 
Name 





AppEvent01.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SecEvent01.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SysEvent01.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
AppEvent02.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SecEvent02.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SysEvent02.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
AppEvent03.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SecEvent03.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
SysEvent03.Evt Xn Yn Zn 
Xn, Yn, Zn = Number of Records 
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B.  For Swap Files 
1.  Using WinHex  
This experiment was conducted to retrieve and examine the data 
using the WinHex. 
i. This experiment used 9 pagefile files (pagefile01.sys until 
pagefile09.sys) as described in Table 6.2 with the WinHex to 
collect information from pagefile files. 
 ii.  The statistic used: 
Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ words found  
= ANn, where 
ANn  =Yes / No, where 
N = V, W, X, Y, Z 
n = 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09 
2. Using Prototype Software 
This experiment was carried out to retrieve and examine the data 
using the Prototype Software. 
i. This experiment used 9 pagefile files (pagefile01.sys until 
pagefile09.sys) as described in Table 6.2 with the Prototype 
Software to collect information from pagefile files.  
ii. Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ words found 
= BNn, where 
BNn = Yes / No, where 
N = V, W, X, Y, Z 
n = 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09 
3. Results 
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Table 6.4: Swap File Experimental Results for Experiment 2 Using WinHex 
 
The results of the experiment will be entered in the form: 
ANn = Yes / No, where 
N = V, W, X, Y, Z and  
n = 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09 




Existence of  ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ 
words in Prototype Software (BNn) 
 
‘mail’ ‘from’ ‘www’ ‘html’ ‘send’ 
pagefile01.sys BV01 BW01 BX01 BY01 BZ01 
pagefile02.sys BV02 BW02 BX02 BY02 BZ02 
pagefile03.sys BV03 BW03 BX03 BY03 BZ03 
pagefile04.sys BV04 BW04 BX04 BY04 BZ04 
pagefile05.sys BV05 BW05 BX05 BY05 BZ05 
pagefile06.sys BV06 BW06 BX06 BY06 BZ06 
pagefile07.sys BV07 BW07 BX07 BY07 BZ07 
pagefile08.sys BV08 BW08 BX08 BY08 BZ08 
pagefile09.sys BV09 BW09 BX09 BY09 BZ09 
BNn = Yes / No, where 
N = V, W, X, Y, Z and  




Existence of  ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ 
words in WinHex (ANn) 
 
‘mail’ ‘from’ ‘www’ ‘html’ ‘send’ 
pagefile01.sys AV01 AW01 AX01 AY01 AZ01 
pagefile02.sys AV02 AW02 AX02 AY02 AZ02 
pagefile03.sys AV03 AW03 AX03 AY03 AZ03 
pagefile04.sys AV04 AW04 AX04 AY04 AZ04 
pagefile05.sys AV05 AW05 AX05 AY05 AZ05 
pagefile06.sys AV06 AW06 AX06 AY06 AZ06 
pagefile07.sys AV07 AW07 AX07 AY07 AZ07 
pagefile08.sys AV08 AW08 AX08 AY08 AZ08 
pagefile09.sys AV09 AW09 AX09 AY09 AZ09 
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The goal of the experiment was to evaluate the results after the developed 
software application had been tested in a controlled environment to determine 
whether it was functioning effectively. The experimental process was carried 
out according to the following plan: 
Subjects of Experiment 
The subjects were recruited from among post-graduate students in the 
Information Security Research Group, University of Glamorgan.  
Structure of Experiments 
i. Data 
The experiments used AppEvent04.Evt, SecEvent04.Evt, SysEvent04.Evt and 
pagefile10.sys from the examined disks (readable disks) that were used in the 
analysis of information remaining on disks obtained as part of the disk study 
at the University of Glamorgan.  
ii. Questionnaires: 
A questionnaire (see Appendix I) was given to all subjects to be answered after 
completion of the set task. 
iii. The process: 
The process of the questionnaire is carried out by giving the participants 
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iv. The tasks: 
The following tasks were used in the experiments:  
A. For the Extensible Architecture of the Prototype  
Task 1:  To verify the extensible architecture.  
B. For Event log files  
Task 1:  To install the event log plugin with SAFTool.  
Task 2:  To open and analyse the event log file with SAFTool.  
Task 3:  To open and further analyse the event log file (visualise 
event log files). 
Task 4:  To generate report with SAFTool. 
C. For Swap files 
Task 1:  To install the pagefile plugin with SAFTool.  
Task 2:  To open and analyse the pagefile file with SAFTool.  
Task 3:  To open and further analyse the pagefile file (visualise 
pagefile file) with SAFTool.  
Task 4:  To search word (keyword search) with SAFTool.  
Task 5:  To generate report with SAFTool.  
6.2 Comparison with Other Tools 
The Windows system generated artefacts forensic analysis system concerns 
the use of data structure (refer to Definition 2 of Chapter 1) when extracting 
data of an artefact and visualising the data. The proposed tool for this purpose 
is similar to other tools related to forensic analysis such as JView (Microsoft, 
2005), EnCase Registry Viewer (Guidance Software, 2005), FTK Registry 
Viewer (AccessData, 2009). However, these tools in particular EnCase 
(Guidance Software, 2005); and FTK (AccessData, 2009) focus on the Windows 
Registry as the key Windows artefact. In addition, comparing this approach to 
(Vlastos and Patel, 2007), a tool which also involves presentation, the 
approach selected in this thesis includes reporting tools that help the 
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investigator to easily assess data found in the selected Windows system 
generated artefacts. 
The work undertaken in this research is similar to Carvey’s (2007) Perl 
script, as the same mechanism is used to identify information in the artefacts. 
Data structures are extracted from a file, and field offsets extracted from an 
artefact are used as field descriptors of an artefact to extract information (as 
elaborated upon in Section 6.3) and not rely on Windows API. 
6.3 Objective Evaluations Experiment of Forensic 
Analysis System 
This section describes the analysis performed by the prototype forensic 
analysis system on a selection of  event log and swap files sourced from data 
collected as part of the disk studies carried out at the University of Glamorgan 
(Jones et al., 2006, 2008, 2009). The experimentation platform consisted of a 
PC (Pentium 4, with 4 GB memory) running under a Windows XP Professional 
environment (32 Bit, Version 2002) and during the experiment no other 
programs were running on the PC.  
After retrieving and examining evidence data using the prototype tool, 
SAFTool, the results were verified by performing the same tasks with 
comparable forensic software. The experiment used a number of pieces of 
software for comparison: Event Viewer, which is a GUI manager for the Event 
logs by Microsoft; Carvey’s Perl script (evtstats.pl and lsevt.pl), which is the 
script which parses the header of the Event logs file and determines the 
number of records that should exist (for the Event logs); and WinHex 
(Vyavhare, 2009), a hexadecimal editor to validate the results of the prototype 
tool (for the Swap files). The Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and lsevt.pl, and 
WinHex will be examined along with the prototype tool for evaluation 
purposes. The results of using these forensic tools over the same test data is 
compared to the SAFTool results. The tools should retrieve the same 
information when the same event logs file or swap file is analysed and 
presented.  
6.4 Practical Experiments                                                                                                         194 
 




 Measuring the ability to retrieve information required visualising the 
information extracted from Windows system generated artefacts in the form of 
narrative constructs and also in graphical form. The comparison and accuracy 
of information retrieved by the tools was based on the number of records and 
the content recovered from the artefacts. Since our prototype tool, the SAFTool 
had not been pre-assessed for its extracting and visualising capabilities, we 
used the accuracy scores relating to the data extracted (number of records 
parsed) from each file to determine whether the tool was functioning as 
desired under normal conditions. Snapshots were collected of the tool’s 
functioning capability.  
6.4 Practical Experiments 
This section describes the practical experimentation. As discussed in Chapter 
4, this took place over three experiments, each focused on determining 
whether the objectives (Section 1.3.3) had been met. 
As discussed in Section 6.1, the first and second practical experiments 
assess the functionality of the tool. This assessment was to determine whether 
the prototype tool was functioning according to the design requirements.  
• The first experiment examined the SAFTool to determine whether the 
application was functioning as desired under normal conditions. 
Screenshots were collected from this process. 
• The second experiment examined the SAFTool as a whole against the 
nominated forensic software (Event Viewer, evtstats.pl, lsevt.pl and 
WinHex), to discover how the SAFTool compared to existing solutions 
(Section 6.4.1 until Section 6.4.5).  
• In this experiment, the analysis involved determining the SAFTools 
ability to parse the event logs and swap files and display the results 
in a suitable format (Section 6.4.6).  
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• In this experiment, the variables examined in this experiment are 
the number of records parsed with processing time from the 
selected event logs and swap files (Section 6.4.7).  
• The third experiment examined the SAFTool to determine how well the 
system supported the analysis of Windows system generated artefacts 
by evaluating the functionalities and usefulness of the SAFTool (Section 
6.5).  
To carry out the following experiments, a dataset was created that contained 
10 event log files and 10 swap files (pagefile.sys). A list of the files used and 
associated information can be seen in Appendix G.  
6.4.1 Experiment on the Event Logs with the Event 
Viewer 
The following steps took place when running this experiment: 
1. The dataset from Appendix G was inserted into the Windows 
directory of the test computer.  
2. The Event Viewer application was invoked and set to view the events. 
Screenshots, number of records parsed and processing times were 
collected from this process. 
3. The tool, as it is part of Windows, provides output via a Windows 
GUI. When data started to appear in the Event Viewer application, 
the Action menu was clicked when the mouse position was on the left 
pane and next the Action menu was clicked when the mouse position 
was on the right pane.  
Results 
A visual record of the output from the Microsoft event viewer is shown in 
Figure 6.1. The Event logs are presented to the user in a Windows Explorer 
like interface. Event Viewer tool has two different panes. The left pane shows 
the list of available log files, the right pane shows the selected log’s contents. 
The left pane shows the list of available log files: Application, System and 
Security log, while the right pane shows a list of different event 
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entries, one line per entry.  The menu options in Event Viewer are context 
sensitive, depending on where the focus of the mouse is at the time. The menu 
choices may change. In having two panes, and context sensitive menu option 
make the tool more difficult to use as users can be confused at what 
information they are looking at. Opening a saved log is not a straightforward 
process. There are four items that the Event Viewer has to be told: the File 
name, Files of Type, Log Type and Display Name. This means that opening a 
file is not possible or wrong information is displayed if the items given is not 
correct. In Figure 6.1, the Event Viewer is shown showing the Windows Event 
logs file in two panes with context sensitive Action menu for one Event log test 
subject. This Figure 6.1 shows the result from the third step of the experiment. 
Sometime when opening a log files that were saved or imaged from another 
























Figure 6.1: The Event Viewer Shows the Content of the Windows Event Logs 
 
Left pane shows the list of 
available log files. 
The Action menu with the 
focus on the left pane. 
 
Right pane shows a list of 
each different event entry, 
one line per entry. 
The Action menu with the 
focus on the right pane. 
File name, Files of Type, Log 
Type and Display Name need 
to be input when opening a 
saved log files. 
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6.4.2 Experiment on the Event Logs with the evtstats.pl 
and lsevt.pl 
This experiment examined how evtstats.pl and lsevt.pl could view events in an 
event log file. The following steps took place when running this experiment: 
1. The dataset listed in Appendix G was inserted into the Windows 
directory of the test system.  
2. The evtstats.pl application was invoked and set to view the events. 
3. The lsevt.pl application was invoked and set to view the events. 
4. Screenshots, number of records parsed and processing times were 
collected from this process. 
5. The event log files were processed and appeared in the Command 
Prompt window.  
Results 
The visual output can be seen in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. The Perl scripts of 
Carvey (2007) collected information from the Event log files and displayed 
simple statistics collected from the .Evt file shown in Figure 6.2 and displayed 
event records in simple listing format as illustrated in Figure 6.3. The 
mechanism operated like this: the script parsed the header of the Event log file 
and determined the number of records that should exist, then parsed through 
the contents of the Event log file and, using various tags from within each 
event record, performed an actual count of the number of records found.  
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Figure 6.3: The lsevt.pl Shows the Event Records from an Event Log File 
 
Display of event records in a 
simple listing format. 
Display of a simple statistic 
collected from an .Evt file. 
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6.4.3 Experiment on the Event Logs with the SAFTool  
This experiment examined (i) the built in extensible architecture of the 
SAFTool by testing the mechanism used to install a new plugin; and (ii) how 
the SAFTool examined and viewed events in an event log file. The following 
steps took place when running this experiment: 
1. The dataset from Appendix G was inserted into the Windows 
directory of the test system.  
2. The SAFTool was run. Initially no option of artefact names could be 
seen on the menu.  
3. The Install Plugin was clicked; the process of installing the plugin 
was performed. 
4. The Analyse Event Log was clicked; the process of analysing event 
logs was performed. 
5. The Visualise Event Log was clicked; the process of visualising 
events for event logs was performed. 
6. The Report Event Log was clicked; the process of reporting the event 
logs was performed. Screenshots, number of records parsed, and the 
processing times were collected during the experiment. 
Results 
In Chapter 5, the extensible architecture, on which the prototype 
implementation was based, was outlined. The architecture enables a variety of 
system artefacts to be analysed by enabling other system objects and tools to 
be added easily; and it also caters for different data structures. In other words, 
a number of possible complex data structures within Windows can be easily 
analysed using the developed architecture. ‘Plug and Play’ features can be 
added easily, depending on what exactly is being analysed, how the analysis is 
to be shown, and what type of case is under investigation.  
 The Windows Event logs and Swap files were investigated to 
demonstrate that the proposed extensible architecture could extract 
information from the known data structure of Windows Event logs and the
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not known data structure of Swap files. The architecture also allows features 
to be added to support visualisations and various forensic analysis capabilities. 
A concept of plugin is introduced to the architecture. A plugin can be developed 
to perform a specific function on the data. The plugin can perform searches on 
the data sets data and determine the most appropriate way to display the 
results in the interface. In order to examine the architecture’s extensibility, 
the plug and play features were examined.  
The visual output can be seen in Figure 6.4. The user interface of the 
SAFTool is dynamic. It is dynamic in such a way that it shows the 
implementation of the extensible architecture of the application. As illustrated 
in Figure 6.4, the prototype tool did not display the list of artefact name files 
for the user to choose to analyse (Analyse menu), further analyse (Visualise 
menu) and report (Report menu) before an artefact’s plugin had been installed. 
Furthermore, the Analyse menu, Visualise menu and Report menu were 
disabled. Only the File menu was enable to be clicked for installing the plugin, 
to restart the application when a plugin was to be reinstalled, and exit the 
application. When a plugin was installed, the Analyse menu, Visualise menu 
and Report menu were enabled and displayed the artefact name files. Figure 
6.5, Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 illustrated the Analyse menu; Visualise menu; 
and Report menu were enabled and displayed the artefact name files. This 
feature allows the core application to be extended easily without modifying its 
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Figure 6.5: The SAFTool Displays Active Menu When the Event Logs Plugin 










6.4 Practical Experiments                                                                                                         202 
 












Figure 6.6: Th SAFTool Displays Active Menu When the Swap Files Plugin 





















Figure 6.7: The SAFTool Displays Active Menu after the Event Logs and 
Swap Files Plugin Have Been Installed 
 
The SAFTool allows the user to launch the application, and then select 
the specific system generated artefacts they wish to process. In this situation, 
the user can select the Event log as the artefact, and provide the location of the 
extracted files for analysis or allow the application to scan the computer for 
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any .Evt files available, thus the user can select the desired file to be 
examined.  For example, in Figure 6.8, the SAFTool displays the list of event 
log files the user can choose to analyse.  
The SAFTool shows the three main categories of event log (Application, 
Security and System) as a separate file. Once the files have been selected, the 
user can examine the data that has been processed by the prototype tool. The 
prototype tool extracts the following data from the files: Record number, Date 
and Time, Event ID, Event Type, Event Category, Source Name, Computer 
Name and Description. The user does not need prior knowledge of the internal 
data structure of the files, and the data is extracted.  
 
Figure 6.8: The SAFTool Display the Event Log Files the User Can   
Choose to Analyse 
 
The logs in their native .Evt binary format provide the most flexibility 
in analysing them. The prototype tool parses through the information in those 
files in a manner that does not rely on the Windows API. This is important 
since this approach not only provides the user with the possibility of 
discovering hidden information or having loss of data if the file comes from 
other formats such as .txt or .csv. It also allows the user to perform 
analysis on platforms other than Windows; in other words investigators are 
not restricted to analysing Windows images on a Windows platform. The 
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visual output can be seen in Figure 6.9. As illustrated in Figure 6.9, the 
prototype tool displays the menu user can choose to analyse event logs and 

















Figure 6.9: The SAFTool Displays the Menu Option, Progress Window and 
Processing Time Message Window for the Event Logs Analysis 
The event records in the files are saved in the database for further 
analysis. Each category of event log has its own table in the database with its 
file name and timestamp for the table name. The purpose of choosing a file 
name and timestamp for the table name is to make it unique and simplify the 
retrieval for further analysis. The user does not need to know the table name 
and where the table is stored, the prototype tool automatically shows the 
artefact name and the user simply selects the desired artefact to be analysed. 
Further, the prototype tool offers the user (via a menu options) the opportunity 
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to visualise the event logs.  As illustrated in Figure 6.10, the prototype tool is 





























Figure 6.10: The SAFTool Displays the Menu Option and List of Event Logs 
Files User Can Choose to View Further 
Further analysis is provided in the prototype tool for event logs. The 
user can select a specific event log and the visualisation format. There are two 
formats used in displaying the file contents of event logs. One format lists all 
the event records in an event log file, one line per entry. Figure 6.11 shows the 
SAFTool displaying the AppEvent04.Evt event records.  
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Figure 6.11: The SAFTool Displaying the AppEvent04.Evt 
Event Records 
 
The second format displays the events information in graphical form 
and a timeline of event records. The graph shows the number of types of event 
which will entries relating to Information, Warning and Error for Application 
and System logs, and Success or Failure for the Security log. According to 
Anson and Bunting (2007), “some information, warning or error events may be 
of evidentiary value, the presence of a warning or an error by itself is not 
indicative of an attack”. The visual output can be seen in Figure 6.12. This 
Figure 6.12 shows the graph displaying the number of entries of two types in 
this particular log, information and warning events. The timeline of event log 
records is the graphical representation of events in chronological order. The 
timeline portray events as they occurred and tells what happened as it 
happened (see Figure 6.13). According to Anson and Bunting (2007), “timelines 
are an excellent means of conveying technical facts in a way that makes 
understanding much easier”.  
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Figure 6.13: The Timeline of Event Logs Records 
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Once an investigator has located the information they require that information 
needs to be included into a report. As illustrated in 6.14, the prototype tool 
provides a feature to generate a report. Upon clicking the generate report 
option, the Microsoft document will pop up with information about the file 
name analysed, the date the file was created, the file hash value and the 
number of records existed in  the file.  At this point, a report has been created 
and been saved (see Figure 6.15 below).                                                                        
 
Figure 6.14: The SAFTool Allows the User to Generate A Report for the 




















Figure 6.15: The Report Generated for the Event Logs Analysis  
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6.4.4  Swap Files Analysis Using WinHex  
The following steps took place when running this experiment: 
1. The file listed in Appendix G was inserted into the Windows directory 
of the test system.  
2. The WinHex application was invoked and set to view the swap files’ 
content. Screenshots, total size of data and processing times were 
collected from this process. 
Results 
As discussed in Chapter 3, WinHex is the tool provided by X-Ways Software 
Technology AG and is capable of performing a number of operations including 
displaying the content of each file type, including swap files.  
The user can select to open the swap files from the File menu of the 
WinHex window. The data contained within the swap files are presented to the 
user in GUI in a hexadecimal display and an ASCII display window (although 
there are options to display in a full width window).  
 WinHex provides the user with information about the logical size of the 
file (size without slack) or physical size of a directory, physical file size and 
valid data length (for files stored in an NTFS file system) in the Info Pane. The 
visual output can be seen in Figure 6.16 which illustrates the hexadecimal 
data display, the ASCII text display, and the information window.  
The WinHex Search Menu provides a find text command to search for a 
specified string of ASCII characters in the current file. The visual output from 
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Figure 6.16: The Hexadecimal Data Display, ASCII Text Display        




Figure 6.17: The Find Text Function for WinHex 
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6.4.5 Swap Files Analysis Using the SAFTool  
This experiment investigated how the SAFTool can examine and views the 
contents of a swap file. The following steps took place when running this 
experiment: 
1. The dataset from Appendix G was inserted into the Windows 
directory of the test computer.  
2. The SAFTool was run.  
3. The Analyse Pagefile menu was clicked; the process of analysing the 
swap file was performed. 
4. The Visualise Pagefile menu was clicked; the process of visualising 
the swap file contents was performed. 
5. The Report Pagefile menu was clicked; the process of reporting the 
examining of the swap file was performed. Screenshots, total size of 
data and processing times were collected from this process and are 
detailed below. 
Results 
The prototype tool allows the user to launch the application then select the 
system generated artefacts. In this situation, the user can select the swap files 
as the artefact, and provide the location of the extracted files for analysis or 
allow the application to scan the computer for any .sys files available, thus 
the user can select the desired file to be examined.  The visual output can be 
seen in Figure 6.18 which illustrates the prototype tool displaying the list of 
swap files the user can choose to analyse.  
Once the files have been selected, the user can examine the data 
depicted by the prototype tool. The user does not need prior knowledge of the 
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Figure 6.18: The SAFTool Displays the List of Swap Files the User  
Can Choose to Analyse 
 
The swap files in their native binary format provide the most flexibility 
in analysing them. Collecting the swap file on a live system is cumbersome 
since the Windows operating system has complete control and protection of it. 
The prototype tool parses through the information in those files in a manner 
that translates a stream of bytes into a usable file structure of an artefact and 
recovers the content of the file. The visual output from the SAFTool can be 
seen in Figure 6.19. The prototype tool displays the menu option, the progress 
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Figure 6.19: The SAFTool Displays the Menu Option, Progress Window and 
Processing Time Message Window for the Swap Files Analysis 
The event records in the files are saved to the database for further 
analysis. Each category of event log has its own table in the database with its 
file name and timestamp for the table name. The purpose of choosing a file 
name and timestamp for the table name is to make it unique and retrievable 
for further analysis. The user does not need to know the table name and where 
the table is stored, since the prototype tool automatically shows the artefact 
name and the user simply selects the desired artefact to be analysed. Further, 
the prototype tool offers the user a menu to visualise the swap files as shown 
in Figure 6.20. This figure shows the prototype tool displaying the list of swap 
file names the user can choose to further analyse. 
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Figure 6.20: The SAFTool Displays the Menu Option and List of Swap File 
Names the User Can Choose to Visualise the Swap Files 
The prototype tool supports the investigator by enabling the selection of 
specific swap file and a visualisation format for the file. Two possible 
visualisation formats have been included in the prototype tool. Firstly, the 
hexadecimal data display and ASCII text display format to display the 
detailed contents of each swap file. In Figure 6.21, output from the prototype 
tool displays the hexadecimal data display and ASCII text display format for 
the contents of swap files.  
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Figure 6.21: The Hexadecimal Data Display and ASCII Text Display Format 
for Displaying the Contents of Swap Files 
 
The second visualisation included in the prototype is the block view 
format which displays the file’s content. This consists of series of square blocks 
colour coded to indicate the density (the percentage of the ASCII character) of 
swap file’s content.  Each 4MB file’s content is colour coded according to a 
predetermined scheme and is controlled by the percentage of the ASCII 
character in it. This 4 is used due to, when the memory in used exceeds the 
amount of RAM available, the operating system will move pages (4KB pieces) 
of virtual address spaces to the swap file. 4MB is used instead of 4KB due to 
the size of swap file used which average was 555673KB. The block view format 
which displays the file’s content is implemented as this visualisation technique 
(nonhierarchical visualisation technique defined by Teerlink and Erbacher 
(2006)), can aid the investigator to direct their search to suspicious area of the 
swap file. If the block’s content contrasts greatly with an other block, it is 
easily spotted because it stands out against a sea of different coloured blocks. 
This method is used due to the fact that it is common that pages in swap files 
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are blank or contain less ASCII content. The visual output can be seen in 
Figure 6.22. As illustrates in Figure 6.22, the block view displays a swap file in 
which the density of the block is controlled by the intensity within the 4MB 
data of ASCII characters. 
 
 
Figure 6.22: The Square Block Diagram for the 
Density of Swap Files 
 
The prototype tool basic information need to be exported to a report. The 
visual output can be seen in Figure 6.23. The prototype tool provides a limited 
feature to generate a report. Upon clicking the generate report option, a 
Microsoft word document is created containing information about the file name 
analysed, the date the file created, the file hash value and number of records 
that exist in the file. At this point, a report has been created and have been 
saved, which is shown in Figure 6.24 below.  
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Figure 6.23: The SAFTool Enables the User to Generate A Report for the 








6.4 Practical Experiments                                                                                                         218 
 




6.4.6 Analysis of the Results  
The following table (Table 6.6) below shows the results of the desired functions 
comparison. Overall, all the representatives were able to parse the test dataset 
and display the results accordingly. Table 6.6 shows, the SAFTool is able to 
parse system artefacts files and visualise the results in the forms of narrative 
constructs and also in graphical form, that is the tables, graph, timeline, 
hexadecimal data display, ASCII text display and block view.  
Table 6.6: Ability to Parse the Dataset and Display the Results 




Parse Event Logs 
Yes. 
Windows API is 
used.  
Reports the saved 
event logs file is 
corrupted when 
trying to open it. 
Yes. 
Windows API is 
not used. 
Yes. 




Two panes.  








and time lines. 
 
Function WinHex SAFTool 
Parse Swap Files Yes Yes 
Format for 
Displaying Results 
Hexadecimal data display 
and ASCII text display. 
Hexadecimal data display, 
ASCII text display and  
Block Diagram. 
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6.4.7 A Comparison of the Results for the Event Logs 
and Swap Files Experiments 
Measuring the accuracy of this tools ability to retrieve information required 
assessment of the number of records in the artefacts with known and not 
known data structures, and evaluation of their visualisation in the form of a 
narrative construct and graph. For this evaluation, the experiments were 
performed on a number of artefact files of varying sizes that were extracted 
from different hard drive images (dataset from Appendix G) and using the 
tools mentioned earlier in Section 6.2.  
The results of applying the various tools to the test files listed in 
Appendix G are summarised for discussion in Table 6.7. This table indicates 
the number of records that are processed from individual event logs (one line 
per log file). Ultimately, the SAFTool was able to parse the files and locate a 
greater or equal number of records than the evtsstat.pl. The Event Viewer was 
not able to parse the files. When using Event Viewer as a tool to open and view 
the event records of a saved log file, viewing for the event records is 
impossible. This can be accounted for because the viewer relies on the eventlog 
service API. The file would be reported as corrupted because of the out of 
synch fields and the file status byte in both the header and the floating footer 
(Anson and Bunting, 2007).  
Referring to the data shown in Table 6.7, there were two event log files 
examined by evtstats.pl and SAFTool that generated different results, which 
were the SysEvent01.Evt and AppEvent02.Evt from the dataset in Appendix 
G. Both were obtained from parsing the Event log files in binary mode and 
bypassing the Windows API all together. According to Schuster (2007), such 
variation in results is likely due to a special condition regarding the Event log 
record, in that a record is written to the end of the .Evt file but wraps around 
the beginning of the file, resulting in part of the event record following the 
header.  
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Table 6.7: Number of Records Retrieved for Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and 
SAFTool 




No. of Records 
Event Viewer evtstats.pl SAFTool 
AppEvent01.Evt 512 X 2317 2317 





SysEvent01.Evt 512 X 1364 1491 
AppEvent02.Evt 512 X 1909 1911 
SecEvent02.Evt 512 X 1949 1949 
SysEvent02.Evt 512 X 2599 2599 
AppEvent03.Evt 64 X 206 206 
SecEvent03.Evt 64 X 260 260 
SysEvent03.Evt 192 X 765 765 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as 
corrupted. 
Figure 6.25 illustrates the total event records located for the evtstats.pl 
script and the prototype SAFTool.  
 
 



































Total of Records 
evtstats
SAFTool
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Data in Table 6.8 shows the processing times for the requests 
submitted to the forensic analysis system during the processing of the event 
logs. In the context of this chapter, processing time is the duration in time 
(measured in milliseconds (ms)) of the forensic analysis system to generate an 
analysis display upon receiving an analysis request. According to Zhu (2007), 
“the common measure of efficiency is the time taken to complete a task and 
baseline task completion times should be recorded for non-visual displays and 
used as a reference”.  
Table 6.8: Processing Time for Event Viewer, lsevt.pl and SAFTool 

















AppEvent01.Evt 512 X 2317 2172 2317 14813 











SysEvent01.Evt 512 X 1364 1641 1491 8379 
AppEvent02.Evt 512 X 1909 1719 1911 10427 
SecEvent02.Evt 512 X 1949 1852 1949 13032 
SysEvent02.Evt 512 X 2599 2235 2599 16595 
AppEvent03.Evt 64 X 206 719 206 1392 
SecEvent03.Evt 64 X 260 859 260 1422 
SysEvent03.Evt 192 X 765 953 765 5658 
 X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as corrupted. 
 
Table 6.8 shows the time required to process the event logs using 
lsevt.pl and SAFTool. It should be noted that the lsevt.pl tool is used in this 
comparison due to the fact that evtstats.pl only displays simple statistic mean 
while lsevt.pl displays event records in a listing format. The graph in Figure 
6.26 is generated based on the parses through the contents of the Event log file 
and display event records.  The results show more time is required by the 
SAFTool to parse through the Event log file (with a greater or equal number of 
records when compare to lsevt.pl) and display the event records. The total 
processing time would be in milliseconds and the practical impact is that extra 
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in average 8965 milliseconds is taken. This would suggest that, due to the 
visualisation of the analysis in a graphical form, the processing time is in 
average 8965 milliseconds; and the Carvey program (lsevt.pl) shows numbers 
of record in a simple listing format. Both illustrate almost the same shapes of 
graph, i.e. processing time increases with the file sizes. Note the fact that the 
Event Viewer supplied with the operating system was unable to deal with a 




Figure 6.26: Graph Showing the Number of Records Located With 
Processing Time 
  
 Data in Table 6.9 shows total size of data parsed for WinHex and the 
SAFTool. As can be seen, the same results were recorded for each tool. A graph 
(see Figure 6.27) was subsequently drawn comparing the total size of data 
























Comparison of Total Records Located Over Time 
lsevt
SAFTool
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Total Size of Data (bytes) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile01.sys 1,506,576 1,598,029,824 1,598,029,824 
pagefile02.sys 540,672 553,648,128 553,648,128 
pagefile03.sys 786,432 805,306,368 805,306,368 
pagefile04.sys 774,144 792,723,456 792,723,456 
pagefile05.sys 117,760 120,586,240 120,586,240 
pagefile06.sys 512,000 524,288,000 524,288,000 
pagefile07.sys 173,648 177,815,552 177,815,552 
pagefile08.sys 196,608 201,326,592 201,326,592 
pagefile09.sys 393,216 402,653,184 402,653,184 
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x
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Table 6.10 shows the processing times for WinHex and the SAFTool 
which was subsequently displayed in graph form, Figure 6.28 and Figure 6.29 
respectively.  
In the context of this chapter, processing time recorded in milliseconds 
(ms) in term of the time taken by the forensic analysis system to generate an 
analysis display. It took a longer generate hexadecimal data display or an 
ASCII text display for the contents of each swap file when the SAFTool was 
employed. The additional time was required as a result of the need for the 
SAFTool to find the data structure and to identify the structure of each record 
in a binary data file without using a predefined template, WinHex was slightly 
faster due to the uses of a pre-defined template to examine a swap file and has 
the capability to move freely forwards and backwards within the data (X-Ways 
Software Technology AG, 2010).  
 






Processing Time (ms) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile01.sys 1,506,576 531 575,484 
pagefile02.sys 540,672 469 235,078 
pagefile03.sys 786,432 516 292,579 
pagefile04.sys 774,144 500 266,562 
pagefile05.sys 117,760 297 38,343 
pagefile06.sys 512,000 437 137,063 
pagefile07.sys 173,648 390 50,297 
pagefile08.sys 196,608 406 55,438 
pagefile09.sys 393,216 421 98,765 
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Comparison of Total Size of Data (bytes) Located Over Time 
SAFTool
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Chapter 2 outlined the key requirements of a forensic investigation including 
outlining in Chapters 2 and 3 the key features of forensics tools. According to 
(Volonino et al., 2007), “computer forensics tools support the investigator by 
helping to: recreate a specific chain of events or sequence of user activities; 
search for key words and dates and determine which of the data is relevant; 
search for copies of previous document drafts; search for potentially privileged 
information; search for the existence of certain programs, such as file-wiping 
programs; and authenticate data files and their date and time stamps”.  
According to Shinder and Tittel (2002), swap and page files contain all 
sorts of data, including e-mail, web pages, word processing documents and any 
other work that has been performed on the computer during the work session. 
In line with this, five search terms related to the user Internet activity, 
specifically e-mail communications were selected to use as a test set for 
searching. The terms were chosen to check for their existence in the swap files 
were ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term.  
Their existence in the swap files as identified by WinHex and the 
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Table 6.11: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in Swap 
Files Identified by WinHex 
 
Table 6.12: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in Swap 









Existence of  
‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile01.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile02.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile03.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile04.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile05.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile06.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile07.sys 173,648 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile08.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 










‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile01.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile02.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile03.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile04.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile05.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile06.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile07.sys 173,648 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile08.sys 196,608    √    √    √    √    √ 
pagefile09.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 
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6.5 Subjective Evaluations Experiment of Forensic 
Analysis System 
To validate the results of the tool in interpreting and the data extracted from 
the Event logs and Swap files, further evaluation experiments were conducted. 
The objective of the evaluation was: to gain an understanding of the level of 
awareness surrounding the use of System Generated Artefacts in an 
investigation; to assess subjects’ level of satisfaction with the SAFTool ability 
to aid their understanding of System Generated Artefacts and their data 
content; and to assess the degree to which the SAFTool can be modified and 
extended. 
 The functionality and usefulness of the SAFTool is further examined by 
the use of a series of questionnaires. The questionnaires targeted 
knowledgeable and experienced users in the digital forensics domain. The 
objectives is to verify the implementation of the SAFTool by (1) viewing 
different types of events recorded in the Event logs, (2) viewing the contents of 
Swap files, (3) searching for traces of keywords in Swap files as keyword 
searching is a primary method for the examination of large blocks of data 
(Gagnon, 2008), (4) further analysing the event logs and swap files by 
displaying the file information regarding the contents of the files in a graphical 
manner, and (5) generating report.  
The structure of the experiment is described in Section 6.5.2, which is 
then followed by a summary of the questionnaire results.  
6.5.1 Subjects of Experiments 
The subjects were recruited from among post-graduate students from the 
Information Security Research Group, University of Glamorgan. These 
individuals are in different stages of pursuing doctoral awards and is either 
actively researching the area of computer forensics or are responsible for 
teaching on the undergraduate or postgraduate awards offered by the Faculty 
of Advanced Technology at the University of Glamorgan. The goal of the 
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system generated artefacts forensic analysis system is to enable it to visualise 
the known data structure of Event logs and the not known data structure of 
Swap files in such a way that the investigator can easily see what data is 
available within these system areas of the Windows, only students who 
already had previously participated in a disk study were recruited as subjects. 
Further, because the system is a prototype, that at the moment only handles 
event logs and swap files, a basic knowledge of event logs and swap files was 
also required so that subjects could easily understand the tasks set and later 
be better able to evaluate the data in the display.  
 The objective of the evaluation was to evaluate the functionalities and 
usefulness of the prototype architecture with the utilisation of system 
generated artefacts as forensic evidence.  
Test files were extracted from the hard drive images from the forensic 
laboratory disk study. Only Event logs files and Swap files were extracted as 
subjects. The experiments used AppEvent04.Evt, SecEvent04.Evt, 
SysEvent04.Evt and pagefile10.sys from the examined disks (readable disks) 
that were used in the analysis of information remaining on disks offered for 
sale on the second hand market at the University of Glamorgan (2008). This is 
listed in Appendix G. 
 A total of five subjects participated in the evaluation experiments. All 
the five subjects had been involved to varying degrees in the residual data disk 
studies which had examined volumes and types of information that remains on 
computer hard drives offered for sale on the second hand market. Thus, they 
had been using system artefacts as forensic object. The subjects’ expertise in 
forensic analysis varied, ranging from specialists in hard drive forensic 
analysis, mobile forensics to network forensics. Table 6.13 summarises their 
background knowledge about forensic in general and system artefacts in 
particular. 
As outlined four files subjects were selected in the evaluation 
experiments and Table 6.14 summarises the properties of the files. Three files 
is used for the event logs since an event logs comprises three files as outlined 
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in Chapter 3, and one file is used for the swap file, for analysis and visualising 
the event logs and swap file.  
Table 6.13: Forensic Knowledge and Expertise of Human Subjects 
Subject S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Years of experience in computer forensics 
field 
5 2 >5 1 5 
No. of computer forensics tool used 5 2 >5 1 5 
 
Table 6.14: File Size of File Subjects 





6.5.2 Structure of Experiments   
i. Questionnaires: 
A questionnaire (see Appendix I) was given to all subjects to be answered after 
completion of the set task. 
Objectives of the questionnaire:  
1. To find out whether they were aware of system generated artefacts 
before this experiment and if so had they examined system generated 
artefacts to find digital evidence. 
2. To find out whether this prototype software helped them easily see what 
data was available within these system areas of the Windows operating 
system. 
ii. The process: 
The questionnaires process was as follows: 
1. A briefing was given to participants, describing the tasks and objectives 
of the questionnaire. 
2. The test data was explained to participants. They were requested to use 
the test data for the experiments. 
6.5 Subjective Evaluations Experiment of Forensic Analysis System                                231 
 




3. The participants were then required to carry out an evaluation of the 
system generated artefacts (AppEvent04.Evt, SecEvent04.Evt, 
SysEvent04.Evt and pagefile10.sys) as forensic evidence using the 
prototype software (SAFTool). 
4. The participants were then asked to answer the questionnaire as in 
Appendix I, which addressed the metrics for performing each type of 
evaluation. 
5. The results from the questionnaires were then analysed and presented in 
tabulated form and graphical charts. 
iii. The task: 
A. The Extensible Architecture of the Prototype  
The following tasks were used in the experiments: 
Task 1: 
To verify the extensible architecture, do the following: 
1. Click Analyse (No displayed artefact name) 
2. Click Visualise (No displayed artefact name) 
3. Click Report (No displayed artefact name) 
Task 2: 
To verify the extensible architecture after the Event log plugin and/or Swap 
file plugin have been installed, do the following: 
1. Click Analyse (Artefact names are displayed) 
2. Click Visualise (Artefact names are displayed) 
3. Click Report (Artefact names are displayed) 
Note: This task is used only after the Event log plugin and/or Swap file plugin 
have been installed. 
B. For Event log files 
The following tasks were used in the experiments: 
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Task 1:  
To install the event log plugin with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Open SAFTool and examine the drop-down menu selections. 
2. Click File > Install Plugin  
3. Select EventLogPlugin.xml > Open (plugin descriptor for 
installation) 
4. Plugin Installer > Install Plugin  (Plugin Installer Dialog 
displayed) 
5. Confirmation Dialog > Yes (Confirmation to restart base 
application) 
Task 2:  
To open and analyse the event log file with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Analyse > Analyse Event Log  
2. In the File Open dialog, browse to the AppEvent10.Evt file.  
Click Open 
3. Message popup will appear.  
Task 3:  
To open and further analyse the event log file (visualise the event log files) 
with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Visualise > Visualise Event Log  
2. In the view window, browse to the AppEvent10.Evt file,  
Click View 
3. To view graph,  
Click Graph  
Task 4:  
To generate report with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Report > Report Event Log  
2. In the view window, browse to the AppEvent10.Evt file,  
Click Generate 
3. The Microsoft word documents will popup.  
Note: All these tasks can be used for AppEvent10.Evt, SecEvent10.Evt and 
SysEvent10.Evt. 
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C. For Swap files 
The following tasks were used in the experiments: 
Task 1:  
To install the pagefile plugin with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Open SAFTool and examine the drop-down menu selections. 
2. Click File > Install Plugin  
3. Select PageFilePlugin.xml > Open (plugin descriptor for 
installation) 
4. Plugin Installer > Install Plugin  (Plugin Installer Dialog 
displayed) 
5. Confirmation Dialog > Yes (Confirmation to restart base 
application) 
Task 2:  
To open and analyse the pagefile file with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Analyse > Analyse Pagefile  
2. In the File Open dialog, browse to the pagefile10.sys file.  
Click Open 
3. Message popup will appear.  
Task 3:  
To open and further analyse the pagefile file (visualise the pagefile file) with 
SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Visualise > Visualise Pagefile  
2. In the view window, browse to the pagefile10.sys file,  
Click Hex View 
3. To view density map,  
Click Map View  
Task 4:  
To search word with SAFTool (keyword search), do the following: 
1. Click Visualise > Visualise Pagefile  
2. In the search window, key in ‘mail’ word,  
Click Search 
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3. The ‘mail’ word will be displayed if it exists 
Task 5:  
To generate report with SAFTool do the following: 
1. Click Report > Report Pagefile  
2. In the view window, browse to the pagefile10.sys file,  
Click Generate 
3. The Microsoft word documents will popup.  
6.5.3 Results 
This section reviews and analyses the findings of the evaluation experiments. 
The objectives of the experiments were to verify the implementation of the 
SAFTool through: (1) verifying the extensible architecture; (2) viewing 
different types of events recorded in the Event logs, (3) viewing the contents of 
Swap files; (4) searching for traces of keywords in Swap files as keyword 
searching is the primary examination method (Gagnon, 2008) since swap and 
page files contain all sorts of data, including e-mail, web pages, word 
processing documents and any other work that has been performed on the 
computer during the work session; (5) further analysing the event logs and 
swap files by displaying the file information relating to the contents of the files 
in a graphical manner; and (6) generating a report. Developing a plugin was 
not undertaken in the testing of the architecture’s extensibility since in order 
to build a plugin, the subjects would have been required to analyse each of the 
programs in the collection and write their own code for the new plugin. 
Considering that the subjects were volunteers, such an activity would have 
been time consuming. Five subjects were asked to use the system and verify 
the functionalities and usefulness of the SAFTool. Their expert opinion was 
captured using questionnaires. 
The five subjects were given with four files to analyse and visualise. In 
total, there were 95 tasks conducted with the forensic analysis system during 
the experiment. A detailed review of these tasks is included in Appendix G. 
The different tasks were related to assessing different sections of 
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the architecture: six tasks related to the architecture, forty-five tasks to the 
Event logs and twenty tasks to the Swap files.  
The task with regard to the architecture was to verify that the 
architecture is extensible; which new plugins of various Windows artefacts can 
be added and with various visualisation techniques, which can be used for the 
analysis and visualisation of the artefacts. The tasks with regard to the Event 
logs is to view different types of events recorded in the Event logs; visualise 
the file information regarding the contents of the files in graphical manner, 
which can aid the investigator to interpret massive amounts of data and 
representations of events in chronological order helps understanding much 
easier; and generating report, which is used when the investigator requires the 
information from the analysis to be included in a report. The tasks with regard 
to the Swap files is to view the contents of the Swap files; searching for traces 
of keywords since swap and page files contain all sorts of data, including e-
mail, web pages, word processing documents and any other work that has been 
performed on the computer during the work session; visualise the file 
information regarding the contents of the files in block view format 
(nonhierarchical visualisation technique) which can aid the investigator to 
interpret massive amounts of data and this helps understanding much easier; 
and generating report, which is used when the investigator requires the 
information from the analysis to be included in a report. Upon conducting a 
task, the user would see the outcome of the task in a different format: the 
Event logs displayed data in one line per entry and graphical form, i.e. in table 
and timeline; and Swap files displayed information in hexadecimal data 
display and ASCII text display and square block view format which display the 
file information regarding of file content.  
At the same time, the subjects’ opinions regarding the functionalities 
and usefulness of the SAFTool were gathered through the comment columns of 
the questionnaires. Their contents are summarised below:  
(1) Features to help users: 
Menu, colours and presentation are elements to help users in using the 
tool and understanding the objectives of the usage of the tool. Use of 
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colours to identify different areas and to easy understand visual aids 
will also help. The SAFTool should have a ‘Help’ menu for users to 
understand how the tool works.  
(2) Information presentation: 
Visualisation is the key element to aid users’ exploration of the file 
contents. The SAFTool presents a visual presentation of artefacts 
generated by the system both graphically and textually. Presentation of 
information was in a structured manner but with a basic level of detail. 
Start with Analyse, Visualise then Report. With the search function, 
the possibility of any queries can be seen through the system generated 
artefacts and therefore supply a better understanding. In order to 
better understand the information in the files the SAFTool should have 
more information on visual representation. For example, incorporate 
better description for the graph’s legend by explaining more of the units 
used in the block diagram of the Swap files. 
(3) Consideration of interface design: 
The most important element for the interface design is the menu 
structure. The SAFTool’s linear menu is easy to operate and 
demonstrate the flow design of left to right in the menus.  The SAFTool, 
at the same time, uses branched menus in one visual representation of 
the file’s content to branch out to another visual representation of the 
file’s content. 
(4) Enhancement for expansion: 
The SAFTool has a built-in extensible architecture. It seems the tool 
could be expanded with additional add ons. It is a straightforward 
process, just a couple of clicks and a plugin is installed, but this needs 
to be further investigation.  
 In order to study the functionalities and usefulness of system generated 
artefacts as forensic evidence, the functionalities and usefulness of the 
prototype software with additional information annotation as a working tool; 
and the SAFTool’s built-in extensible architecture, allowing it to be expanded 
6.5 Subjective Evaluations Experiment of Forensic Analysis System                                237 
 




with additional add on, three objectives were introduced and analysed as 
follows:  
O1: To gain understanding of the level of awareness surrounding the use 
of System Generated Artefacts in an investigation; 
O2: To assess the degree to which the SAFTool supports the 
understanding of System Generated Artefacts; and  
O3:  To assess the degree to which the SAFTool can be modified and 
extended. 
The three objectives were assessed using the questionnaire distributed to the 
five subjects. Their satisfaction levels will the objectives established in 
questions A1, A2, A3, B4, B5 and C6 below were analysed: 
A1: The data analysis and the presentation of data in the application 
aid the understanding of the selected system generated artefacts. 
The use of the tool highlights the importance of system generated 
artefacts.  
A2: The chosen analysis and display methods aid the understanding of 
the system generated artefacts data. 
A3: Additional information annotation provided in the application aids 
the understanding of the information contained in the system 
generated artefacts. 
B4: The data analysis and data visualisation easily and clearly indicate 
the contents of the Windows system generated artefacts. 
B5: The data analysis and data visualisation used in the prototype aid 
in understanding the information contained in the Windows system 
generated artefacts. 
C6: In your expert opinion, and given the information provided, how 
easy is it to modify and extend the tool?  
In Figure 6.30, participants’ satisfaction levels are tabulated and presented in 
the form of a bar chart with categories relating to the functionalities and 
usefulness of the system generated artefacts as forensic evidence; the 
functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software with additional 
information annotation as a working tool; and the SAFTool’s built-in 
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extensible architecture allowing it to be expanded with additional add ons. The 























Figure 6.30: Participant’s Satisfaction Level with the System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis Tool (SAFTool) 
 
Figure 6.30 above depicts the results of the participant’s satisfaction 
level on the satisfaction of analysing, visualising and reporting system 
generated artefacts concentrating on Event logs and Swap files which is built 
in the extensible architecture of SAFTool. Generally, majority of the 
participants are in the fair and above fair category of satisfaction with the 
functionalities and usefulness on the use of System Generated Artefacts in an 
investigation and the support of System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis 
Application (SAFTool) in understanding of System Generated Artefacts.  
Looking at the subjects’ satisfaction level with the objectives 
established in questions A1, A2, A3, B4, B5 and C6, depicted by the bar chart, 
more than 50% of the subjects expressed a fair and above level of satisfaction 
with them: 4(80%) with A1; 4(100%) with A2; 3(60%) with A3, 5(100%) with 
B4, 3(60%) with B5; and 5(100%) with C6. Subjects thus indicated they were 
Very Satisfied Satisfied Fair Unsatisfied
Very 
Unsatisfied
A1 0 3 1 1 0
A2 2 1 1 1 0
A3 1 2 0 2 0
B4 2 2 1 0 0
B5 0 3 0 2 0
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satisfied with their ability to analyse, visualise and report on system 
generated artefacts using an extensible architecture during an investigation.   
Looking at subjects who were unsatisfied with the objectives 
established in questions A1, A2, A3, B4, B5 and C6, depicted by the bar chart, 
less than 50% were unsatisfied: 1(20%) with A1; 1(20%) with A2; 2(40%) with 
A3, 0(0%) with B4, 2(40%) with B5; and 0(0%) with C6. Not one subject was 
very unsatisfied. 
The result thus show and confirm that the SAFTool aided 
understanding system generated artefacts; the additional information 
annotation provided in the tool aided understanding of the information 
contained in the system generated artefacts; the data analysis and 
visualisation functionalities easily and clearly indicated the contents of the 
artefact; and the SAFTool’s built-in extensible architecture would allow it to be 
expanded with additional add ons. Hence all the objectives: O1 (to gain an 
understanding and increase the level of awareness surrounding the use of 
system generated artefacts in an investigation); O2 (to assess subjects’ level of 
satisfaction with the SAFTool’s ability to aid their understanding of system 
generated artefacts); and O3 (how easy they thought it would be to modify and 
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6.6 Additional Experiments 
The testing of the tool for consistency is examined here via a several number of 
test files would be used and number of times that each one was tested, to 
demonstrate that a tool meets the consistency test. For this test, all the 
experiments were performed three times run on a number of artefacts files of 
varying sizes and were extracted from different machine (dataset from 
Appendix H) and using the tools mentioned earlier in Section 6.2. A new 
database was created each time of the run.  
The result of applying the various tools to the test files listed in 
Appendix H is summarised for discussion in Table 6.15. This table indicates 
the number of records that are processed from individual event logs (one line 
per log file) from the three runs of each event logs. Figure 6.31 illustrates the 
total event records from three runs of each event logs in Appendix H located 
for the evtstats.pl script and the prototype SAFTool in the consistency test.  
Table 6.16 shows the average time required to process each event logs 
using lsevt.pl and SAFTool (from three runs of each event logs in Appendix H). 
The graph in Figure 6.32 is generated based on the parses through the 
contents of the Event log file and display event records.  The total processing 
time would be in milliseconds and the practical impact is that extra in average 
1521 milliseconds are taken. Both illustrate almost the same shapes of graph, 
i.e. processing time increases with the file sizes. As noted in Section 6.4.7, the 
experiment with the Event Viewer could not be condu
6.6 Additional Experiments                                                                                                      241 
 




Table 6.15: Number of Records Retrieved for Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and 
SAFTool in Consistency Test 
Test Data File Name Size (KB) 
No. of Records 
Event Viewer evtstats.pl SAFTool 
AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 112 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 58 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 347 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 262 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 123 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 260 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 370 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 139 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 1547 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 106 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 2317 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 395 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 63 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 295 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 187 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 359 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 110 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 206 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 236 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 89 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 247 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 124 
SysEvent14.Evt 128 X 312 312 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as corrupted 
 






Figure 6.31: Total Event Records Located for the evtstats.pl Script and SAFTool in Consistency Test
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Table 6.16: Processing Time for Event Viewer, lsevt.pl and SAFTool in 
Consistency Test 

















AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 87 112 661.33  
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 57 58 343.66 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 198.66 347 1390.66 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 70 76 437.33 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 149.33 262 1239.33 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 87.66 123 677 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 148 260 1089 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 396.66 370 1729 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 104.66 139 838.33 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 804.66 1547 6025.66 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 79.33 106 474 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 851 2317 9755.33 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 397.33 395 2805.66 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 60 63 349 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 150 295 1251 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 115.66 187 874.66 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 263.33 359 1583.66 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 85 110 531.66 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 118.33 206 901 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 136.33 236 911.66 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 75.66 89 468.66 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 147.66 247 1067.66 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 67 76 401.33 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 97 124 828 
SysEvent14.Evt 128 X 312 162 312 1385.33 
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Data in Table 6.17 shows total size of data parsed for WinHex and the 
SAFTool (from three runs of each swap file in Appendix H). As can be seen, the 
same results were recorded for each tool in the consistency test. A graph (see 
Figure 6.33) was subsequently drawn comparing the total size of data parsed 
by each tool. It confirmed the result in Table 6.17.   






Total Size of Data (bytes) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 1,598,029,824 1,598,029,824 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 603,979,776 603,979,776 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 2,145,386,496 2,145,386,496 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 805,306,368 805,306,368 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 201,326,592 201,326,592 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 553,648,128 553,648,128 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 120,586,240 120,586,240 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 524,288,000 524,288,000 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 792,723,456 792,723,456 




























































































   






Table 6.18 shows the processing times for WinHex and the SAFTool 
(from three runs of each swap file in Appendix H) which was subsequently 
displayed in graph form, Figure 6.34 and Figure 6.35 respectively.  
In the context of this chapter, processing time recorded in milliseconds 
(ms) in term of the time taken by the forensic analysis system to generate an 
analysis display. It took a longer generate hexadecimal data display or an 
ASCII text display for the contents of each swap file when the SAFTool was 
employed in the consistency test.  
 






Processing Time (ms) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 23.33 461,594 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 21.00 299,812 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 25.00 572,125  
pagefile14.sys 786,432 22.66 359,896 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 19.33 234,735 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 20.66 295,911 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 18.33 228,339  
pagefile18.sys 512,000 20.33 290,052 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 21.33 338,813 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 19.66 283,339 
 
The ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term existence in the swap 
files (from three runs of each swap file in Appendix H) as identified by WinHex 
and the SAFTool is shown in Table 6.19 and Table 6.20 respectively.  


































































Comparison of Total Size of Data (bytes) Located  Over Time 
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Table 6.19: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in Swap 
Files Identified by WinHex in Consistency Test 
 
Table 6.20: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in Swap 








Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 1,560,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 








Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 1,560,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000    √    √    √    √    √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile20.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 






 A total of 15 subjects participated in the evaluation experiments to 
evaluate the tool. This number is three times the number of subjects involved 
in evaluating the tool as undertaken in Section 6.5.3, therefore should shows a 
realistic population. All the 15 subjects involve directly in digital forensic 
examination and analysis including in the area of audio and video forensics.  
Thus, they had been using system artefacts as forensic object. The subjects’ 
expertise in forensic analysis is hard drive forensic analysis, phone forensics, 
audio forensics and video forensics. Table 6.13 summarises their background 
knowledge about forensic in general and system artefacts in particular. 
Test files were extracted from the hard drive from the multimedia 
laboratory used to train computer technician. Only Event logs files and Swap 
files were extracted as subjects. The experiments used AppEvent05.Evt, 
SecEvent05.Evt, SysEvent05.Evt and pagefile20.sys in the analysis. This is 
listed in Appendix H. As outlined four files subjects were selected in the 
evaluation experiments and Table 6.14 summarises the properties of the files.  
Table 6.21: Forensic Knowledge and Expertise of Human Subjects of Fifteen 
Participants 
(a) Subject 1 to 5 
Subject S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Years of experience in computer forensics 
field 
5 2 2 1 5 
No. of computer forensics tool used 9 2 4 2 5 
 
(b) Subject 6 to 10 
Subject S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
Years of experience in computer forensics 
field 
5 2 6 1 4 
No. of computer forensics tool used 6 2 7 1 5 
 
(c) Subject 11 to 15 
Subject S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 
Years of experience in computer forensics 
field 
5 2 >5 1 5 
No. of computer forensics tool used 5 2 >5 1 5 
 






Table 6.22: File Size of File Subjects for Additional Experiments 






The 15 subjects were given with four files to analyse and visualise. In 
total, there were 285 tasks conducted with the forensic analysis system during 
the experiment. A detailed review of these tasks is included in Appendix H 
(Table H4). The different tasks were related to assessing different sections of 
the architecture: 90 tasks related to the architecture, 135 tasks to the Event 
logs and 60 tasks to the Swap files. The outline of the experiment has already 
been discussed in Section 6.5.2.  
This section contains the results of the questionnaires as initially 
discussed in Section 6.5.3. In Figure 6.36, participants’ satisfaction levels are 
tabulated and presented in the form of a bar chart with categories relating to 
the functionalities and usefulness of the system generated artefacts as forensic 
evidence; the functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software with 
additional information annotation as a working tool; and the SAFTool’s built-
in extensible architecture allowing it to be expanded with additional add ons. 
The questionnaire for the experiments undertaken is provided in Appendix I. 
Figure 6.36 depicts the results of the participant’s satisfaction level on 
the satisfaction of analysing, visualising and reporting system generated 
artefacts concentrating on Event logs and Swap files which is built in the 
extensible architecture of SAFTool. Generally, all of the participants are in the 
fair and above fair category of satisfaction with the functionalities and 
usefulness on the use of System Generated Artefacts in an investigation and 
the support of System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis Application 
(SAFTool) in understanding of System Generated Artefacts.  
 
 
































Figure 6.36: Participant’s Satisfaction Level with Fifteen Participants in Using 
the System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis Tool (SAFTool) 
 
Looking at the subjects’ satisfaction level with the objectives 
established in questions A1, A2, A3, B4, B5 and C6 depicted by the bar chart, 
more than 50% of the participants are very satisfied. Out of the total of 15 
participants, 12 (80%) of A1, followed by 10 (67%) of A2, 8 (53%) of A3, 12 
(80%) of B4, 9 (60%) of B5, and lastly 10 (67%) of B6 show that by using 
visualised tool, system generated artefacts can be easily read to enhance the 
understanding. Subjects thus indicated they were satisfied with their ability to 
analyse, visualise and report on system generated artefacts using an 
extensible architecture during an investigation. Whereas, the percentage of 
below 50% on the participant’s satisfaction level of satisfied, fair, 0% for 




Very Satisfied Satisfied Fair Unsatisfied
Very 
Unsatisfied
A1 12 3 0 0 0
A2 10 3 2 0 0
A3 8 2 5 0 0
B4 12 2 1 0 0
B5 9 3 3 0 0








































i. Satisfied (3 (20%) of A1; 3 (20%) of A2; 2(13%) of A3; 2(13%) of 
B4; 3(20%) of B5; and 2(13%) of B6) 
ii. Fair (0 (0%) of A1; 2 (13%) of A2; 5(33%) of A3; 1(7%) of B4; 
3(20%) of B5; and 3(20%) of B6) 
The result thus show and confirm that the SAFTool aided 
understanding system generated artefacts; the additional information 
annotation provided in the tool aided understanding of the information 
contained in the system generated artefacts; the data analysis and 
visualisation functionalities easily and clearly indicated the contents of the 
artefact; and the SAFTool’s built-in extensible architecture would allow it to be 
expanded with additional add ons. Hence all the objectives mentioned in 
Section 6.5.3 were accomplished. 
To conclude, the SAFTool (the visualised tool) with built-in extensible 
architecture and with additional information annotation (menu, colours and 
presentation) as a working tool have enhanced the understanding about 
system generated artefacts. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have presented the results of a number of comparisons and 
evaluations of the proposed system generated artefacts forensic analysis 
system. Based on the experiments undertaken, the proposed system to locate 
and extract data from the data structures is more robust and accurate than 
approach using the Windows API to analyse system generated artefacts. 
Further, the system has been shown able to locate and extract data from a 
known and a not known data structures and present users with the data using 
different visualisation techniques. We obtained approximately 100% of records 
examining both event logs (parsing the contents of the Event log file and 
performing an actual count of the number of records found and not parses the 
header of the Event log file and determines the number of records that existed 






to both evtstats.pl and SAFTool) and swap files (equal total size of data parsed 
given a pagefile to both WinHex and SAFTool). According to Teerlink and 
Erbacher (2006), the forensic analysis process can be made better if 
visualisation is employed to display mountains of data in analysing suspicious 
files.   
 In addition we also learned that there is a difference in processing time 
in locating and extracting known and not known data structures. Based on the 
experiments undertaken, it was noted that swap files (with a not known data 
structure) took a longer processing time when compared to event logs files 
(with a known data structure). This was probably due to the difference in their 
data structure, i.e. one known and one not known.  
 The results produced by the questionnaire evaluation confirmed the 
functionalities and usefulness of system generated artefacts as forensic 
evidence; the functionalities and usefulness of the prototype software with 
additional information annotation as a working tool; SAFTool’s built-in 
extensible architecture allowing it to be expanded with additional add ons; and 
the data analysis and data visualisation used in the prototype increasing 
understanding.  Generally, all of the participants (five and fifteen) are in fair 
and above fair category of satisfaction with the functionalities and usefulness 
on the use of System Generated Artefacts in an investigation and the support 
of System Generated Artefacts Forensic Analysis Application (SAFTool) in 
understanding of System Generated Artefacts. 100% of records obtained 
examining both event logs and swap files with the three times that each file 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
In the introduction to this thesis, a hypothesis was proposed and a series of 
objectives were outlined which focused on testing the hypothesis. These were 
concerned with the tools, processes and procedures required to support the 
forensic analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. This chapter reflects 
on these outlined objectives, describe how the various chapters contribute to 
addressing the questions, raised and also draws a series of conclusions.   
7.1 Summary 
The purpose of the thesis was to prove that the prototype tool could: 
• Benefit investigators by providing a mechanism through which the 
analysis and visualisation of system artefacts can effectively reveal the 
contents of a selection of system artefacts to further assist investigators 
in examining evidence. 
• Allow investigators to see the evidentiary value of each of the selected 
system generated artefacts as they incorporate new modules of 
analysis, visualisation and report for those artefacts. 






• Assist in the process of examining system artefacts, by incorporating 
search for keywords function and visualisation techniques to interpret 
massive amounts of data and this helps understanding much easier.  
In the literature review contained in (Chapters 2 and 3), a need was 
identified in the lack of  special software to analyse system artefact data in 
order to find information related to a specific case, which  data can be found in 
many different places. Several of these artefacts are created on Windows 
systems during normal operations without reference to the user and without 
the user’s knowledge. System generated artefacts represent valuable sources 
of evidence and are increasingly the focus of investigation and legal discovery 
as they are generated by the system and are not readily visible to the common 
user, which also makes it more plausible that they have not been altered 
(Volonino et al., 2007). 
Further, with ever increasing hard drive capacity, and also for critical 
business requirements it is more practical to be able to gain access to the file(s) 
required since, as pointed out by Carvey (2004), “I found that in many ways, 
all these forensic analysis applications are vastly different, different in the 
capabilities they provide, and especially different in how you would go about 
getting them to perform a certain function and then display the results. A 
forensic analysis application needs a core set of functionalities and capabilities. 
A forensic analysis application should be a data presentation application.” This 
statement would appear to support the development of new forensic analysis 
application. 
The aim and objectives of the research were influenced by a literature 
review and by observing and using the current state of the art tools available 
for the analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. The research was 
structured around three central questions 1 to 3 summarised below which in 
Section 7.1.1 through Section 7.1.3, and which have been addressed and stated 
by the summarisation of related chapters. This further led to the architecture 
design and implementation of the prototype tool (SAFTool) 




(Chapters 4 and 5). Next, coupled with the research presented in this thesis, a 
new solution to a problem has been evaluated (Chapter 6).  
In the introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1), a number of questions is 
posed concerning with the tools, processes and procedures required to support 
the forensic analysis of Windows system generated artefacts. In this chapter, it 
will reflect on these questions, describe how the various chapters contribute to 
answering each question and draw some conclusions. 
7.1.1 Information Extraction 
 
One of the first steps in a forensic analysis is to extract the information 
contained in an artefact: in this case, the automated extraction of information 
from an artefact file. In Chapter 1, we argue that this step is hindered in some 
cases by the internal structure of the file not being generally available. The 
internal structures being effectively unknown makes it difficult to parse the 
file for the file evidentiary values. Hence, this project suggested implementing 
the ideas of abstraction to data structuring and providing appropriate parsers 
to extract different types of data structure that are explicitly and implicitly 
contained in a file. Chapter 3 addressed the data structures contained in a 
number of system generated artefacts. Event logs and Swap files data 
structures were selected as specific examples for this thesis, as they are 
examples of the complex internal structures of system artefacts found in the 
Windows Operating System, Event logs for their known data structure and 
Swap files for their not known data structure. Chapter 4 introduced the 
proposed architecture aimed at processing Windows system artefacts. The 
architecture requirements and objectives were defined based on a clear 
understanding of the priority of the requirements identified in Chapters 2 and 
3 from the issues associated with current state of the art tools. In order to 
make the architecture extensible, Chapter 4 elaborated on how the design 
Question 1: How can we extract information from an artefact? 




process of the proposed architecture incorporated and implemented object 
oriented features, such as abstraction, modular software, event-driven 
programming, reusable software and model transition. In addition, the 
architecture has a layered architecture, that is, has separate layers for the 
application logic, presentation, domain and database, and each layer has 
different classes. Therefore, this architecture provides an extensibility 
functionality whereby the application can be extended easily without 
modifying its original code base. Following the design process was 
implementation of the prototype system, which dealt with how the design 
decisions were implemented with respect to the requirements in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 focused on the implementation of the proposed architecture and the 
development of the prototype and discussed the various techniques used to 
implement the architecture. In Chapter 6, the prototype implementation and, 
in turn, the architecture was evaluated using a series of experiments based on 
test data consisting of previously unseen event log files and swap files.  
The architecture deals with the complex structure in the native format. 
It facilitates the extraction of data from complex structures. The architecture 
use data structures to access and extract all the relevant data from the 
complex structures. This can be done for all structures, as it does not use the 
APIs internally for accessing, adding and retrieving data. 
7.1.2 Organising Data 
 
 
In Chapter 4, we introduced the requirements for the storage of persistent 
data to operate independently of any changes made to the database, thus 
reinforcing the architecture’s extensibility.  In Chapter 5, we have 
demonstrated the use of a Database Management System (DBMS) to integrate 
information on the known and not known data structure of an artefact as 
Question 2: How can we organise and integrate the various data structures 
to improve the correlation of the data obtained? 




Event logs represent known data structure, whereas swap files represent not 
known data structure. The database can be used to suit the storage of data for 
known and not known data structures of Windows system generated artefacts 
and can be used further for data from different systems. Both file and database 
provide stores for information but the file for keeping data and the other 
database design is not used as the file is only appropriate for simple 
applications and for storing data that does not need to be shared and updated 
by many users; other database designs tested did not include the use of 
recursion and resulted in more fields being added to the database records. 
Therefore, a relational database represents a storage better compared to using 
files as a means of persistent storage. The DBMS is a comprehensive data 
management system which organises and manages the tasks associated with 
storing and providing effective access to large volumes of data. It can be 
expanded in terms of accepting all sizes of data without any knowledge of the 
structure and extracting the data for visualisation and report printout 
purposes. 
The architecture enables the automatic processing of complex data 
structures into a common data store. The data is pulled from the complex 
structure and stored in the database for use by the visualiser. The architecture 
also incorporates a mechanism to ensure that no data in the original complex 
structure will change, to ensure that forensic integrity is maintained during 
the investigation.  




An issue which arises after parsing and storing the information contained in 
an artefact is presenting it usefulness, in a way that can be easily understood 
and interacted with. Visual representations translate data into a visible form 
Question 3: How can we use the information obtained in the first two 
questions to support and improve forensic analysis? 




that highlights important features, including commonalities and anomalies 
(Guillermo et al., 2007). The work undertaken was demonstrated in Chapters 
4 and 5 included the operation of mapping data into a visual form such that 
the data representation is invoked during the use case Visualise Artefact 
Data. The use case description is as follows: the artefact data may be examined 
to identify valuable meaningful data and allow for further analysis. The 
mapping data to a visual form is presented in a more human friendly format by 
graphs, charts or illustrations. Results from the design of the use case 
Visualise Artefact Data in Chapter 5 showed that by information 
visualisation, visual forensic analysis can be improved. Teerlink and Erbacher 
(2006) commented, “Using this concept of visual perception, we have developed 
a GUI and associated visualisations that display file information in a 
graphical manner; and with these visualisation techniques reduce the time 
examiners need to analyse data and greatly increase the probability of locating 
criminal evidence”. In Chapter 6, we learnt that the Carvey’s (2007) programs 
(evtstats.pl and lsevt.pl) shows the numbers of record in numeric form and the 
SAFTool program shows the number of records in visualisation form in the 
shape of graph (bar graphs).  
The architecture presents the data extracted from the structure 
visually in many formats using analytical visualisation techniques or 
informative visualisation techniques. The architecture uses the data stored in 
the complex structure and uses the visualiser to visualise the output of the 
data. The visualiser can provide visualisations of data in informative ways, 
illustrating the data in graphs and charts. Analytical visualisation can provide 
the user to further analyse the data. The architecture also provides the 
investigator with a reporting feature. A reporting feature can be used to export 
out the data to a report.  
 





The following achievements were the results of proving the hypothesis and 
fulfilling the research aim and objectives outlined in Chapter 1 which allowed 
verification through a thorough evaluation process:  
• A design overview and detailed design with design documentation 
which detailed in the justifications the decisions taken when discussing 
the features and development practices required for the implementation 
of the SAFTool to be a success. 
• The implementation of the design, which is the development of an 
extensible architecture that enables a variety of system artefacts to be 
analysed by allowing other objects and tools to be added easily. The 
architecture also caters for different data structures (known and not 
known internal data structures of system generated files by the 
Windows Operating System). This includes the provision of 
visualisation that displays file contents information in a graphical 
manner.  
• The implementation of a proof of concept prototype tool capable of 
visualising the Event logs and Swap files.  
• A detailed evaluation plan was produced. A number of comparable 
applications from academia and industry were selected as 
representatives of current state-of-the-art tools and compared to the 
proposed prototype tool. 
• The evaluations carried out produced detailed evaluation results which 
have been examined and discussed in depth. Conclusions regarding the 
architecture’s ability to satisfy the requirements identified at the start 
of the research were drawn from the experiments and helped to confirm 
the contributions made to science.  
The architecture developed has satisfied the hypothesis of the thesis. 
The following are the contributions in more detail: 




• An architecture as a single standard means for examining system 
artefacts contained in hard disk images. 
• An architecture as a single standard means for analysing and visualising 
evidence from various artefacts within the Windows Operating System. 
These artefacts’ data are parsed separately and later combined into a 
single representation. Such an approach can be extended to include other 
data from various areas within the Windows operating system as 
identified and/or required by the user. The data in the complex data 
structures within the Windows operating system can be easily analysed 
using the developed architecture.  
• An architecture that parses the information in those files in a manner 
that does not rely on the Windows API.  
• Architecture capable of visualising data contained in an artefact in such 
a way that the investigator can easily see what data what is available 
within these areas of the Windows operating system. 
• An architecture that incorporates reporting functionality which some 
tools do not offer a reporting facility. 
• The provision of an open source architecture that is as extensible and 
flexible as possible for future improvements, research and the addition of 
features as well as integration of the implemented system into a wider 
forensic tool. 
• A prototype tool for visualising the Event logs and Swap files’ data as a 
means to highlight its features in order of their importance, reveal 
patterns, and simultaneously show features that exist across multiple 
dimensions. Thus, visualisation is the important method to understand 
and communicate information.  




7.3 Issues and Future Work 
While this research proved that it is feasible to develop an architecture that is 
able to integrate forensic data from the known and not known internal data 
structure of system generated files by the Windows Operating System; display 
the content information of those files in the form of narrative constructs and in 
a graphical manner; and to implement a proof of concept prototype tool capable 
of visualising the Event logs and Swap files, many additional areas that need 
to be resolved were identified. During the implementation stage of this project, 
a number of issues were revealed that could not initially be addressed. Some of 
the issues identified are improvements that can be made to the SAFTool in its 
current state; others are possible feature improvements that could make the 
SAFTool more feature-rich. These are discussed below: 
• There are some speed issues that should be investigated. The process of 
analysing Swap files can take some time when large file sizes are being 
processed. However, the architecture works and given further research, 
the speed issues can be identified and addressed.  
• The architecture has been created as a proof of concept prototype tool 
and not meant to be distributed, but through the experiments 
conducted it seems that its applications are stable and functional. The 
tool could be used in the academic environment as a teaching aid 
allowing others to examine the work and perhaps add their own 
contributions to the project. 
• As the SAFTool is able to parse different data structure formats of 
system artefacts, it could be further developed to recognise and present 
other versions of the Windows operating system and all the various 
types of computer operating systems, both proprietary and open source. 
• SAFTool is not necessary confined purely to system artefacts analysis. 
As a data examining architecture, it can be applied to different 
examining paradigms. For example, be able to recognise and present a 
wide range of files data structure, if any in the future and incorporating 




recovering internal structure of processes from the memory (Craiger et 
al., 2005; Sutherland et al., 2008). Further, additional spectrum of data 
container could be used. Investigators have an increasing need to share 
digital evidence between different organisations and analysis tools. But 
today’s investigators are hindered by a variety of independently 
developed and incompatible formats used to store digital evidence 
(EnCase, 2005; Garfinkel, 2006; The Common Digital Evidence Storage 
Format Working Group, 2006; Turner, 2006; and Pladna, 2008). 
• To provide the investigator with an additional resource the system 
could also include a flat text file with an explanation / interpretation of 
the structure of the artefact. This can then be used as a reference for 
the investigator or to add an interpretation of material for a court 
report. 
• As the SAFTool is able to be used in post-mortem analysis, there is a 
need to view running processes in conducting live investigations.  In 
addition to physical media, investigators may also obtain evidence from 
other sources such as live memory analysis. Where the capture of live 
memory is not possible, some evidence of memory activity can be 
recovered from the Swap files left on the hard drive. The evolution of 
technology has a need for live analysis than a post-mortem one. With 
such live investigation, the forensic analysis system will more flexible 
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Table A.1: Event Logs Header 
No. 
Offset   
(bytes ) 
Type Description 
1 0x00 char[8] Magic string (“ElfFile”) 0x00 
2 0x08 char[8] Unknown, const 0x00 
3 0x10 int64 Number of current chunk 
3 0x18 int64 Number of next record 
4 0x20 uint32 Header space used, constant 0x80 
5 0x24 uint16 Minor version, constant 1 
6 0x26 uint16 Major version, constant 3 
7 0x28 uint16 Size of header, constant 0x1000 
8 0x2a uint16 Chunk count 
9 0x2c char[76] Unknown, const 0x00 
10 0x78 uint32 Flags 






















Size (bytes) Description 
1 0x000 char[8] Magic string (“ElfChnk”) 0x00 
2 0x008 int64 Number of first record in log 
3 0x010 int64 Number of last record in log 
4 0x018 int64 Number of first record in file 
5 0x020 int64 Number of last record in file 
6 0x028 uint32  Size of header 
7 0x02c uint32 Offset of last record 
8 0x030 uint32  Offset of next record 
9 0x034 uint32 DataCRC 
10 0x038 char[68] Unknown 
11 0x07c uint32 HeaderCRC 
12 0x080 uint32[64] StringTable 
13 0x180 uint32[32] TemplateTable 
 









1 0x00 char[4] Magic, constant 0x42, 0x00 
2 0x04 uint32 Record length 
3 0x08 int64 NumLogRecord 
4 0x10 FILETIME TimeCreated (FILETIME) 
5 var. char[] Event message, binary XML stream 












































0x0 2 String(“sk”) Magic number 
0x4 4 Offset Pointer to previous SK record 
0x8 4 Offset Pointer to next SK record 
0xC 4 Unsigned Integer Reference count 




Data structure which contains 
owner SID, DACL, SACL and 
control flags. 
Table B.2: Key Records (NK) Data Structures (Morgan, 2009) 
Offset 
Size 
(bytes) Type Description 
0x0 2 String(“nk”) Magic number 
0x2 2 Flags 
0x0001, 0x0002, 0x0004, 0x0008, 0x0010, 




64-bit NT time stamp 








Number of subkeys (volatile) 
0x1C 4 Offset Pointer to subkey-list (stable) 




Number of values 
0x28 4 Offset Pointer to value-list for values 
0x2C 4 Offset Pointer to the SK record 
0x30 4 Offset Pointer to the class name 
0x34 4 Unsigned 
Integer 
Maximum number of bytes in a subkey 
name 
       



































The key name; stored in ASCII and is 
typically NULL terminated 





0x0 2 String 





Number of elements in this 
subkey-list 
0x4 
4 or 8 
(each) 
Structure List Multiple subkey-list elements 





0x0 2 String(“vk”) Magic number 
0x2 2 Unsigned 
Integer 
Value name length 
0x4 4 Unsigned 
Integer 
Data length 
0x8 4 Offset Pointer to data 
      










0xC 4 Enumeration Value type; One of; REG_NONE (0), 
REG_SZ (1), REG_EXPAND_SZ (2), 
REG_BINARY (3), REG_DWORD (4), 
REG_DWORD_BIG_ENDIAN (5), 
REG_LINK (6), REG_MULTI_SZ (7), REG_ 
RESOURCE_LIST (8), 
REG_FULL_RESOURCE_ DESCRIPTOR (9), 
REG_RESOURCE_ REQUIREMENTS _LIST 
(10), REG_QWORD (11). 
0x10 2 Flags If the 0 bit is set, the value name is in 
ASCII, otherwise it is in UTF-16LE 
0x14 Variable String The value name; stored in ASCII and is 
typically NULL terminated 





0x0..[4*(num. values)] 4 Offset List of pointers to VK records; 
appear in order of value 
creation 






0x0 Variable Raw 
Data 
Data type and structure depends on type indicated 















0x0 2 String (“db”) Magic number 
0x2 2 Unsigned Integer Number of data fragment 
0x4 4 Offset Pointer to big data indirect 
cell 
 
Table B.8: Big Data Indirect Cells Records Data Structures         










































Requirement Use Case 
To locate and access the artefact file in the file 
system. 
Analyse new artefact 
 
To create new artefact object. 
To extract data from the artefact’s internal 
structure (extract fields). 
To record details of each artefact for each user. 
This will include the title of the artefact, the 
interpretation and reconstruction of the fields.  
To provide data store for insertion of data for each 
artefact. 
To get a database specification from the user, and 
tell the database object to read in an artefact 
object from the database. 
Visualise artefact data 
To display the current information about the 
desired artefact. 
To provide information that is used to visualise 
the data of an artefact in an intuitive format, that 
is to check the artefact data. 
 
Use Case Description 
 
Use Case Description 
Analyse new artefact  When a user gets the system artefact analysis task, 
details of the new artefact are entered into the 
database. These include the translation of a stream 
of bytes into a usable structure to recover evidence 
(data structures) from the artefact. The aim is to 
extract all data from any complex structure. 
Availability of a data store ensures retrieval and 
insertion of data. 
The investigator for that artefact is the person who 
analyses it. 
Visualise artefact data 
 The artefact data may be examined to identify 
valuable meaningful data and allow for further 
analysis. The mapping of data to a visual form 
presents the data in a more human friendly format 
by the use of graphs, charts or illustrations. 

































































Sequence diagram for the use case Analyse new artefact  



















Sequence diagram for the use case Visualise artefact data  
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+isUpdated() : bool 
+loadRegisteredPlugin() : 
<unspecified> 





+createMenu()   
















+loadClass(in Class : Object)  
 
com.forensic.base::ClassLoaderFactory 



































+getConnection()  : object 
+select(in query : string) : object 






























































































   
   





























































































































































































































































































































CREATE TABLE Artefacts 
 ( 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  LoadedDate datetime NOT NULL, 
  CreatedDate datetime NOT NULL, 
  FilePath varchar(200), 
  FileType int NOT NULL) 
      FileCRC varchar(200)  
 ); 
 
CREATE TABLE Eventlog 
 ( 
  EventUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
  RecordNo int NOT NULL, 
  GeneratedTime datetime NOT NULL, 
  WrittenTime datetime NOT NULL, 
  EventID int NOT NULL, 
  EventType int NOT NULL, 
  EventCategory int NOT NULL, 
  StrCount int NOT NULL, 
  SourceName varchar(200) NULL, 
  ComputerName varchar(200) NULL, 
  Description varchar(200) NULL 
 ); 
 
CREATE TABLE Pagefile 
 ( 
  PageUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
  Content blob NOT NULL, 
  AsciiSize int NOT NULL, 
  ChunkSize int NOT NULL, 
  Block int NOT NULL 
      );  
 








CREATE TABLE Registry 
 ( 
  RegistryUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
  EventID int, 
  EventTypeID int   
 ); 
 
CREATE TABLE Hive 
 ( 
  HiveUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  RegistryUID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Registry(RegistryUID), 
  Registry text NOT NULL, 
  Description text NOT NULL  
  );  
 
CREATE TABLE Key 
 ( 
  KeyUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  RegistryUID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Registry(RegistryUID), 
      HiveUID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES HiveUID(HiveUID), 
  KeyName text NOT NULL  
 );  
 
CREATE TABLE KeyData 
 ( 
  KeyDataUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  KeyUID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES KeyUID(KeyUID), 
  KeyDataName text NOT NULL, 
      KeyDataType text, 
      KeyDataData text 












CREATE TABLE WebCookies 
 ( 
  WebCookiesUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
  ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
  VarName varchar, 
      VarValue varchar, 
      Website varchar,  
      ExpiredM timestamp, 
      ExpiredL timestamp, 
      CreationM timestamp, 
      CreationL timestamp  
  ); 
CREATE TABLE RecycleBin 
     ( 
     RecycleBinUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
     ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
     RecycleSize int, 
     RecycleName varchar, 
     RecycleID int, 
     RecycleNum int, 
     RecycleDT timestamp, 
     RecycleFSize int 
     ); 
CREATE TABLE IEActivity 
    ( 
    IEActivityUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
    ArtefactID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES Artefacts(ArtefactID), 
    IELength int, 
    CDirectory varchar 
    ); 
CREATE TABLE Activity 
   ( 
   ActivityUID int NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
   IEActivityUID int NOT NULL FOREIGN KEY REFERENCES IEActivity(IEActivityUID), 
   Type varchar, 
   URL varchar, 
   ModifiedDate timestamp, 
   AccessDate timestamp, 
   Filename varchar, 
   Directory varchar, 
   HTTPHeader varchar 
   ); 
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Table G.1: Event Logs File Name and File Size   
No. Event logs File Name File Size (KB) 
1. AppEvent01.Evt 512 
2. SecEvent01.Evt 64 
3. SysEvent01.Evt 512 
4. AppEvent02.Evt 512 
5. SecEvent02.Evt 512 
6. SysEvent02.Evt 152 
7. AppEvent03.Evt 64 
8. SecEvent03.Evt 64 
9. SysEvent03.Evt 192 
10. AppEvent04.Evt 64 
11. SecEvent04.Evt 512 
12. SysEvent04.Evt 64 
Table G.2: Swap Files File Name and File Size 
No. Swap Files File Name File Size (KB) 
1. pagefile01.sys 1,506,576 
2. pagefile02.sys 540,672 
3. pagefile03.sys 786,432 
4. pagefile04.sys 774,144 
5. pagefile05.sys 117,760 
6. pagefile06.sys 512,000 
7. pagefile07.sys 173,648 
8. pagefile08.sys 196,608 
9. pagefile09.sys 393,216 
10. pagefile10.sys 393,216 
 




A review of the tasks carried out by five participants when they were given 
four data files from the dataset to analyse and visualise. 
Table G.3: Review of the Tasks Carried Out by Five Participants 
No. The Tasks 
Data from the 
Dataset 
Total number of tasks 
carried out by five 
people (95 tasks) 
1 The built in extensible architecture of the SAFTool (6 tasks) 
 Click File from menu no data is used  
 
6 tasks X 5 
= 30 tasks 
 
Click Analyse from Menu no data is used 
Click Visualise from Menu no data is used 
Click Report from Menu no data is used 
Click Install Plugin – EventLogPlugin.xml no data is used 
Click Install Plugin – PageFilePlugin.xml no data is used 
2 Event Logs – 3 tasks for each data (3 tasks X 3 = 9 tasks)  





9 tasks X 5 
= 45 tasks 
 
Click Visualise Event Logs AppEvent04.Evt 
SecEvent04.Evt 
SysEvent04.Evt 
Click Report Event Logs AppEvent04.Evt 
SecEvent04.Evt 
SysEvent04.Evt 
3 Pagefile – 4 tasks for each data (4 tasks X 1 = 4 tasks)  
  Click Analyse Pagefile pagefile10.sys  
4 tasks X 5 
= 20 tasks 
 
Click Visualise Pagefile pagefile10.sys 
Click Visualise Pagefile > Search 
keyword 
pagefile10.sys 
Click Report Pagefile pagefile10.sys 
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Table H.1: Event Logs File Name and File Size of File Subjects                         
in Consistency Test 
No. Event logs File Name File Size (KB) 
1. AppEvent05.Evt 64 
2. SecEvent05.Evt 64 
3. SysEvent05.Evt 128 
4. AppEvent06.Evt 64 
5. SecEvent06.Evt 64 
6. SysEvent06.Evt 64 
7. AppEvent07.Evt 64 
8. SecEvent07.Evt 64 
9. SysEvent07.Evt 256 
10. AppEvent08.Evt 192 
11. SecEvent08.Evt 64 
12. SysEvent08.Evt 512 
13. AppEvent09.Evt 192 
14. SecEvent09.Evt 512 
15. SysEvent09.Evt 128 
16. AppEvent10.Evt 64 
17. SecEvent10.Evt 64 
18. SysEvent10.Evt 64 
19. AppEvent11.Evt 64 
20. SecEvent11.Evt 64 
21. SysEvent11.Evt 128 
22. AppEvent12.Evt 64 
23. SecEvent12.Evt 64 
24. SysEvent12.Evt 64 
25. AppEvent13.Evt 64 
26. SecEvent13.Evt 64 
27. SysEvent13.Evt 64 
28. AppEvent14.Evt 64 
29. SecEvent14.Evt 64 
30. SysEvent14.Evt 64 
Table H.2: Swap Files File Name and File Size of File Subjects                         
in Consistency Test 
No. Swap Files File Name File Size (KB) 
1. pagefile11.sys 196,608 
2. pagefile12.sys 589,824 
3. pagefile13.sys 1,560,576 
4. pagefile14.sys 589,824 
5. pagefile15.sys 393,216 
6. pagefile16.sys 540,672 
7. pagefile17.sys 117,760 
8. pagefile18.sys 512,000 
9. pagefile19.sys 774,144 
10. pagefile20.sys 786,432 




Table H.3: Number of Records Retrieved for Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and 
SAFTool (First Run) 




No. of Records 
Event Viewer evtstats.pl SAFTool 
AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 112 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 58 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 347 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 262 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 123 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 260 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 370 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 139 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 1547 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 106 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 2317 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 395 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 63 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 295 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 187 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 359 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 110 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 206 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 236 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 89 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 247 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 124 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 312 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as 
corrupted. 
 




Table H.4: Number of Records Retrieved for Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and 
SAFTool (Second Run) 




No. of Records 
Event Viewer evtstats.pl SAFTool 
AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 112 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 58 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 347 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 262 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 123 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 260 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 370 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 139 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 1547 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 106 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 2317 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 395 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 63 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 295 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 187 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 359 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 110 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 206 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 236 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 89 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 247 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 124 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 312 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as 
corrupted. 
 




Table H.5: Number of Records Retrieved for Event Viewer, evtstats.pl and 
SAFTool (Third Run) 




No. of Records 
Event Viewer evtstats.pl SAFTool 
AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 112 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 58 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 347 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 262 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 123 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 260 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 370 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 139 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 1547 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 106 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 2317 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 395 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 63 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 295 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 187 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 359 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 110 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 206 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 236 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 89 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 247 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 76 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 124 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 312 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as 
corrupted. 
 




Table H.6: Processing Time for Event Viewer, lsevt.pl and SAFTool       
(First Run) 

















AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 76 112 703 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 53 58 359 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 182 347 1328 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 61 76 422 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 150 262 1281 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 87 123 719 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 148 260 1063 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 386 370 1468 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 96 139 812 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 807 1547 5906 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 76 106 453 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 839 2317 10797 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 393 395 2805.66 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 56 63 349 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 145 295 1251 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 100 187 843 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 284 359 1583.66 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 64 110 547 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 120 206 901 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 140 236 844 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 76 89 468.66 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 148 247 1067.66 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 70 76 422 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 95 124 828 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 154 312 1385.33 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as corrupted. 
 
 




Table H.7: Processing Time for Event Viewer, lsevt.pl and SAFTool     
(Second Run) 

















AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 98 112 625 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 62 58 328 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 229 347 1344 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 62 76 453 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 148 262 1187 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 87 123 625 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 150 260 1094 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 406 370 1735 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 109 139 875 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 807 1547 6031 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 78 106 453 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 864 2317 8969 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 410 395 1296 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 54 63 266 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 159 295 987 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 129 187 906 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 214 359 1688 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 68 110 516 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 120 206 844 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 143 236 922 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 76 89 453 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 145 247 1109 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 70 76 360 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 100 124 781 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 173 312 1516 
X – unable to complete the operation. The event log file is reported as corrupted. 
 
 




Table H.8: Processing Time for Event Viewer, lsevt.pl and SAFTool      
(Third Run) 

















AppEvent05.Evt 64 X 112 87 112 656 
SecEvent05.Evt 64 X 58 56 58 344 
SysEvent05.Evt 128 X 347 185 347 1500 
AppEvent06.Evt 64 X 76 78 76 437 
SecEvent06.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent06.Evt 64 X 262 150 262 1250 
AppEvent07.Evt 64 X 123 89 123 687 
SecEvent07.Evt 64 X 260 146 260 1110 
SysEvent07.Evt 256 X 370 398 370 1984 
AppEvent08.Evt 192 X 139 109 139 828 
SecEvent08.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent08.Evt 512 X 1547 800 1547 6140 
AppEvent09.Evt 192 X 106 82 106 516 
SecEvent09.Evt 512 X 2317 850 2317 9500 
SysEvent09.Evt 128 X 395 89 395 719 
AppEvent10.Evt 64 X 63 70 63 265 
SecEvent10.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent10.Evt 64 X 295 146 295 1188 
AppEvent11.Evt 64 X 187 118 187 875 
SecEvent11.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent11.Evt 128 X 359 292 359 719 
AppEvent12.Evt 64 X 110 123 110 532 
SecEvent12.Evt 64 X 206 115 206 1015 
SysEvent12.Evt 64 X 236 126 236 969 
AppEvent13.Evt 64 X 89 75 89 485 
SecEvent13.Evt 64 X 0 0 0 0 
SysEvent13.Evt 64 X 247 150 247 1016 
AppEvent14.Evt 64 X 76 70 76 422 
SecEvent14.Evt 64 X 124 96 124 953 
SysEvent14.Evt 64 X 312 159 312 1375 













Total Size of Data (bytes) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 1,598,029,824 1,598,029,824 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 603,979,776 603,979,776 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 2,145,386,496 2,145,386,496 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 805,306,368 805,306,368 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 201,326,592 201,326,592 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 553,648,128 553,648,128 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 120,586,240 120,586,240 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 524,288,000 524,288,000 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 792,723,456 792,723,456 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 402,653,184 402,653,184 
 





Total Size of Data (bytes) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 1,598,029,824 1,598,029,824 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 603,979,776 603,979,776 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 2,145,386,496 2,145,386,496 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 805,306,368 805,306,368 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 201,326,592 201,326,592 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 553,648,128 553,648,128 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 120,586,240 120,586,240 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 524,288,000 524,288,000 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 792,723,456 792,723,456 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 402,653,184 402,653,184 
 
 









Total Size of Data (bytes) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 1,598,029,824 1,598,029,824 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 603,979,776 603,979,776 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 2,145,386,496 2,145,386,496 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 805,306,368 805,306,368 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 201,326,592 201,326,592 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 553,648,128 553,648,128 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 120,586,240 120,586,240 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 524,288,000 524,288,000 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 792,723,456 792,723,456 




































Processing Time (ms) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 37 439,890 
pagefile12.sys 589,824  25 307,547 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 34  572,719 
pagefile14.sys 786,432  28 406,469 
pagefile15.sys 196,608  25 239,969 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 25 314,687 
pagefile17.sys 117,760  20 240,797  
pagefile18.sys 512,000 26 314,625 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 32 340,297 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 25 262,688 
 






Processing Time (ms) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 18 638,844 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 20 375,312 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 21 680,156  
pagefile14.sys 786,432 20 388,094 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 18 318,469 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 17 353,640 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 18 295,860 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 20 328,187 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 18 436,360 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 17 444,766 
 










Processing Time (ms) 
WinHex SAFTool 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 15  306,047 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 18 216,578 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 20 463,500  
pagefile14.sys 786,432 20 285,125 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 15 145,766 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 20 219,406 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 17 148,360 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 15 227,343 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 14 239,781 





















Table H.15: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 
Swap Files Identified by WinHex (First Run) 
Table H.16: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 












Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000    √    √    √    √    √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 








Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000    √    √    √    √    √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 




Table H.17: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 


























Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000    √    √    √    √    √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 




Table H.18: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 








Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Table H.19: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 








Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 








Table H.20: Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ Terms in 









Existence of ‘mail’, ‘from’, ‘www’, ‘html’ and ‘send’ term 
mail From www Html send 
pagefile11.sys 1,506,576 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile12.sys 589,824 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile13.sys 2,095,104 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile14.sys 786,432 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile15.sys 196,608 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile16.sys 540,672 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile17.sys 117,760 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile18.sys 512,000 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile19.sys 774,144 √ √ √ √ √ 
pagefile20.sys 393,216 √ √ √ √ √ 
 
 




A review of the tasks carried out by fifteen participants when they were given 
four data files from the dataset to analyse and visualise. 
Table H.21: Review of the Tasks Carried Out by Fifteen Participants 
No. The Tasks 
Data from the 
Dataset 
Total number of tasks 
carried out by fifteen 
people (285 tasks) 
1 The built in extensible architecture of the SAFTool (6 tasks) 
 Click File from menu no data is used  
 
6 tasks X 15 
= 90 tasks 
 
Click Analyse from Menu no data is used 
Click Visualise from Menu no data is used 
Click Report from Menu no data is used 
Click Install Plugin – EventLogPlugin.xml no data is used 
Click Install Plugin – PageFilePlugin.xml no data is used 
2 Event Logs – 3 tasks for each data (3 tasks X 3 = 9 tasks)  





9 tasks X 15 
= 135 tasks 
 
Click Visualise Event Logs AppEvent04.Evt 
SecEvent04.Evt 
SysEvent04.Evt 
Click Report Event Logs AppEvent04.Evt 
SecEvent04.Evt 
SysEvent04.Evt 
3 Pagefile – 4 tasks for each data (4 tasks X 1 = 4 tasks)  
  Click Analyse Pagefile pagefile10.sys  
4 tasks X 15 
= 60 tasks 
 
Click Visualise Pagefile pagefile10.sys 
Click Visualise Pagefile > Search 
keyword 
pagefile10.sys 

























Questionnaires on user satisfaction level with the System Generated 
Artefacts Forensic Analysis Application. 
 
Objectives of the questionnaires: 
 
1. To gain an understanding and increase the level of awareness 
surrounding the use of System Generated Artefacts in an 
investigation. 
 
2. To assess your level of satisfaction with the SAFTool’s ability to aid 
your understanding of system generated artefacts and their data 
content. 
 
3. To find out how easy you think it would be to modify and extend the 
tool.  
 
Please score the performance measures using the following criteria: 
 
Very unsatisfied = 1; Unsatisfied = 2; Fair = 3; Satisfied = 4;            
Very Satisfied = 5 
A. System Generated Artefacts are files which are created due to the 
routine operation of a computer operating system. These may be 
created without the user’s knowledge.  
 
1. Data analysis and presentation of data in the application increases 
the understanding of the main points of the system generated 
artefacts and their data content. The use of the tool highlights the 
importance of system generated artefacts. Comment please. 
 Comments  
Please Tick 
1 2 3 4 5 





2. The chosen analysis and display methods aid the understanding of 
















2 3 4 5 
 
3. Additional information annotation provided in the application aids the 
understanding of the information contained in the system generated 















2 3 4 5 
B. Information Representation 
4.  The data analysis and data visualisation easily and clearly indicate 
















2 3 4 5 




5. The data analysis and data visualisation used in the prototype help 
the user to understand the information contained in the Windows 















2 3 4 5 
C. Extensibility  
6.  In your expert opinion, and given the information provided, how easy 



















































List of Computer Forensics Tool Used: 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank You 
 
 
 
 
